

PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVES

come out of the TRANSCEND program Peaceful Conflict Transformation directed by Johan Galtung, reflecting his experience with conflict during more than half a century. Rather than critiquing-moralizing the perspectives are constructive. Most of the conflicts are geo-political, but there are also conflicts at the micro and meso levels.

A perspective is a way of looking at a conflict. They carry dates (06z stands for December 2006) and are sometimes updated, sometimes, maybe, dated. The numbering is by and large chronological.

The methodology is one-on-one dialogues with many parties, high and low, governmental and not--across the fault-lines gender-generation-race-class-nation/civilization-state/region. Guidelines: empathy with all parties, creativity, and non-violence. Peace by peaceful means.

The perspective is tripartite, Diagnosis-Prognosis-Therapy: analysis, mapping the conflict in parties, goals, and clashes and testing goals for legitimacy; forecasting what will happen without intervention and bridging legitimate goals by transcending, opening for a new reality where a sustainable solution acceptable to most may be located.

Conflict is a contradiction/clash between goals and dangerous when it leads to violent behavior and hateful attitudes. Unresolved conflict may turn very violent. But the search for acceptable and sustainable solutions is also an opportunity to create new reality. A solution is not the same as a settlement--a sheet of paper with signatures--which may or may not be a solution. Solutions are not invalid because some parties today declare them "unrealistic", meaning that they disagree. Solutions are like the seeds being sown, nurtured toward blossoming and carried by democratic dialogues of tomorrow's settlements.

This web-site is one form of communication. Another is directly with conflict parties and others, or via workshops and TRANSCEND Peace University courses on-line and on site. Some have been converted into politics; others are on the way. Many were published in Searching for Peace (with CG @ K Jacobsen, London: Pluto, 2000-02). For methods and 40 case studies see Johan Galtung, Transcend & Transform London: Pluto Boulder CO: Paradigm, 2004; in many languages.

Anybody is invited to make use of these perspectives. Thieves are most welcome - we are not in the academic quotation game. But if you quote the source it is kind of nice - - .

Peace is a relation, not a country or a person. So is conflict, so is violence, so is conflict. We get violence and war when conflict is handled badly, and peace when is handled well. But the capacity to handle a conflict relation rests with countries, persons and actors in general. A major task in today's world is to increase that capacity through a conflict transformation culture stimulating constructive, concrete, creative ideas. In a culture of peace a culture of peaceful conflict transformation is a key component.

[83] **MOROS VS CHRISTIANS IN MINDANAO: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE** [1]

Diagnosis. The conflict is nation vs dominant nation and vs government. There are 2,000 nations in 200 states, but only 20 (mono) nation-states and only 4 equitable multi-nation states--Switzerland, Belgium, India, Malaysia--under federalism. "Multi" spells diversity, which with equity spells development.

The Bangsa Moros, Muslim nation came from Malaysia-Indonesia and founded sovereign sultanates (by 1450), long before the Spanish came in 1517 fresh from ousting Muslims from Spain, and continued as Spanish colony 1567-1898, carried forward by the US attack/colony 1898-1946, and by the Republic governments from 1946, GRP. The 1968 and 1970-72 massacres by GRP and by Christian settlers-vigilantes mark tragic history giving rise to the Moro resistance organizations MNLF and MILF (Moro National/Independence Liberation Fronts), and terrorist Abu Sayyaf. An Autonomous Region of Muslims in Mindanao (ARMM) exists. But how many barangays, communities, will be included (GRP offers 600+, MILF demands 1000+)? And, how about **ancestral lands**, bringing history into a numerical plebiscite process?

[2] Prognosis: Continued struggle for independence or autonomy, violent or not, till high level autonomy is found combining numerical and historical approaches, avoiding dictatorships both by majority and minority. Costs will accumulate: dead, wounded, material damage, and money and as traumatized minds and social energy diverted from people's basic needs. More money can be made by insecurity business than by mediation. Nation and class conflicts make states less than they could be, and nations generally want to be ruled by their own kind--even when unkind.

[3] Therapy. There is an impressive, creative process of dialogues with GRP based on mutual respect, but also an absence of compelling, positive, creative visions of peace benefits. Points:

[a] Dialogue minority nation-government is needed but governments focus on cease-fire, constitution, territorial unity, disarmament and conciliation and less on solution. Dialogue with Christians is indispensable for conviviality and conciliation processes. Parallel bilateral dialogues could lead to Tripartite dialogue.

[b] In general there are three alternatives between unitary state and independence: devolution, federation and con-federation. Governments prefer devolution to set the problematic nation apart, like ARMM. But this turns them inward, not towards the neighbors.

[c] A federal solution could apply to Mindanao on a barangay basis with two autonomies sharing some power in the region, or to the RP as a whole but also on a non-territorial base with chambers of the nationalities in each part of the country with suspending veto in matters affecting them and a Constitutional Court for settlement.

[d] For the historical aspect one might consider a distinction between ownership and trusteeship, recognizing Moro ownership but Christian use under certain conditions, with RP ownership as base.

[e] For the numerical aspect BM might consider accepting the 600 barangays under plebiscite conditions, not as final settlement but subject to review after X years making it a success attracting more barangays. If a failure some might leave; openness cuts both ways. There is also the possibility of jointly steered barangays; all the time benefiting from Muslim-Christian diversity.

[f] Final democratic decisions are made by the parties concerned. But consultation in an ASEAN framework, comparing with the Aceh and Pattani processes (also former sultanates) might be helpful.

[g] Success or failure matter for the mega conflict: a West-East OIC Community Casablanca-Mindanao vs the Hindu North-South SAARC.

[h] Parallel, not before, transformation, conciliation is needed; by the German textbook method and the South African TRC. (06X)

[82] **THE NORTH KOREAN BOMB: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE** (06x)

[1] Diagnosis. 9 October 2006 North Korea test-exploded a small nuclear bomb. Why? When the USA proclaims an Axis of Evil of three countries, attacks one unleashing the killing of above half a million, may attack the second, is a nuclear No. 3 surprising? Should they wait for their turn to come? What are the goals of the Koreans and their neighbors in the Six Powers Talks? Hypotheses:

North Korea wants:

- to deter a US attack on the third "Axis of Evil" country, and to take a part of the world with them if they go under;
- bilateral talks NK-USA for a Peace Treaty normalizing N Korea, with Japan acknowledging the crimes committed 1910-1945;
- continuation of the Sunshine joint project N-S Korea policy;
- full autonomy: N Korea decides what happens inside the country

United States wants:

- no proliferation that could deter US military intervention;
- the collapse of the North Korean regime;
- peace treaty only with submissive countries (Japan, S Korea);
- N Korea stick-and-carrot steered through Six Power Talks.

Japan wants:

- to be a solidary, cooperative US ally accepting US analyses;
- a nuclear umbrella deterring possible aggressors like N Korea;
- stability in NE Asia through the Six Power Talks;
- "normalization" of Japan with A9 heavily modified.

South Korea wants:

- no war between Koreans, regretting the dangerous nuclear test;
- continuation of the Sunshine policy of joint projects;
- unification of the Korean nation first, then the two states;
- command over any war activity from S Korea including the USA.

China wants:

- to be a reasonable world leader dispensing wisdom (confucian);
- NK went beyond the permissible with the nuclear explosion;
- a buffer Korean buffer between China and US forces;
- full autonomy: China decides what happens inside the country.

Russia wants:

- to be in the talks and look important. No clear goals known.

[2] Prognosis. Nuclear advanced deployment in Japan and S Korea, some event igniting the nuclear keg, mutual genocide.

[3] Therapy. A complex goal formation with the peace treaty as key to a new reality. North Korea demands treatment as equal, the USA withholds that for several reasons and Japan toes the line. The 1962 Cuban crisis when the Soviet Union deployed nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba; the USA said this is unacceptable, and the Soviet Union turned around. Why? A deal: the Soviets pulled theirs out of Cuba and the USA theirs out of Turkey, both deployed very close to Soviet and USA mainlands. But since the deal was on equal terms and did not flow from superiority it had to be kept secret. North Korea may use the bomb for a nuclear free Korean peninsula, or, if it does not work, for a threat stalemate. This splits S Korea into those, like China, focussed on deal and stalemate, and those like the USA and Japan, focused on threat (and Russia unclear). But this is very much worth working on. Hence, consequently:

[1] Go in for both Six Power and Bilateral talks, aiming at a peace treaty in exchange for nuclear verifiable disarmament, and, if that works, also for a nuclear free Korean Peninsula.

[2] Learn from India after the Mumbai atrocity: keep calm, do nothing dramatic like nuclear-tipped missile deployment.

[3] Keep the vision of an East Asian Community alive with Japan doing its part: decent text-books and alternatives to the Yasukuni shrine dedicated to all war dead, and to future cooperation.

[81] **ALTERNATIVE JAPANESE POLICY: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (06X)**

[80] ALTERNATIVE YASUKUNI SHRINE: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

-To put to rest the souls of those who perished in the service of the state, including Class A war criminals, is an honorable duty.

-But an adequate memorial to 1931-45 should not polarize but reconcile. The Yasukuni shrine polarizes between Japan and China-Korea-other victim countries, and polarizes deeply within Japan.

-Turning those who perished in the service of the Japanese state into gods is a strong political statement. As such the Yasukuni shrine may be protected by the freedom of belief and expression.

-But visits by a Japanese Prime Minister is an act of endorsement, by the state, of that political statement and as such unacceptable. Removing the Class A war criminals will not change that fact.

-Moreover, during the period 1931-45 Japan was both perpetrator and victim. An adequate Memorial should reflect both in a balanced way.

The following TEN PROPOSALS FOR A MEMORIAL FACILITY are inspired by Memorial in Caen, Normandie, France, and the Okinawa Monument.

[1] A Memorial facility should be dedicated to all who perished by acts of war 1931-45, in the service of the state or not, Japanese, Chinese, Koreans and others, including Americans.

[2] The Memorial would address both the negative past and positive visions of a cooperative future, such as an East Asian Community. Visitors should share sorrow for the divisive past and optimism for a shared future; clearing the past and entering the future together. Only through a better future can we meaningfully overcome the past.

[3] There should be a Room of Silence for deep meditation and joint sorrow; with unifying, not divisive, texts and symbols.

[4] The Memorial itself should be religiously neutral, but open for religious and multi-religious services in the Room of Silence.

[5] Heads of State and/or Government of the countries concerned, and others, should be invited to pay their respect in the Memorial; singly or jointly, also using the Memorial for unifying statements.

[6] The Memorial should have a research center on the Pacific Hemisphere, both to understand the factors causing 1931-45 and the conditions that would make war unthinkable; and a peace museum showing the implications of war absence of war and positive peace.

[7] The Memorial should combine dignity and beauty with facilities for politicians, civil society, women and youth groups, artists and others to share the past and construct a peaceful future together.

[8] The construction of the Memorial should be based on dialogue and cooperation, not on unilateral Japanese action.

[9] A design competition among architects and others should be open to all countries concerned, with a multi-national jury.

[10] Similar Memorials might also be constructed in China, in both Koreas, and in the USA, as acts of international cooperation. (066)

[79] **HOLISTIC RECONCILIATION CAMBODIA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE** [1]

Diagnosis. Cambodia is treated extremely badly by history:

- A- structural violence by cities (Phnom Penh) on the countryside for millennia, legitimized by a Hindu caste system. A Buddhism with more horizontal solidarity eventually became state religion;
- B- Thai and Vietnamese invasions and occupations;
- C- French colonialism (part of "Indo-China") 1863, 1884, 1904-1953, partly using Vietnamese as bureaucrats;
- D- Japanese occupation interlude 1941-45;
- E- USA-Viêt Nam war 1961-75 (ending with the USA beaten 30/04), with US bombing of Cambodian countryside 1972-73 as part of the war, also directed from Phnom Penh (US Embassy and the Lon Nol regime);
- F- Khmer Rouge driving the people from cities, working, starving them to death, killing them, Vietnamese and Chinese, 1975-1979;
- G- Vietnamese invasion and occupation 1979-89, beating Khmer Rouge; the line-up in this phase being USA-NATO-Lon Nol-Singapore-Malaysia-Thailand-China-Khmer Rouge vs Viêt Nam-Soviet Union;
- H- UN/NGO international community imposing Western individualism for Western style electoral democracy by counting more than dialogue.

There seem to be two basic factors in this conflict formation:

- Cities vs countryside, with outsiders, France and their Vietnamese bureaucrats, Japan, Thailand, USA and their Cambodian allies, UN/NGO and (most?) Cambodian elites working through Phnom Penh.
- Cambodia vs neighbors (not Laos) and colonizers France, Japan, USA. Seen in this perspective the Khmer Rouge was an exception: the countryside was hitting back. Of course, to explain is not to excuse. But, why not earlier? And when, and how, will it happen next time?

[2] Prognosis. Of all atrocities F has been chosen for punitive justice, with the UN-Cambodian tribunal--the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia--starting summer 2006. The powers that be have tilted the game that way and can celebrate their reconfirmation. However, given the enormous atrocities let punitive justice be done. But, there will be no reconciliation, little or no feeling of closure and healing when the few Khmer Rouge leaders alive after a lengthy court process are sentenced. Unlimited delay seems to be the Cambodian reconciliation approach as they know the total reality better than foreigners who use one horror, F, to conceal all others. The leading process is the process preferred by the leading powers.

[3] Therapy. More meaningful may be a South Africa style Truth and Reconciliation process, a Rwanda style ga-ca-ca confrontation, a Polynesian ho'o pono pono for restorative justice, or German-style school textbooks written by the victims, not by self-appointed judges with crooked axes to grind. However, adding to that, imagine Phnom Penh, French, Japanese, US, Chinese, UN elites apologizing for exploiting the Cambodian countryside, killing them in various ways, tricking them politically, and/or invading them culturally. Imagine a monument dedicated to all the victims of all these atrocities, all these acts of commission, and the acts of omission by doing nothing, letting it happen, including supporting anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge.

Imagine a memorial, a peace museum, dedicated to the past and even more so to the future, where common citizens, mindful of what happened, also can articulate their dreams and hopes for better distribution city-countryside, and sustainable peace with neighbors. With a more rational, Mekong Delta, cooperative relation to Viêt Nam.

Not impossible in a city where the river flows both ways, where Mao Zedong boulevard meets Eisenhower Avenue meets Charles de Gaulle Avenue, and where at some time electoral contenders got one prime minister and one minister each in relevant ministries. What is most needed now is a process for holistic reconciliation and peace.(065)

[78] HOLISTIC RECONCILIATION TURKEY/ARMENIA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Diagnosis. A horrible massive category killing of Armenians happened in Turkey in 1915, whether referred to as genocide or not. No effort to contextualize should be construed as justification, but might lead to some efforts to get out of the present deadlock of 90 years of denial, and broken relations between Turkey and Armenia.

Turkey was ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary against France, England and later the USA. The Ottoman Empire was in an old age crisis, overextended and behind politically, militarily, economically and culturally. The loyalty of minorities, including the Armenians, was of the essence. The Armenian minority, high up economically as bankers and merchants, and culturally as intellectuals was rank discordant with the Turkish majority that dominated politically and militarily and in the agricultural sector. High correlation between class and nation usually lead to mutual prejudice and discrimination, and is, in fact, even a recipe for massive category killing.

Another minority, the Kurds, ranked low on all these dimensions. Did high-ranking Turks offer low-ranking Kurds freedom as reward for eliminating cross-ranking Armenians? Freedom they did not get, but many places where Armenians lived in East Turkey Kurds live today.

At the same time something similar was happening in the Ottoman Empire. The English and French foreign ministers Sykes and Picot, in negotiations with the Russians (as revealed in 1917 by Russian revolutionaries) offered the Arabs freedom if they raised against the Ottoman Empire. They did, and freedom they did not get. They were colonized instead: Syria and Lebanon by France, Palestine and Iraq by England (with Palestine later divided into Jordan, Israel and a mini-Palestine); all carved out of the Ottoman Empire. Who learnt from whom may be the wrong question, they both sprang from imperial divide et impera mentalities. But England, France and USA were winners and Turkey, German and Austria losers. Sympathy goes to the victims of the losers more than to the victims of the winners.

[2] Prognosis. Turkey westernized under Kemal Atatürk and is now negotiating for EU membership. Turkey, like Germany, must come clean by acknowledging what happened, even if no similar demand has been made on such colonial powers as EU members England, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Denmark--and Germany for its massacre of the Hereros in Namibia. The prognosis is that a formula will be found because it has to be found. The massacres by those others will also emerge from the dark shadows of history.

[3] Therapy. Turkey has to acknowledge the fact of massive category, with a right to invoke circumstances like those mentioned. They are disturbingly similar to the German-Jewish situation, with the Zionist declaration of war on Germany, German Jews occupying a niche similar to the Armenians, and German Lumpen-proletariat playing the role of the Kurds. But Germany acknowledged, as must Turkey, and the EU colonial powers, and non-EU like Russia, Japan and the USA.

The German model of rewriting school textbooks serves well to pin norms against massive category killing on the human conscience. So would memorials and peace museums also dedicated to the future.

The Turkey-Armenia issue is closely linked to Turkey-Kurdistan and Armenia-Azerbaijan by numerous and tight ties, for bad and for good. A good compensation could take the form of strong regional cooperation, an open border community with separate status for Nagorno-Karabagh (and Armenia withdrawing from some parts presently occupied), and promotion of Kurdish autonomy. Much of this must be underwritten by Turkey--like Germany in an EU mostly of countries once occupied; for their own sake. And how about Ararat as common heritage, a natural monument to peace?

Statesmanship is needed. And Turkey has that commodity (065).

[77] RECONCILING GERMANY/HERERO: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (062)

[1] Diagnosis. As a part of the German colonization of Southwest Africa--today Namibia--the Prussian Army under General von Trotha in 1904 exterminated between 45-65,000 of the Herero and Nama peoples who resisted the German rule; with no mercy shown even to women and children. In addition to direct killing many were forced into the desert and died from thirst and starvation; others died from brutality in forced labor camps. The issue is important also because it was a precursor to what happened under German Nazism, indicative of deeper roots in German history.

Germany has contributed to a historical museum to commemorate what happened. But at the inauguration on 14 August 2004 the German minister of technical assistance was told that the statement from the German parliament was insufficient. It did not contain the word "apology" but "deeply felt regrets and its sorrow to the suppressed African peoples", words that could also apply to natural disasters. There is much about protests in the German Parliament of 1906 (evidently too late), and that the resistance of the Africans continued (one reading: the suppression was not that harsh).

The word "apology" was also absent from the minister's speech, but "we Germans accept our historical and moral responsibility and the guilt incurred by Germans at that time" comes close. There was also a plea for forgiveness "in the words of the Lord's Prayer that we share", and "remembrance is the key to reconciliation." (no, a clear apology is). There was acknowledgment of the fact, no denial; but still not satisfactory. The Hereros also felt that a real apology has to come from the German head of state or government.

Some additional complicating factors, not unique to this case:

- the Hereros had launched a court case in New York against the German state, pitting a legal defense with no guilt-admission against a reconciliation where guilt-admission is of the essence;
- Namibia has a policy of equal treatment of all peoples in the country making any compensation directly to the Herero problematic;
- funds directly to the government may be diverted for other ends;
- funds directly to the Herero leadership may also be diverted;
- England and France, fellow European Union members, with more history of colonialism and massacres, are against guilt-admission.

[2] Prognosis. The case could drag on, hoping it will be forgotten; or suddenly be solved through high level German action.

[3] Therapy. Something has to be done, not only for the sake of Germany-Herero relations but for Western Europe-Africa relations in general. A number of EU members were colonial powers in Africa (UK, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Denmark) meaning that EU is also, as such, involved in the issue. Some approaches:

- the German apology, with that word, from the highest level, should be forthcoming with no further delay. The wording would have to be negotiated between the parties in advance;
- two or more wrongs do not make one right; other colonial powers will have to face the same problem, and find their solutions;
- a history museum in Berlin, like for shoa, also taking up the precursor theme that runs against the idea that Nazism was merely an aberration with clear beginning and end, might be useful;
- a joint German-Namibian school textbook commission could possibly arrive at a joint text that could be used in both countries;
- the compensation could take many forms, and the proposals from the German Parliament are creative.
- scholarships to students from the victim peoples may compensate; - better terms of trade or products from Herero/Namibia into Germany is and remains a major way of negating colonialism.

[76] RECONCILING DENMARK-ISLAM: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (062)

[1] Diagnosis. The Danish Jyllandsposten published 30 September 2005 12 cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed (also the Norwegian Magazinet). They were offensive by being provocatively malicious, with stereotypical, polarizing ideas of Islam = Bombing. Whereas Islamic nation (the ummah) is divided, mainly by the West, into states, the West consists of more or less multi-cultural states with Christianity dominant. Had the act been committed by a Muslim it would have been high treason against the ummah; committed by a non-Muslim it is at least highly offensive, like insulting somebody's mother and father, or depicting Jesus Christ and Virgin Mary as Abu Ghraib torturers.

Publication was justified by freedom of expression, a key human right. But in "April 2003 a Danish illustrator submitted a series of unsolicited cartoons offering a lighthearted take on the resurrection of Christ to the Danish newspaper Jyllandsposten. They were rejected, the Sunday editor saying: "I don't think Jyllandsposten's readers will enjoy the drawings. As a matter of fact, I think they will provoke an outcry. Therefore I will not use them" (The Nation, 27 February 2006, p. 4). Thus, the idea that offense to human feelings by intruding into their private space sets limits to the freedom of expression was not unknown, exposing the Danes to accusations of unequal treatment, against the Golden Rule and against Kantianism. This was then exacerbated by the Danish Prime Minister's refusal to enter into dialogues (a) with Muslims in Denmark (200,000 in a population of 5,3 million), (b) 11 ambassadors from Arab countries and (c) the Secretary-General of the OIC, the Organization of the Islamic conference, with 57 member countries, indirectly with 1.3 billion Muslim members, referring to the newspaper's freedom of expression.

[2] Prognosis. The triple conflict of offensive depictions, dialogue refusal and unequal treatment--seen as racism where "social distance" might be a better general term--led to a strong reactio. Economic boycott, burning of flags and embassies, complaints to the UN, were directed against a state involved through the major acts of omission by its Prime Minister. But this must also be seen against the background of West vs Palestine and West vs Iraq, with Denmark as highly articulate in its pro-Western stance. Even more important is how the "cartoon issue" will feed into the other conflicts and make them even more intractable long after the cartoons are forgotten.

[3] Therapy. The Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (Cordoba Foundation) in Geneva hosted a mediation between high ranking Danish and Middle East delegations 13/02/06. As the initial causes were past commission and omission acts, our approach included reconciliation, which means closing the past and opening for a better future. The former implies an apology. The standard Western "We deeply regret that you found this offensive" borders on an insult, placing the onus on Other. Three apology elements: [a] Acknowledging: I/we-the Danish government-did something wrong.

[b] Describing: what was wrong (formulations to be negotiated):

- dialogue refusal, even three times, at three levels;

- failure to demarcate border line/zone between freedom of expression and offense, better understood as libel in domestic law, but poorly understood in international law in a globalizing world;

[c] Projecting: self-improvement to improve the relations, like multiple public dialogues for youth, clerics, politicians, with the Danish government; a commission of jurists, theologians and others to explore the limits of freedom of expression; and support for the Spanish-Turkish initiated UN supported alliance of civilizations.

[75] RECONCILING JAPAN/CHINA-KOREA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Diagnosis. Japan is in a crisis, mainly of its own making, with China, the Koreas, and other neighbors. The issue is Japanese failure to clean up the past, removing from the political agenda Japanese atrocities like genocide, slave labor, forced prostitution and robbery during the Pacific War. This is indispensable for East Asia to follow the general world trend toward regionalization of geographical and cultural neighbors, like the European Union, the African Union, the South Asian Community SAARC and the Southeast Asian Community ASEAN. The potentials for an East Asian Community, including Taiwan, both Koreas, Okinawa & the Northern Territories, are huge. But those shadows of the past, and the textbook and Yasukuni Shrine issues, darken the future. The visits of the Japanese Prime Minister to a shrine dedicated to uniformed war dead, also Class A war criminals, has been compared to a German chancellor repeatedly visiting a monument dedicated to Hitler &c: The German European Union membership would be suspended.

On the other hand, the early admission of Germany to the EC, later EU, unopposed by the USA as bulwark against communism, paved the way for German reconciliation by solving conflicts with neighbors so well. And yet it took two decades from German membership in the Coal and Steel Community (1950) and in the Common Market (1958) for the textbook approach to reconciliation and Willy Brandt's genuflection in the Warsaw ghetto (1970).

Conflict resolution without reconciliation will leave the past as a festering wound, and reconciliation without conflict resolution is tantamount to pacification. The experience is that the two have to go hand in hand. But the USA always opposed any closeness to "Mainland China" and North Korea.

[2] Prognosis. The conflict over the two issues could easily escalate beyond demonstrations, diplomatic ruptures and economic boycotts. But the major impact is the loss of positive peace opportunities. There is trade, but with some exceptions no blooming and deepening of relations. The raw material for an East Asian Community is not there, today. Japan's inability and unwillingness to acknowledge what happened, even if there are some buts and howevers, makes Japan an outsider to East Asia. Japan is increasingly treated by the others as outside the kaya, the coziness of the shared mosquito net. What Japan risks is not so much war as exclusion. China turns to a more interesting economic giant, India, will probably spawn China style economies in North Korea and Myanmar, and build bridges to ASEAN and SAARC rather than to Japan. Japan may turn to 3A, the Anglo-American-Australian, community, hoping to be accepted as honorary member, but may also fall between two chairs rather than being a bridge.

[3] Therapy. For the textbook issue there is a clear model for Japan to emulate, Germany. But for the Yasukuni Shrine a new approach has to be found; there is no clear model anywhere. And there is more at stake than non-provocative, peaceful relations with China and Korea. There is the perennial problem of any war: for what did they perish? "Putting their souls to rest" is a step in search of that meaning. One may be against the war, not only against losing it. But not to honor those who lost their lives is a grave act of violence to them, and to the bereaved.

Whereas Greater East Asia concept of military Japan was vertical, with Japan at the apex, an East Asian Community would have to be egalitarian. The Yasukuni shrine, respecting only uniformed Japanese lives endorses that military concept. Hence, an alternative has to be found, and the matter is urgent. (05Y)

[74] RECONCILING MYANMAR PAST/FUTURE: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Diagnosis Myanmar is richly endowed, but much less than it could be after successively failed attempts at building a modern country of disparate communities with a democratic governance, a dynamic economy, and positive ethnic relations. But there is also a broad consensus for non-disintegration of the Union of Myanmar; for establishing democracy as way of governance; for developing a modern, prosperous economy; for peaceful life within the union with no discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender, religion; and for safeguarding national autonomy, becoming a client state neither of former colonial powers, nor neighbors India-China, nor the USA.

However, there is also deep distrust between the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, the government) and much of the population around such issues as high prices and inflation, meeting basic needs and increasing disparity, transportation, energy and environmental difficulties, drugs and trafficking in general, and pandemics. Indeed also over issues of democracy and human rights. And: Myanmar is bogged down by a deeper conflict, not over how and when, but over time itself, over the past and the future.

[2] Prognosis Outside pressure to get Myanmar on a path of reforms has proven to be counterproductive, forcing the government to withdraw from engagement with the world, even including ASEAN, damaging Myanmar's integration into positive political processes in the region, a crucial factor for the people of Myanmar to succeed in building democracy, economic development and sustainable ethnic co-existence. Pressure is likely to foster a bunker-"laager" mentality, and to hit the most vulnerable in the society already suffering from severe basic needs deficits. Myanmar is a proud, well endowed country with much longer history than some of those exercising such pressures. Creating opportunities for Myanmar to interact with, and be exposed to, internationally accepted norms of political and human rights--not isolation--have led to emergence of moderate voices and spaces within Myanmar's political elite.

[3] Therapy The key to Myanmar's success lies in drawing on the many positive elements the country is fortunate to have. A blossoming Myanmar with the participation of everybody in creative dialogues, with nobody having monopoly on truth--the essence of democracy--could be within reach. For this to happen there has to be a new beginning, closing the past and opening the future.

The parties in Myanmar could make two deals--not necessarily explicit--one about the past, and one about the future, understood as useful rules of conduct to get out of the current deadlock:

As to the past: Myanmar has spiritual resources which allow people to forgive, if not forget. A recognition by the SPDC that mistakes have been made, and an agreement by all parties to commit such issues to history and "put them behind us" should be feasible.

As to the future: There also has to be some recognition of Government achievements, like keeping Myanmar autonomous, providing internal security, and constructing an infra-structure with little external assistance since 1988. Building on this all parties have to come up with detailed maps of the future for a joint process toward democracy by democratic means to be charted; including:

- how to involve the general public in a process toward democracy by use of more print and electronic media;
- an open dialogue over the role of the private and public sectors in providing safety nets for all citizens;
- an open dialogue over advantages and disadvantages of unitary state, devolution and federation;
- easy, inexpensive promotion of knowledge of two, even three, Myanmar and neighbor languages for as many as possible. (05y-065)

[73] RECONCILING USA-UK/IRAN: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (064)

[1] Diagnosis There are obvious similarities to USA-UK vs Iraq, but possibly less obvious that UK will follow suit or even play a major role (like "The Downing Street Memorandum") this time.

The goals of the USA seem to be diverse, like these nine:

- regime change, like in 1953, possibly also to reinstate the Shah family, again assuming Iranians will be receptive;
- Middle East political control, fearing that control is slipping from USA-Israel to Iran-Hizbollah-Hamas and radical shia Islam;
- revenge for the 52 hostages-444 days humiliation 1979-81;
- eliminating any Iranian threat to the US-UK Iraq construction;
- eliminating any Iranian threat to Israel, nuclear or not, given the statements by president Ahmadi Najad;
- securing Iranian oil flow at affordable prices;
- protecting the use of dollars against euros for oil trade;
- expanding further the military bases encircling Russia-China;
- eliminating any Iranian nuclear weapon capability;

The last goal is the public text, the others are subtexts. That text may also be a pretext, for public consumption, and like WMD-AI Qaeda connection for the case of Iraq without real substance.

Iran's public text is the NPT right to enrich uranium up to industrial grade, e.g. to diversify energy.

Subtext goals include:

- never more 1953! sovereignty, no more humiliation/intervention;
- surrounded by 3 nuclear powers and 3 more, USA/Israel/France, threatening, keeping the nuclear option is understandable;
- with the dollar falling opting for the euro is understandable;
- Islamic/shia solidarity in an Islamic world divided by the West;
- an open, high level dialogue of civilizations with the West.

[2] Prognosis. There is enough raw material here to be processed into a war if so wanted, with air strikes without Security Council authorization (economic sanctions may hurt the West more than Iran). But, can Bush afford it economically and Blair politically? The answer is probably no. And, air strikes may lead to attacks on US-UK soil by major bombs assembled in US-UK for remote detonation. A ground attack would make the resistance in Iraq look like a tea party; an opportunity probably welcomed by many in Iran. Closing the Strait of Hormuz is a minor part of the response.

[3] Therapy. The keys to acceptable and sustainable ways out are in the subtexts, not in the texts. In the text focus, uranium enrichment, IAEA inspection might be helpful. But it is difficult to see why Iran should submit when Israel, India and Pakistan have enriched up to weapons grade and gotten away with it. Unless, that is, USA reverses its Israel-India policy, like it did during the 1962 Cuba crisis by the tit-for-tat of taking US missiles out of Turkey.

It is a sad reflection on the spiritual poverty of the West that the obvious way out is not traveled: Bush-Blair acknowledging the CIA-MI6 overthrow of a legally elected prime minister, Mossadegh, and support of 25 years Shah autocracy; calling for a joint fact-finding historical commission, preparing an apology. And Bush-Blair accepting the invitation by the former Iran president, Khatami, to a high level, open dialogue, also using the Spanish-Turkish-UN Alliance of Civilizations for that purpose. Needless to say, recognition of some truths is needed to clean up the past before turning to the pragmatics of opening for a cooperative, peaceful future.

Do that, and almost for sure the negotiation road would open up, including over what kind of Israel Iran might recognize, like, for instance, the Israel of 4 June 1967 (today's Israel certainly not).

The onus is on the West. Only the weak cannot admit mistakes of the past. Is Anglo-America strong enough? Or are they still so addicted to belligerence that they prefer another major mistake?

[72] **RECONCILING USA-UK/IRAQ: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE** (056)

[1] Diagnosis Comparing the illegal war in Iraq with Viêt Nam is accurate as to the inability of the US war machine to cope with a people's war. But whereas the Viêt Nam nation had been brutally divided into two states and managed to get together by and large flawlessly after the US withdrawal, Iraq consists of nations brutally forced together by external and internal aggressors into one state before, and indeed after, the decline and fall of the Ottoman empire.

Most of the analysis of why the war took place is about politics and crafty lobbying, about lies and tactical errors. But just as important is a focus on deep culture. US proclivity for dualistic thinking, inspired by fundamentalist Christianity and pure stupidity, made them unable to see that a majority of non-Kurdish Iraqis could be against both Saddam and US attack/occupation. And it is deeply regrettable that the suffering of the bereaved, Iraqis and US, is not a major factor in the discourse. Neither flaw is easily changed.

[2] Prognosis A People's War of resistance to the attack was the strategy from the beginning, shedding and burning uniforms, dressing and living among people in general, advancing and retreating when the USA/UK retreat and advance; some factions being more active and articulate than others. Like Norwegian communists during the German occupation 1940-45 no doubt hoping to be amply rewarded with major power after the war, and like them probably in vain. But who has the longest time perspective and the lowest vulnerability wins, and that is not USA-UK; they never had any chance.

[3] Therapy Illegality, immorality, inoperationality point in the same direction: pull out the (increasingly unwilling) coalition forces, particularly USA-UK, and their military bases. Necessary, but as insufficient as leaving a badly mistreated patient, even worse off than before the "treatment". Something X has to be added; like X1-9:

X1: A **Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East**, CSCME, modeled on the Helsinki conference 1973-75, with Iraq, Iran, Kurdistan, Israel/Palestine on the agenda; all inextricably linked. A ceasefire is not a condition to get started, but would be helpful.

X2: The UN Security Council alone cannot keep Iraq secure and stable given the absence of Muslim veto powers and inhuman sanctions. OIC, parliamentary democracies like Turkey and Indonesia, European non-belligerents--France-Germany-Spain-Belgium--and India might help.

X3: Iraq is fact and non-fact, with centripetal and centrifugal forces. Iraq as a unitary state is not a goal in itself. A federation or even confederation, an "Iraqi Community", would be more realistic.

X4: Iraqi Kurds should be free to develop their relations with Kurds in Syria, Turkey and Iran, with human rights and some autonomy in all four, and as open borders as possible. The totality of these autonomies could be "Kurdistan". Guarantees for Turkmen is essential.

X5: Iraqi Shia Arabs should be free to develop their relations to Shia Arabs in Iran (Khuzistan); with a similar flexible model.

X6: Iraqi Sunnis (4 out of 18 provinces, but they are all mixed) might be supported internationally, given insufficient oil revenue and deeply rooted conflicts both with both Kurds and shias.

X7: Self-determination serves better than borders imposed by foreigners; autonomy forces will only grow by being resisted anyhow.

X8: A process of Truth and Reconciliation, with a fact-finding commission broadly composed, not only USA-UK and Iraq, and, then

X9: Imagine, just imagine, that USA-UK summons the decency to:

- apologize unconditionally for the 2003 attack and its aftermath;
- compensate materially for civilian and military, coalition and Iraqi, human and material damages due to the war. While waiting for this miracle the task passes to the decent elements of the world. They exist in Islam. Do they also exist in the Christian West?

[71] **RECONCILING ANGLO-AMERICA/ARABIA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE** [1]

Diagnosis USA-UK will here be compared with Spain, being similar in the gross violences of 9/11, 07/07 and 11M but different in the discourse and action chosen: security for USA/UK, conflict handling for Spain. Violence takes place in space and time; divided into here (USA-UK-Spain) and there (Arab countries), and into now (the present) and then (the past). That also applies to conflicts:

	HERE	THERE
NOW	9/11-07/07-11M <u>Integration</u> problems	<u>General</u> : Iraq, Israel-Palestine <u>Special for Spain</u> : Ceuta-Melilla <u>War</u> and <u>Mediation</u> problems
THEN		<u>Colonial traumas</u> : 1945-1916-1925 <u>Conciliation</u> problems

One cell is empty as colonialism came to the Arabs, not vice versa.

Underlying is the complex relation Christianity/West-Islam with the obvious implication: civilization dialogue. This gives six aspects:

- [1] Problems immigrants/host country: Integration
- [2] War: Army withdrawal from the arena, or from offensive action
- [3] Ongoing general conflicts West-Arab countries: Mediation
- [4] Ongoing special conflicts West-Arab countries: Mediation
- [5] Colonialism with its particularly traumatic events: Conciliation
- [6] Civilization-religion relations: Dialogue. **Traumas spelt out:**

1945: the treaty between USA/Roosevelt and Saudi Arabia/Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, giving the USA the right to exploit the oil resources and the duty to protect the Royal House against its own Wahhab people;

1916: the Sykes/Picot treason, the UK/French foreign ministers who promised the Arabs freedom if they raised against the Ottoman Empire. They did and were colonized; UK took Palestine (later Israel, Jordan and Palestine) and Iraq, France took Syria and Lebanon. Then came the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and 1918 the end of the Ottoman Empire.

1925: French planes with US pilots, paid by Spain, ordered by General Francisco Franco bombing Xauen-Morocco, killing many civilians. Italy started bombing civilians in 1911 in Libya; then the UK in Iraq 1922. The conflict is 95% history. The perpetrator forgets, the victim not. [2] Prognosis The violence will continue till steps are taken to mediate the here-there,now and reconcile the there,then.

[3] Therapy Spain worked on 4 of the 6, USA on 0 and UK on 0:

Zapatero legitimized close to half a million illegal Moroccans if they could prove employment; withdrew the army from Iraq eliminating mutual killing as factor in the conflict; his first visit abroad was to King Mohammed VI, also Ceuta-Melilla (like Hong Kong with one flag down, another up, one garrison out, another in, the rest remaining as it was, also for Gibraltar?), and organized with Turkey the first dialogue West-Islam Madrid 28/10/2005. No known mediation in Iraq and Israel/Palestine, nor conciliation for the past. Nevertheless a brilliant record, and a guide for others. More attacks in Spain seem unlikely, more attacks in USA and UK highly likely.

What could be four feasible implications of this for the UK?

As to integration: integration into agenda-setting, opinion-production and policy-making; debate, free and public, about all issues, from "now and here" via "now and there" to "then and there". As to the situations in Iraq and Israel-Palestine: stop killing and torture, start negotiating in a Helsinki Conference type setting.

As to past conflicts/traumas: appoint a Royal Commission on 1916 -17 and the consequences, with UK and Arab historians. History did not start on 9/11, nor on 07/07, nor on 11M. Give history a voice. As to Christianity-Islam: let 1000 public dialogues blossom. (05Y)

[70] EUROPEAN UNION-DEMOCRACY-PEACE: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Diagnosis.

Democracy. The EU is accused of a "democracy deficit" which was highly visible in the draft European Constitution process. The draft has been described as written by and for lawyers, or by and for eurocrats, endorsing, particularly in Articles 115-448, major points in EU directorate politics. The draft departs from constitutions by being very long, incomprehensible and very detailed while at the same short on gender equality, on social and labor rights, which belong in a Constitution. And then it subordinates politics to the European Central Bank, EU to NATO and imposes military budget increases, which do not belong. A constitution does not endorse concrete politics, but human rights and the rules for deciding concrete politics.

In addition referendum was only certain in the Western part of Western Europe; in for instance Germany and Italy not. Spain left to celebrities like the soccer champion Zidane to sell it without debate. The only democratic aspect was a conscious public opinion in France and Netherlands, to the left and the right; France rejecting May 29 2005 by 55% (71% among the unemployed), and Netherlands June 1 by 62%. Highly undemocratic was the EU leadership response, accusing them of being anti-EU in general and against the prospect of Turkey as a member in particular (the Eurobarometer showed that Turkey mattered for only 6% in France and 3% in the Netherlands; and both countries are very pro-EU).

The EU leadership should have respected democracy at work and thanked the people for saving them from a bad draft, solicited their opinion and invited them into a new process. Instead the process is now on ice till 2009.

Peace. The European Union is rightly seen as a peace community with internal inter-state war highly unlikely; in addition to being able to accommodate Germany after the Nazi atrocities. The problem is whether that peace-building capacity is extended to the rest of a world tormented by Capitalism vs Alternative economies, State terrorism vs Non-state terrorism, State vs Nation, Christianity vs Islam, and USA vs West vs Rest. The EU seems by and large to side with the first alternative, with a positive opening for Christianity vs Islam expressed in the EU-OIC dialogues February 2002, half a year after 9/11. But EU has an extensive list of "terrorist" organizations that precludes neutrality. With 11 of EU members being former colonial powers spheres of interest cover much of the non-European world. Subordination to USA, accepting the US way of looking at the world, comes easily when only a few smaller members are non-NATO.

[2] Prognosis. When it comes to peace: US policies will be followed to the extent that when the US Empire crumbles the EU is willing and capable of being new superpower and world hegemon. When it comes to democracy: that it will be limited not to stand in the way of such goals; the draft constitution paving the way.

[3] Therapy. The EU launches itself as a peace superpower, available as mediator and conciliator and as a model for others, like in the Middle East for Israel and border states, with a military capacity adjusted to that intention, and a defensive defense. For operation beyond that, subordination to the UNSC and systematic work for good relations to other regions, like the AU, SAARC and ASEAN, and the Latin American, Islamic (like the OIC, from Casablanca to Mindanao) and East Asian Communities in the making. The EU should not impose democracy anywhere but practice it, also by respecting all parties to conflicts. Including among EU member states. And including with their own peoples. (061)

**[68] MEN vs WOMEN: DIRECT, STRUCTURAL, CULTURAL VIOLENCE:
A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (05Y)**

[67] **2000 NATIONS vs 200 STATES: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (05Y)**

**[66] ALLIANCE vs CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS:
A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (05X)**

[65] **CHIAPAS: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (054)**

[1] Diagnosis This conflict molecule has 18 conflict atoms:

MILITARY: EZLN vs Mexican Army; Confrontations with para-military;

POLITICAL: Local Autonomies vs State Government; NGOs vs Government National/state conflicts in the PAN-PRI-PRD triangle

ECONOMIC: Basic needs vs market economy; Primary vs Secondary/Tertiary sector economy

CULTURAL: Indigenous religions vs Christianity; Catholic vs Protestant (evangelical) Christianity; Indigenous languages vs Spanish

SOCIAL (LOCAL AND NATIONAL): Indigenous vs Mestizo; Women vs Men;

Poor vs Rich; Rural vs Urban

INTERNATIONAL: USA vs Mexico (history, drugs, migrants); US-Mexican government-corporate elites vs People of Mexico; Mexico-Centroamerica (history, drugs, migrants); Mexico-CentroAmerica vs the Maya People

The first 14 conflicts are in the day-to-day reality of Chiapas, and the last 4 are an important backdrop. A key characteristic of the Chiapas conflict syndrome is very high criss-cross, or entropy

[2] **Prognosis.** Predictions derived from this holistic approach:

There will be no big violence pitting two major groups against each other, but possibly many small violencies. The short duration of the January 1994 war and the relative calm is less due to any policy than to a general depolarization that probably is stable.

The whole society is fluid, people will move in and out of some of the combinations and strong persons will convert disequilibria into social mobility so that there will be many small changes. But major changes for large groups are unlikely. High entropy = low energy. The political energy has to come from the outside.

A system like this is easily manipulated from above and from the outside as there will not be a united society against manipulation, nor a highly polarized society with one party mobilizing against the outside. A structurally depolarized society like this would absorb pressure from the outside with much hatred and hostile action, but at the micro and local, not meso and macro levels. The system has a high level of stability pleasing to those who prefer little change.

[3] **Therapies.** Unless major events or political initiatives at the national and/or state level generate major energies, the best therapy would be many small steps for as many conflicts as possible: withdrawal of armed forces, mediation for conflict transformation, dialogue, culture of peace; appropriate and traditional technologies for basic needs satisfaction in food, nutrition, housing, clothing, health and education, energy; more self-reliance and more exchange within networks of local autonomies; removal of prejudices between NGOs and governmental actors; strong nonformal economy, mix primary-secondary-tertiary sector economy; religious dialogues, bilingualism, Massive education for indigenous and women, quotas; Much more focus on uplift of the poor; more urban culture to rural life; USA-Mexico reconciliation for the war of 1846-48 with high quotas for Mexicans to settle in their old territories; a **Plan USA** to reduce US drug consumption; economic boycott of US goods if neoliberal initiatives sharpen conflicts and broaden gaps; higher quotas for Mexico-Centro America resettlement, human rights for Maya people all over, flexible autonomous regions for the Maya and a confederation of those regions, not changing inter-state borders but giving double identities as Mayans and Mexicans, Mayans-Guatemalans might form a Republica Maya.

SUMMARY: **PRIORITIES TO LOCAL COMMUNITY AUTONOMY, BASIC NEEDS, INDIGENOUS AND WOMEN RIGHTS, INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE, BILINGUALISM, CHIAPAS INTERESTS AND CHIAPANECO NEEDS, AND TO A CULTURE OF PEACE.**

The point of gravity in the syndrome varies in space, and changes over time. People in Chiapas focus on military and political events like the outbreak of violence and ceasefire in [1]-[2], and the 2006 elections in [5] rather than on economic, cultural, social, international formations that are static or at most glacially dynamic. There are some rapid changes, though, like in [3] and [9], maybe [15]-[16]. Most static is the underlying social formation with the indigenous woman, poor and rural at the bottom, abused, exploited, suppressed; in a formation mainly run by mestizo men, rich and urban. **IWPR vs MMRU.**

THE CHIAPAS CONFLICT SYNDROME II AS ONE COMPLEX CONFLICT

How do elementary conflict "atoms" inter-connect, in Chiapas, or anywhere? Two answers: by allocation, and by causation.

Take [11] and [1] as an example. How are indigenous and mestizos allocated to EZLN and to the Army? If EZLN were only indigenous and the Army only mestizo we would get maximum structural polarization and minimum entropy, "high entropy" meaning disorder, mix, chaos. In fact both groups are found in both military formations, meaning high entropy and low structural polarization. Another word for that inter-connection is criss-cross, which in no way excludes high attitudinal and behavioral polarization--hatred and little or no contact--along [11] and [1]).

If we take the 14 Chiapas conflicts there is for every human 2 possibilities on 13 of them and 3 on [5], meaning $2^{13} \times 3 = 24,576$ combinations. Allocate 4 million Chiapanecos and the empty cells would be few. Or, so is the hypothesis.

On the other hand, imagine complete polarization: all IWPR are in EZLN, in the autonomias, in non-governmental organizations and all MWRU are in or for the army and the extra-official military, in and for the government and so on. The former group is in the basic needs primary sector and the latter in the market and secondary or tertiary sector. But reality is very far from that.

At the same time there is also a causal relation between [11] and [1]. The indigenous are not only at the bottom, particularly the women, but are also the victims of broken promises like the betrayed San Andres agreements of 1996. In other words, the social position in one formation may lead to a behavioral position in another, like "taking up arms". Said differently: two contradictions are causally related if the sharpening/blunting of one leads to the sharpening/blunting of the other.

The 18 conflicts give us $1/2 \times 18 \times 17 = 153$ pair. There are many causal connections, in both directions, linear, circular, what not. This exercise can be simplified by dividing the conflicts, very roughly, into two sets, the Center and Periphery of the causal web of conflicts. In the Center are the primary conflicts that carry most of the causal burden, and in the Periphery the secondary conflicts that are more effects than causes.

Another key characteristic of the Chiapas conflict syndrome is the multiplicity of primary conflicts, not only one, such as:

- Political: autonomias vs government
- Economic: basic needs vs market
- Social: Indigenous vs Mestizo; Women vs Men
- Cultural: traditional vs Christian, Catholic vs Evangelical
- Cultural: Indigenous vs Spanish
- International: US-Mexican Elites vs the People
- International: Mexican-Centro American elites vs the Maya

According to this hypothesis the crucial factors are the level of autonomy relative to governmental power, the level of priority given to a basic needs economy, race, gender, the cultural contradictions introduced by the Conquista, and elite vs people contradictions involving the countries to the North and the South. The military confrontation EZLN-Army is derivative and will be reproduced if the primary basic contradictions are not addressed, particularly the basic needs. Social antagonisms, like poor/rich, rural/urban and party struggle also derive from this.

First, some predictions for the 18 conflicts:

I MILITARY

- [1] EZLN vs the Mexican Army: sometimes flaring up, mainly stable
- [2] Confrontations involving extra-official military: very unstable

II POLITICAL

- [3] Local Autonomias vs State Government: autonomias remain marginal
- [4] Non-governmental organizations vs Government: basically stable
- [5] Political party conflicts in the PAN-PRI-PRD triangle: ? ? ?

III ECONOMIC

- [6] Basic needs economy vs market economy: economism wins

[7] Primary vs Secondary/Tertiary sector economy: more Sec/Tertiary

IV CULTURAL

[8] Traditional (indigenous) religions vs Christianity: traditional

[9] Catholic vs Protestant (evangelical) Christianity: evangelical

[10] Indigenous languages vs Spanish: more bilingual

V SOCIAL (LOCAL AND NATIONAL)

[11] Indigenous vs Mestizo: more indigenous affirmation

[12] Women vs Men: more women affirmation

[13] Poor vs Rich: more gap between the two

[14] Rural vs Urban: more urbanization

VI INTERNATIONAL

[15] USA vs Mexico (history, drugs, migrants): sharper

[16] US-Mexican government-corporate elites vs People: sharper

[17] Mexico-Centro-America (history, drugs, migrants): sharper

[18] Mexico-Centro-America governments vs the Maya People: sharper

Major source of dynamism are in the international formations and in the extra-official military. Global trends like tertiarization and urbanization, indigenous affirmation religiously and language-wise, and women affirmation, increasing gaps between rich and poor as economism wins as economic orientation also hit Chiapas. There will be pressures on the whole configuration, with stress and strain, resulting in more extra-official military activity, evangelism and displaced persons. PRI (seeing itself as the owner of Mexico?) may emerge against PAN and PRD at the national and state level in favor of status quo ante 1994.

AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OF TELLING THE CHIAPAS STORY: A->B->C->D->E->F

A. In the background is the international configuration, particularly the US penetration in State and Capital in DF, and the Conquista-Independencia Mexico-Centro-America government agreement on borders and basic structure. There are also historical residues and problems of drugs and migrants, but they are secondary:

International:

[16] US-Mexican government-corporate elites vs People of Mexico

[18] Mexico-Centro-America governments vs the Maya People

[15] USA vs Mexico (history, drugs, migrants)

[17] Mexico-Centro-America (history, drugs, migrants)

B. This configuration reproduces colonialism culturally and economically, as continued mission and exploitation, with resistance:

Culturally:

[8] Traditional (indigenous) religions vs Christianity

[10] Indigenous languages vs Spanish

Economically:

[6] Basic needs economy vs market economy

[7] Primary sector economy vs Secondary/Tertiary sector economy

C. The net result is a social configuration with high correlation among four social dimensions:

Socially:

[11] Indigenous vs Mestizo

[12] Women vs Men

[13] Poor vs Rich

[14] Rural vs Urban

At the bottom is **IWPR**, at the top **MMRU**, at the very top USA-DF.

D. Being intolerable, there are military and political reactions:

Military:

[1] EZLN vs the Mexican Army

Political:

[3] Local Autonomies vs State Government

E. The dialectics continues culturally, militarily and politically:

Cultural:

[9] Catholic vs Protestant (evangelical) Christianity

Military:

[2] Confrontations involving extra-official military

Political:

[4] Non-governmental organizations vs Government

F. Eventually this trickles up and crystallizes party conflict with institutionalized conflict election dynamics and possible feedback:

Political:

[5] Political conflicts in the national PAN-PRI-PRD triangle

With no basic conflict transformation violence will be reproduced.

**[64] MODERN vs TRADITIONAL vs APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY:
A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (054)**

[63] INTER-MUNICIPAL BORDER CONFLICT: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** All over the world there are border conflicts, more or less serious, among the world's about 2,000,000 municipalities. Mexico is reputed to have about 20,000 such conflicts. One of them is between two municipalities in the state of Puebla, let us call them A and P. A has a millennia old indigenous tradition, P was a product of the conquista, and mestizo. The border was an intact river. P's border was then extended by a unilateral national-state decree in 1962 to another, seasonal, river so as to include a rapidly expanding zone of 8.5km² rich in license and tax income. The zone residents, according to a consultation, prefer to belong to A, and the tax income still accrues to A. Underneath is the dark shadow of the conquista.

Of the usual four power channels three are activated:

- by political power: by decision, like for the 1962 decree. In case of national-state-municipal P political alignment after the 2006 elections A might easily be overpowered.
- by normative, judicial power: the decree favors P de jure, tax flow, resident opinion, and indeed tradition favor A de facto. A Mexico DF constitutional law firm concluded that it was up to the municipalities to find a settlement, the case not being clear. The national Supreme Court has the final word in case of legal process. - by exchange power, negotiation: not yet really started, because A thinks they can win legally, and P that they can win politically?
- not by coercive power, noting that this until recently, and even today, would have been a casus belli in the inter-state system. But there had to be state intervention to control an encounter in the zone between the two municipal police forces.

[2] **Prognosis.** Of the usual five outcomes "A prevailing, or P prevailing" would probably lead to bad blood between neighboring municipalities--some of that already visible--particularly in the smaller party, A ("tax flow as usual" softens the contradiction). There is general agreement that compromise by dividing the zone is not a viable outcome. No border offers itself. Compromise about budget matters should be possible. The "neither A, nor P" option should not be underestimated. With no settlement in sight, and possibly increasing bitterness, it might take the form of some kind of state take-over. Thus, underlying the bilateral conflict is a trilateral conflict State-P-A, with three possible alliances. A reasonable prognosis is the game of shifting power channels, A pressing for adjudication, P for political power, both engaging in some negotiation. But, bona fede or mala fede?

[3] **Therapy.** This leaves us with the fifth option, some kind of both-and. Here is an outline of what it might look like:

- a bi-municipal zone, a co-dominio, based on parity and rotating presidency, possibly with the state as a third party;
- the zone might have a park with recreation and sports facilities unifying all cities in the rapidly expanding P-A con-urbanizacion;
- a house with a mediation facility for other municipalities, increasingly important as more zone experience accumulates;
- distribution keys for distribution of income and expenditures between A, P, the zone, and the state;
- some state institutions to emphasize the shared character;
- lawyers known for creativity rather than litigation skills to draft a legal framework compatible with law in general, including the Constitution, possibly with some changes, preferably first making experiences under a provisional law. A case of lege ferenda.
- consultation with the residents is of the essence.
- any such settlement should be up for review after X (5?) years.

A zone like this would become a legal/political attraction. (054)

[62] **LANGUAGE CONFLICT AND BILINGUISM: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE** [1]

Diagnosis. All over the world there is language conflict, the mostly as a part of a general conflict between and among nations. At the core of a conflict between two languages, D and R for dominant and recessive is exactly that: one is the language of the dominant nation D, another of the recessive nation R that has receded or been forced to recede into the background. The asymmetry in power in general is reflected in the asymmetry in the use of language. D dominates in public space, from administrative language to the sole language of teaching in public schools, of street signs etc., R has receded into private space, the homes, the quarters, maybe private schools. And, equally or more importantly for the purpose here: The speaker of D do not seen any need to learn R whereas the speakers of R have to learn some D to survive. In the same vein, on the mega level of intercontinental relations speakers of English se little need to learn other, not because, as they say, we always find somebody who speaks English, but because it is the duty of everybody else to learn English. As a result they may remain sadly monoglot, increasingly surrounded by polyglots. The conflict is not only between languages D and R, but also between monoglots and polyglots.

[2] **Prognosis.** In a globalizing world the monoglots will be the losers and the same will ultimately happen inside an equalizing country. Linguistic ignorance will increasingly be seen as what it is, a sign of disrespect and arrogance. Any deviation from linguistic symmetry will be seen as cause and consequence of the deeper inter-nation conflict, any move away from asymmetry will be in line with the universalism of human rights.

[3] **Therapy.** This does not mean that all Spanish speaker in Barcelona have to so perfect in Catalan and the Catalan-speakers in Castellano, or that Spanish speakers in Chiapas have to talk Tzotzil as well as many Tzotzil speakers speak Spanish. Or, the Norwegian-Sami situation. But some moves are needed, and it is not that difficult. There are four modes of knowing a language:

	Active	Passive
Oral	Speaking	Listening
Written	Writing	Reading

Standard teaching covers all four which is perfectionist, time-consuming and unnecessary to start with. In the Swiss National Assembly the norm is to master all four for their own and one more, and the passive modes for the other two. In a world so rich in audio-visual means of teaching, not necessarily dependent on writing/reading and consequently on alphabetization much more logical would be to focus on the oral modes to start with. With the ability to speak and understand the person has already come very far, starting with 10 words, then 100, then 1,000 and getting the syntax right by learning phrases rather than grammar. In addition to cassettes, CDs, DVDs the best way of learning is through affective bonding, the reason why their children of colonialists often picked up indigenous languages from servants. The rest is the question of composing the programs, teaching both ways, and of developing some affective bonding. Binational schools is a very good approach, but others can be devised. (054)

[61] **ADJUDICATION VS MEDIATION: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE** (054)

[1] **Diagnosis.** All over the world there is some discontent with adjudication, as witnessed by the alternative dispute resolution movement (ADR) in the USA and the restorative (as opposed to punitive) justice movement (RJ) that started in New Zealand in 1995, very much inspired by the Maori (ie Polynesian) tradition of conflict resolution. TRANSCEND has been approached by lawyers (in Norway) and by the Supreme Court Justice (in Puebla, Mexico) to explore this conflict. For a conflict it is, over the general to whom does somebody else's conflict belong. The correct answer is, of course, to the parties. But if they do not manage?

The arguments in favor of mediation, beyond that it generally costs less money and less time, would be that it accommodates any number of conflict parties (as opposed to the legal two): that it is focused on the relation between the parties, trying to improve that relation (as opposed to the legal actor focus on who may be guilty of liable); that it tries to reframe the case inviting the parties to search for new approaches (as opposed to the legal framing); that it opens for negotiation (as opposed to the judge's pro et contra); and that the parties themselves decide whether the settlement is acceptable (as opposed to the judge deciding so).

But then there are the arguments in favor of adjudication. The case is treated according to due process of law, using codified rules rather than the whims of the mediator and the parties. This makes it easier to use precedents, which may cut both ways, for and against. Very important is the stamp of social approval a court process gives to the outcome. Moreover, lawyers may identify ways out, including "holes in the law", unknown to mediators.

[2] **Prognosis.** The conflict could turn quite nasty. There is not only salaries/honoraria at stake, but also the position as the major arbiter in society. The winner keeps or rises in status, the loser not. And we are talking about having power over the power relations among others, nothing less than that.

Mediators have strong cards: they can underbid the lawyers in price = time x costs and possibly overbid them in terms of quality of the settlement: in principle both can live with it since it is acceptable, and they can live it with together since it has been negotiated. But the lawyers have another possibility: they can press for licensing and codification of mediation, making it more difficult for them both to underbid and overbid. The lawyers will appeal to the authorities, and the mediators to the public.

[3] **Therapy.** The five-point scheme applies:

1. The lawyers win, mediation becomes more expensive and codified.
2. The mediators win the trust of people, lawyers become marginal.
3. People distrust both of them and develop their own capacities.
4. Legal mediation, meaning mediation on legal premisses.
5. Both lawyers, and mediators, acquire some skills of the other.

The likely outcome in many societies is 3 + 4 + 5.

A higher level of awareness in the population in general of how to handle conflict, a peace and conflict resolution culture, would be all to the good, far better than a people of litigants or a people suffering unsolved conflicts. And the compromise solution of legal mediation is an alternative to either. But if lawyers could get some of the mediator and conciliator (both are needed) skills, then they can serve their clients far better. And the same applies to mediators: they would also serve the parties better if they knew what is legally proscribed, prescribed and permissible -particularly the latter as it opens for new possibilities.

[60] **JAPAN vs RUSSIA vs AINU: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (04Y)**

[59] NAGORNO-KARABAGH: A PEACE & CONFLICT OUTCOME PERSPECTIVE (045)

[1] **Diagnosis.** Nagorno-Karabagh, a former enclave in Soviet Azerbaijan, is a de facto independent Republic (NKR) declared December 1991. NKR has flag, army, war of liberation (1989-94, after the 1988 killing of Armenians in Sumgait near Baku, and with Azeri targeting of civilians, churches and monuments during the war), history, church, parliament, a president, internal law and order, but not de jure international recognition. Some see NKR only as a territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia; the same mistake as with Croatia-Serbia, forgetting Krajna-Slavonia. Reducing a conflict with 3 parties to only 2 is always dangerous.

NKR pleads self-determination based on centuries of Armenian settlement (even if, like Slovenia, not as an independent state); and Azerbaijan claims territorial integrity, based on the enclave status 1922-1992, and uti possidetis. Territorial integrity weighs heavily in international law. So does USA-Georgia-Azerbaijan line-up against Russia-Iran-Armenia as a continuation of the Cold War.

[2] **Prognosis.** This no peace, no war could last as long as any alternative seems worse. Armenians, like Serbs, are strong, but Azerbaijan, like Croatia, may launch an Operation Storm with a US-trained army, or like in Kosovo/a as a NATO operation. Crucial in the equation may be NKR ability to project a war with no ceasefire, but continued paramilitary struggle for their homeland.

[3] **Therapy.** Countries with oil on their agenda and a history of genocide will be suspected of heavy bias. The alternative to US-Russian positioning is intergovernmental mediation by the UN, OSCE and its Minsk Group, Council of Europe and the European Union; and by NGOs and individuals. A Conference for Security and Cooperation in the South Caucasus (CSCSC), with NGOs, aiming at a South Caucasian Community with peacekeeping forces could be initiated.

Peace includes self-determination for NKR, and the Armenian interest in integration. And peace includes Azeri refugee return, and return of the disputed regions of Kelbajar, Fizuli, Gubadli, Jabrail, Zangelan and Aghdam. These are all legitimate goals so work should proceed on all these tracks. It is also legitimate for NKR to have access to Armenia by a highway, like once from West Berlin to West Germany, and similarly for Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan but not by possessing Lachin and Shusha.

NKR independence has to be earned, and a process of double return--when, where, how, how many, how much to be negotiated--will earn NKR respect. NKR should not fall into the trap of loading the refugee burden on Azerbaijan. In this complicated process high level trilateral cooperation Armenia-NKR-Azerbaijan would also be indispensable, starting at individual and NGO levels.

Returned Azeris need to be integrated and must have the right to participate in decision-making processes at all levels. After X (10?) years NKR could be fully recognized as an independent state by the international community with the precondition of having fulfilled all agreements and conditions.

Parallel with the work for independence NKR could also keep alive the idea of Caucasian integration as a Georgia-Abkhazia-Azerbaijan-NKR-Armenia community. The possibility of European Union membership for all five, with Turkey membership as a land bridge, is also a future scenario. All these processes should be seen as complementary, not as competitive. Peace in Caucasus is vulnerable and needs multiple bonds, with NKR independence as common factor.

NKR, peaceful, beautiful and spiritual, is ideal for trek and third age tourism once the Azerbaijan-Turkey blockade is lifted. In a peaceful Caucasian community the whole region could blossom.

[57a] **NEPAL: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE** (035)

[1] Diagnosis. This conflict molecule combines 11 conflict atoms in a structural violence leading to major direct violence:

	FAULT-LINE ISSUE	POSSIBLE REMEDY
1 <u>Humans/Nature</u>	depletion/ pollution	appropriate technology
2 <u>Gender</u>	repression of women	appropriate representation
3 <u>Generation</u>	young people	appropriate representation
4 <u>Class: Political</u>	HMG, King	parliamentary democracy constitutional monarchy
5 <u>Class: Military</u>	RNA	parliament control of army
6 <u>Class: Economic</u>	misery, inequality	massive uplift from below land reform temple land reform strong cooperative, public <u>and</u> private sectors
7 <u>Class: Culture</u>	marginalization	massive literacy campaign sharing of culture
8 <u>Class: Social</u>	dalits	appropriate representation economic/cultural measures
9 <u>Nationalities</u>	dominant culture unitary state	mother tongue education devolution/soft federalism
10 <u>Territories</u>	misery, inequality	massive uplift from below
11 <u>Others/Nepal</u>	intervention	reconfirm <u>panch shila</u>

The high level of criss-cross, entropy, may dampen mobilization.

[2] Prognosis. A high entropy conflict will display much micro- and little macro-dynamics unless at revolt level major energy.

[3] Therapies. M(aoists) and K(ing) dominate because of weak Third Parties = PP, mainstream political Parties; civil society, NGO, maybe 2,000 strong; People in general; Parliamentary Democracy and Constitutional Monarchy as processes. Three needed measures:

- PP get their act together in a strong program for social change, inviting M and K to join the roundtable talks, creating with M an interim government, and a process for revising the constitution. They could also be triggered into such action by People turning to the streets, and/or by strong civil society pressure.
- A statement from M of allegiance to parliamentary democracy
- A statement from K of allegiance to constitutional monarchy

The National Human Rights Commission could continue playing a major role in this peace process, and, for instance:

- organize an experimental roundtable with all parties, using human rights discourses with appropriate processes to address the issues, including monitoring of ceasefire processes and of civil-political and socio-economic-cultural rights implementation generally;
- organize a sarvodaya uplift experiment locally, calling on the expertise of Dr Ari Yaratne and the impressive Sarvodaya experience in Sri Lanka, and also on the appropriate technologies of Ashok Khosla's Development Alternatives in New Delhi;
- organize a general conference on peace/human rights interfaces;
- initiate a Truth and Reconciliation process.

Cooperative action like disarmed soldiers cooperating in health camps, building schools and roads, would be useful and symbolic.

To say that action rewards the direct violence of terrorism is as misplaced as to say that inaction rewards the structural violence of status quo. This is not about pleasing or displeasing parties. There is so much suffering in Nepal because of repressive, exploitative structures, violence and fear. Action should be for the sake of those who suffer, to reduce dukkha and increase sukha; politics in the best sense of that word. The maneuvering of the actors, the political alliances, who gets what out of the struggle is politicking; indispensable, but no goal in itself. What is needed is to rise to the occasion, and address very real issues.

[57b] **NEPAL: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE** (06X follow-up from 57a)

[1] Diagnosis. 3 proposals from mediation exercise May 2003:

- For parties (now SPA, Seven-Party Alliance) a "strong program for social change inviting M(aoists) and K(ing) to join roundtable talks creating with M an interim government; a process for revising the constitution. They could also be triggered into such action by People turning to the streets and/or by strong civil society pressure.
- A statement from M of allegiance to parliamentary democracy
- A statement from K of allegiance to constitutional monarchy."

Effective nonviolence in the Kathmandu streets 6-24/4/06 produced change in this direction. People and Indian pressure made the King give up absolute monarchy; and possibly join the process and respect any referendum. But the present dialogue between PM and the M leader is secret, and accountable to India and USA, not to government-people-parliament (India-USocracy?). The focus is on cease-fire, disarmament, elections to a Constituent Assembly to change the 1990 constitution, monarchy vs republic; with no strong program for social change.

Nepal was a feudal society with absolute monarchy. The maoist revolt used illegitimate means for 40 legitimate modernizing goals, submitted 1/2/96, rejected, followed by the People's War 13/02/96. The King and Government used illegitimate means to keep an illegitimate status quo. And now only conflicts affecting elites are taken seriously: violence control and parliament/government/head-of-state legitimacy, not social inequities and massive deprivation. The focus on elite interests with neglect of people's basic needs leads to asynchrony in the process.

[2] Prognosis. This is a cease-fire process, not a peace process. A causal chain from unresolved conflicts-polarization/dehumanization to violence-trauma calls for a peace process with four components: mediation for conflict resolution, peace-building, violence control, and conciliation for healing and closure. They should be enacted synchronically, as a package. Major dangers: cease-fire without conflict solution may reopen the violence (like the Israel-Palestine and Sri Lanka cases) and conciliation without conflict solution is only pacification. Putting the carts before the horse may lead to massive instability--general strike, violence--unless the conflicts are addressed decisively. However, one does not sense a leadership suffering people's daily suffering, nor much creativity for change.

[3] Therapy. Ten possible remedies for SPA-M joint action and rapprochement, using maoists as source of energy and national renewal for a better Nepal, with youth challenging them all into action:

- [a] have committees, like the National Monitoring Ceasefire Committee, work on major social issues like communicating vessels, with M at multiple levels, villages, district, regions, and in the center.
- [b] learn "positive disarmament from the Nicaraguan sandinista-contra teams of former militants and military for joint reconstruction of what was destroyed, like bridges, clinics, schools;
- [c] send teams of M and others to remote villages to work speedily with the people for literacy in Nepalese, and in other languages;
- [d] practice quotas for women, younger people and dalits in multiple level political bodies--not waiting for the constitution to catch up;
- [e] make sure that Nepal is up to date in labor-intensive, cost-effective, and environment-friendly appropriate technologies;
- [f] experiment with labor value (not only money value) based niches in the economy to alleviate the abject misery of those with no money;
- [g] invite India to share their expertise on federalism with Nepalese experts, but also to respect panch shila norms of non-interference;
- [h] invite USA to solve the 9/11 conflict, like Spain seems to have solved "11M", and not use 9/11 to interfere in Nepalese politics; and
- [i] start thinking of what a reconciliation process might look like.

11 conflicts mediated + 1 cease-fire = 12 jobs, + conciliation = Peace

[56] **USA/UK vs IRAQ: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (031)**

[54] **MEN-WOMEN-MARRIAGE-CULTURE: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (02X)**

[53] **BULLYING: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE** (025)

[1] **Diagnosis.** All over the world pupils and students in primary and secondary schools harass each other. The bully and the "bullee" can be an individual or a groups, boys or girls, only the methods differ. Bullying is genuine violence, to the spirit, the mind and the body. The extreme form of killing, with guns, fellow students and teachers is frequent in the USA, less so elsewhere, like in Erfurt, Germany. Absenteeism for fear of being bullied is found all over, in its ultimate form as suicide, particularly in Japan. The after-effects in the life of bully and bullee as adults must be deep and destructive, but little is known.

There are five different levels of analysis: bully-bullee, the class, the school, the school system and the society. The leaders at each level prefer to see the cause of bullying located one, two, three or four levels below their own. The class teacher would prefer bully-bullee analysis, the school principal the class with that teacher, the school superintendent or minister of education that particular school with that principal, the government might have some ideas about the whole school system. All of them might also like to kick the ball upstairs, bullying being a hot potato.

Bully-bullee analysis, focusing on either, their relation and their families etc, is convenient for the system and may lead to no tolerance remedies like immediate bully expulsion from the school. And there are classes and schools that are more problematic than the others and some times change of top personnel might help.

All levels have something to contribute to the understanding, but the hypothesis here is that the core cause is the school system itself. To treat small, then bigger human beings as raw material to be processed on an assembly line called the curriculum is in itself violence of the structural kind, legitimize by the idea of making them fit for society. Pupils and students alike sense this and become alienated, frustrated and aggressive. Most of them are, however, too coward to attack the school itself so they take it out on other pupils/students. Hypothesis 1: the bully-bullee relation is the relation between school misfits and school conformists, the misfit hitting the school by hitting the suspected school-lover. And hypothesis 2: the more individual freedom a school system allows, the less bullying. Thus, in Norway bullying in Steiner schools and in the Experimental Gymnasium was absent or very rare.

[2] **Prognosis.** If there is some truth to this bullying will also come to universities the more they are organized like primary and secondary schools, with decreasing freedom of choice in form and content of instruction. If some pressure is taken off primary schools the prognosis might work the other way for them. In other words, harassment might be moving up the schooling ladder, and like most forms of violence escalate - as it has already done so far.

[3] **Therapy.** The general lime of therapy is clear: relax the curricula, trust pupils/students more, offer them more choices in content, form, time (when to come) and space (where to go). Let the pupils/students compete with themselves, and praise their progress, rather than with others; avoid standardized national/regional tests and exams. Of course they eventually have to qualify for some job but leave that testing to the future employer.

Sow less structural violence--and reap less direct violence.

[52] **WASHINGTON vs AL QAEDA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (01X)**

[51] THE USA, THE WEST AND THE REST: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Diagnosis.

The world will never be the same again after the terrible attack on the economic USA, the military USA, and on human beings like all of us on September 11 2001. We embrace the victims of the violence, like of all violence, in deep grief and express our hope that those responsible will be brought to justice. A violence at this level can only be explained by a very high level of dehumanization of the victims in the minds of the aggressors, often due to a very deep level of unresolved, basic conflict. The word "terrorism" describes the tactics but like "state terrorism" only portray the perpetrator as evil, satanic, and does not go to the roots of the conflict.

The symbolism of targets (World Trade Center, the Pentagon) and the non-targets (the Capitol or White House) reads like a retaliation for US use of economic power against poor people and poor countries and US use of military power against defenseless people. This calls to mind the around 230 US military intervention abroad, the near extermination of native Americans, slavery, the CIA's responsibility for 6 million killed 1947-87 according to CIA dissidents, and the 100,000 dying daily at the bottom of an economic system identified by many with US economic, military and political power. Given the millions of victims, not thousands, it has to be expected that this generates a desire for retaliation somewhere, some time.

The basic dividing line in this conflict is class--of countries and of people. It is not civilization, although US sense of mission, of "manifest destiny" and Islamic sense of righteousness are parts of it. Right now the confrontations seem to be between the US/West and Arabs/Muslims. But this may simply be because the latter possess more intention and capability than other victims of the enormous US/West violence--direct, structural and cultural--since the Second World War. We should neither underestimate the extent of solidarity in the "Rest" (of the world), nor the solidarity of the West (with Japan), the world upper class. Because of the strength of these two camps it is crucial to build even stronger solidarity with all victims, everywhere.

In placing the horrendous attack on the USA in the context of a cycle of retaliation for US aggression, leading to US retaliation for that retaliation and so on and so forth, there is no element of justification, no excuse, no guilt-attribution. There is only deep regret that such chains of violence and retaliation also are parts of human reality. That may also lead us to a desire to break that vicious spiral. But bombing terrorist bases and the countries that host terrorists may also provoke even more retaliation to avenge that violence, and many people may become "martyrs".

[2] Prognosis

With talk of Crusades from the USA, and of the fourth stage of Jihad, Holy War, from Islamic quarters, the world may be heading for the largest violent encounter ever. The first Jihad, against the Crusades 1095-1291 lasted 196 years; the Muslims won. The second Jihad, against Israel, is undecided so far. The third Jihad, against communism in Afghanistan, ended with Muslim victory, Soviet withdrawal and ultimate collapse. Many of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims, about 3 million in the USA, are willing to die for their beliefs, idolizing martyrdom, expecting to earn a place in paradise.

[3] Therapy

To prevent a slide into a large war with enormous, widespread suffering, the USA, everybody, should not rush to action. We need deep self-reflection, identifying the conflicts, the issues, solving them, reconciliation. Dialogue and global education to understand how others think, and to respect other cultures, not debate to defeat others with stronger arguments, can lead the way toward healing and closure.

The enormous global inequality, which denies basic needs to billions while they see a privileged few indulge in luxury and waste, must be overcome, through a peaceful, cooperative world economic system. This will hardly change the mind of terrorist leaders, but will deprive them of the fertile soil of frustrated and angry young people who feel they have nothing to lose, from which they can easily recruit eager followers.

All clergy--including Christian and Muslim--need to stress that killing innocent civilians is wrong, blasphemous.

Outside support and the supply of arms to autocratic regimes must stop. People who grow up in a democratic culture--where they can not only vote, but frequently express their ideas and grievances and are heard, where governments truly represent their people's aspirations--rarely resort to violence. But if all opportunities for change by peaceful means are denied, some feel tempted to resort to violence.

The prolonged wars in the Middle East and many other Third World regions have bred a culture

of violence. Transcending those conflicts, finding solutions that bring justice to all parties, is an essential component of a successful strategy against terrorism.

Governments in the West, and also in the South, cannot be relied upon to do this; they are too tied to the USA and also afraid of incurring US wrath. Only people can, only the global civil society. What is needed as soon as humanly possible is a massive peace movement, this time North-South. It worked last time, East-West. The future of the world is more than ever in the hands of the only source of legitimacy: people everywhere. (01X)

[50] CHRISTIAN-HEATHEN RELATIONS: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Diagnosis. Much of the legitimation underlying such major atrocities as Christian (later called "Western") conquest (under the name of "discovery"), colonialism, and imperialism can be found in the papal bull Inter Caetera of 4 May 1493 and related documents. It starts praising the "very dear son/daughter in Christ", los reyes católicos, Ferdinand and Isabella (Alexander was Spanish) for spreading the -- Christian religion so "that barbarous nations be overthrown and brought to the faith":

- as witnessed--with so much glory to the Divine Name in your recovery of the kingdom of Granada from the yoke of the Saracens;
- you--chose our beloved son, Christopher Columbus--to make diligent quest for these remote and unknown mainlands and islands through the sea, where hitherto noone had sailed; and-discovered certain very remote islands and even mainlands that hitherto had not been discovered--wherein dwell very many peoples living in peace--going unclothed and not eating flesh-disposed to embrace the Catholic faith and be trained in good morals-
- built a fortress fairly equipped, wherein he has stationed in garrison certain Christians, companions of his, who are to make search for other remote and unknown islands and mainlands. In the islands and countries already discovered are found gold, spices, and very many other precious things-bring under your sway the said mainlands and islands with their residents and inhabitants and-bring them to the Catholic faith.

Whereupon He, Alexander VI, assigns to los reyes catolicos

- and your heirs and successors, kings of castile and Leon, forever -all rights, jurisdictions, and appurtenances, all islands and mainlands, found and to be found, discovered and to be discovered;
- we-appoint-you-lords of them with full and free power and jurisdiction of every kind (italics ours).
- Let no one, therefore, infringe, or with rash boldness contravene, this our recommendation, exhortation, requisition, gift. grant, assignment, constitution, deputation, decree, mandate, prohibition and will. Should anyone presume to attempt this, be it known to him that he will incur the wrath of Almighty God and of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul.

In short: the Earth belongs to God, the Pope administers God's will, and delegates to the kings of Spain all jurisdiction. The result: legitimation of the hideous reality of colonialism.

[2] Prognosis. As pointed out by Steven T. Newcomb in "The Evidence of Christian Nationalism in Federal Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery", Review of Law & Social Change, 1993 No. 2, pp. 303-41, theology (Jahveh in Psalms 2:8 tells his chosen people through King David: "I shall give to thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost part of the earth for thy possession") becomes law of the land ("--the principle declared in the fifteenth century as the law of Christendom, that discovery gave title to assume sovereignty over, and to govern the unconverted natives of Africa, Asia and North and South America"; Tennessee Supreme Court 1835, "on the right to coerce obedience").

[3] Therapy. If the violence and the conflicts engendered by it are legitimized by a document, then it is on the revocation of that document that peace and conflict transformation can be built. The papal bull must become as well known as many of its fatal consequences, many of them genocidal, today universally condemned. That revocation should come from the highest Vatican quarters as declarations that annul Inter Caetera, and explicitly so, and make it a Christian duty to uproot this type of thinking.

(009)

[49] **THE SAMI NATION: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE**

[1] Diagnosis. The traditional sami-territory consists of the northern parts of Finland, Sweden, Norway and the northwestern part of Russia. From before the illegal inclusion of their territories by kings and Tsars into the four countries, the culture of the Sami people has been systematically destroyed. Superior violent means have been used to eradicate their religion, destroy their traditional communities, exploit the natural resources, impose Christianity, discredit their identity, utilize the population as labor force and prevent any organized resistance. When the uprising in Kautokeino took place in 1854 two leaders were given death penalty by the Supreme Court. Their crime was to "with violence and force have worked to eliminate all natural barriers between themselves and the Superiors and that way enforce an equality, which would have destroyed all Civilization". Their skulls were brought to University of Oslo for "scientific studies of lower races" and was not given back for a decent burial until 150 years later.

The exploitations of natural resources are still going on in all four countries without any compensation. The Sami people are not heard when they claim their rights to territory, hunting, natural resources, granted them according to ILO convention 169.

[2] Prognosis. The Sami culture, territory and resources will continue to be exploited by the four occupying states, militaries and international companies. Their culture will be further eroded and end up as exotic items on museums and for exhibitions. A growing number of conscious and determined young Samis will take up violent means in order to put their case on the political agenda in the four states. Secret groups doing spectacular actions could well be found attractive by others and easily recruit more people.

[3] Therapy. A commission of researchers disciplines, appointed by UNESCO and Unrepresented Nations and Peoples' Organization (UNPO) to document all atrocities committed against the Sami peoples since the states started to take control over their territories. The results shall be made public in many ways and the conclusions be a part of the curriculum in schools.

Compensation for abuses of human rights and the exploitation of natural resources shall be invested in a foundation for empowerment of Sami cultures and work for transforming conflicts between Samis and other people living in traditional sami areas.

Sami parliaments should be established in all four states with a right to veto any exploitation of natural resources within their traditional territories. This should include waterfalls, mining, fishing, oil and gas resources on land, in rivers as well as in the Barents Sea and the respective sectors of the North Atlantic. A group of representatives from the Sami Parliaments, the Nordic Council and OSCE should be set up to monitor the implementation of veto-right and handle conflicts of interpretation.

All military installations and training fields must be removed from the Sami territory and no samies conscripted.

Respect for all Human Rights of Samis within each of the countries they are living today, with increasing autonomy, opening for the creation of a confederation of Sami autonomies linking Samis in the four countries in which they are living today.

[48] ANGOLA CIVIL WAR: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Diagnosis The current war is largely resource-driven with roots in ethnic, colonial and Cold War conflicts. Patronage structures or autocracies, run by small oligarchies with little or no people participation, provide the central organization on each of the two main sides. Support from the "International Community" is focused on the government side, with a prohibition for contact with the opposition UNITA party, though some evidence exists of CIA support for both sides. Certain controlling interests within each of the major internal and external parties profit from the current war economy. The lack of governance, regulation and taxation results in corruption, high crime rates (including by the police), poverty, empty schools and the spread of infectious diseases. UNICEF calls Angola the worst country in the world in which to be a child. The electoral system, is modeled on the USA two-party system, and very ill matched to the complexities of Angolan society. Added to this come the UN sanctions, partially effective, partially not, and the land mine situation, globally the highest number in concentration.

[2] Prognosis

Unless there is a break in the political stalemate, the war economy is likely to maintain violence at various levels of intensity for decades. Military resources will finance military expenditures, enriching elites in Angola and in the International Community. Impoverishment will continue, with nutrition, health care and education continuing at substandard levels. In ten to fifteen years the majority of teachers will have passed on or be too old to teach, resulting in a need to begin basic education from zero. The "International Community" is likely to oppose the substantial action necessary to change the situation by pointing to the lack of political will among the Angolan parties, and stating that the conflict is not "ripe" for a peace process. Regardless of possible changes of Presidential candidate from the Government side, the "winner-take-all" election will serve only to maintain the current conflict situation.

[3] Therapy

Complexity of conflict must be met with complexity of strategic peace confrontation. The political stalemate should be broken through a combination of (1) quiet, informal diplomacy; (2) humanitarian cease-fire for polio eradication; and (3) public information on the wealth accrual in Angolan and international elites by exploiting opportunities in the war economy. Reinvention of the public sphere should include a substantive dialogue to bring about a new electoral system with power sharing more suitable to the Angolan socio-political landscape. Use of natural resources should be structured in accordance with Angola's commitment as a signatory of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with special reference to Article 2. War diamonds and war oil should be monitored and (to the extent possible) traced, with diamonds addressed in the market place and oil by shareholder action. Civil society can be empowered through the creation of zones of peace with resource-sharing regimes in local municipalities. The Catholic Church, as a trusted party, should play a key role in the peacemaking and reconciliation process. (019)

[47] AFGHANISTAN: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Diagnosis. The mountains protecting Afghanistan against foreigners, like England and Russia fighting for control-English troops were massacred in Kabul in 1842 leaving only one survivor to tell the story-also divide the country in autonomous parts. The king was overthrown in 1972, followed by a communist coup in 1978, followed by Soviet invasion December 1979 leading to their Viêt Nam. Gorbachev initiated the withdrawal of beaten troops in 1986, a major factor ending the Cold War. Then came Mujahedeen (partly a US construction) and their fight for power, followed by the Taliban (partly a Pakistan construction) and their fight for power. 23 years of war have left Afghanistan destitute, the infrastructure partly destroyed, with a war between the Taliban supported by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and the Northern Alliance of some nationalities supported by USA, Russia, China, Iran (and India?, EU?). The Shanghai Alliance of China, Russia and four Central Asian republics is against Islamic militancy, but also aims at trade, investment and stronger security ties in general (USA?)

Afghanistan is inserted in complex conflict formations:

- the US pincer move expanding NATO eastward and AMPO westward creates a strong Russia-China bond with ties to India-Iran-Iraq;
- the ongoing India-China conflict;
- the ongoing India-Pakistan conflict, particularly over Kashmir;
- the struggle for control over Central Asian oil and pipelines;
- the conflicts with Islamic revival/militancy/fundamentalism;
- UN sanctions because of one member's problem with one person.

[2] Prognosis. Afghanistan will continue as a battlefield among external powers and their allies among Afghan fractions, all this at the expense of an Afghan people steeped in misery. The "humanitarian intervention for US bases" scenario is likely. This happens because Afghanistan is weak, not militarily (nobody has beaten Afghanistan so far), but fragmented, dependent on foreign aid, with divisive identities, and neighbor quarrels.

[3] Therapy. A four-tier peace policy for Afghanistan:

- A strong Afghan people with the basic needs for survival, well-being, freedom and identity satisfied through an end to war; food, housing, clothing, health and education for all; the freedom to choose among competing political actors; and the religious and linguistic identities that are truly theirs.
- A basic needs oriented Afghanistan must have a broadly based central government--after a ceasefire with no winner in the present war--open to, for instance, federal possibilities. A well planned Loya Jirga might provide legitimacy for broadness.
- A Central Asian Community capable of resisting external pressure must be culturally, economically, politically strong. Cultural strength would derive from an Islam beyond Sunni-Shia divides; economic strength from regional self-reliance; political strength from a community--or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Central-South Asia (OSCCSA)--with the five Central Asian republics, Iran and Pakistan (not more "impossible" than the European Community was in the late 1940s).
- A UN Security Council with no Muslim but four Christian and a Confucian country as veto powers should seek cooperation with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) for agendas of this type, together with a broadly based Afghan government.(012)

[46] INTER-GENERATION CONFLICT AND SUSTAINABILITY: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** The conflict between generations is diachronic, through time. Most conflicts are synchronic, and so are the theory and practice of conflicts. Each generation has a goal: its own livelihood. Each generation wants by definition to satisfy its own basic needs. The conflict is obvious: any generation (or, rather, cohort) may compromise the livelihood of succeeding generations through its demand/greed. Concretely:

- economically, by polluting and depleting the environment;
- militarily, by perpetuating violence through trauma and glory;
- politically, by untransformed conflicts and irreversible acts; - culturally, by accepting cultures with such consequences.

The concept of sustainability goes beyond the narrow economic and ecological discourse to a general discourse of handing over a world in good shape, with the environment intact (diverse, symbiotic); people less traumatized by violence and deformed by wishes to prevail through violence; conflicts transformed so they can be handled nonviolently and creatively, not blocked by irreversible decisions; and a world culture with that message. Reconciliation processes would be significant in that context.

[2] **Prognosis.** However, in the world as a whole pollution and depletion are increasing, violence is increasing, the wisdom with which conflicts are handled may be decreasing, and world cultures counteracting these trends are marginalized. The burden of unprocessed problems handed over from one generation to the next is increasing with one exception: better material livelihood for the upper section of humanity. The prognosis is increased violence, mass migration to unsettled areas; the Bible's four horsemen of the Apocalypse: conquest, war, famine, pestilence.

[3] **Therapy.** What is the therapy for extreme generational egoism and lack of inter-generational solidarity, short time perspectives compromising the next generations' livelihood?

The American Indian adage, think through the consequences of your acts for the coming seven generations is excellent, and points to what today is known as future studies. But that will have to be done far beyond the narrow time horizon for most studies of that kind. Moreover, such studies may also serve as a pretext for recklessness, identifying carrying capacities that makes one think that the world is robust enough for an extra load. To be on the safe side insight in tomorrow must be tied to an ethics of diachronic solidarity valid today.

One way of training would be to start with households (oikos) with 3-4 generations living close together and people having future generations so near that the solidarity becomes a necessity of daily life. Solidarity would also apply backwards to parents, grandparents etc., easily forgotten in a one-sided focus on prospective solidarity. Depositing older generations in old age ghettos is incompatible with retrospective solidarity.

Another approach would be to tilt the balance of power in society, and world society, in the direction of categories so far known to be wiser in the sense of being more holistic, more global, more basic needs oriented, with more time perspective. That would point to the older generation, and to women. Women are today getting into and the older generation out of power; the latter trend should be reversed. Beyond and above that we would think in terms of massive education campaigns mobilizing formal an informal education and religious organizations to propagate inter-generational solidarity.

[45] INTER-CLASS CONFLICT/GLOBALIZATION: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** In a world where 358 billionaires have more assets than half of humanity (UNDP), the metaphor "market" should be questioned. The billionaires (and others) are not only buying and selling, they also decide products and factor profiles, thereby changing the life of billions of people (like downsizing through automation). Globalization means global sharing of the positive and negative consequences of economic growth, with increasing disappearance of national markets, increasing world-wide disparity, and above all increasing displacement of people as ecological, economic, political, military and cultural refugees (1 billion on the move by the year 2030? with hardened borders around rich countries). With the mobility (outplacing) of entire companies in search of cheap labor and lower or negative taxes (incentives), state revenues will decrease in many countries. Privatization takes this one step further by depriving the state also of revenue-creating companies. Ever-increasing productivity leads to downsizing (unemployment) or reduction of working hours (contract). If 1.7 billion earn less than \$1 per day and 3 billion less than \$2 we get oversupply/overproduction relative to demand/consumption (80 million cars chasing 60 million buyers). Ever-increasing top-bottom disparity leads to more short-term portfolio investment in search of profit on the top, and more basic needs in search of satisfaction at the bottom, leading to underconsumption at the bottom of use products, and eventually to increasing misery. The IMF functions like doctors with only one medicine: increase company autonomy, of the state (privatization, lower taxes, devaluation), of the workers (labor flexibility, contract work), of the country (repatriation of profit), of the public (no subsidies for basic needs, no taxes on luxury products). Credit is made available to such unscrupulous companies, leading to more disparity, misery, free speculation capital and dependence. The net result is sacrifice of people at the bottom.

[2] **Prognosis.** As a result of all of this the crises become self-sustaining, the system will move from one crisis to the other, showing up where the system is weakest, with attention to symptom therapy: preventing crashes on the stock exchanges by building in delays to prevent panics, bailing out foreign firms. A major crash, recession and depression are all highly likely.

[3] **Therapy.** Massive conflicts call for massive remedies:

- the reinvention of local authorities: a major task of a local authority should be to coordinate production for basic needs on a local basis (or in a confederation of LAs) to guarantee that basic needs are met, to internalize externalities and to reduce pollution due to transportation and other factors;
- the reinvention of the state: a major task of the state is to coordinate the task of production of normal/luxury goods on a state basis (or in an confederation of states), internalize the externalities, reduce pollution and to be a redistributive agent
- the reinvention of the company: companies have to assume social responsibility, and be rewarded and punished accordingly;
- the reinvention of civil society: consumer consciousness must lead to organized preference and organized boycott of companies;
- the reinvention of the media: media should be liberated from corporate interests and state interests and censorship;
- the invention of global governance, which would include massive taxation of speculation, and basic needs guarantees for humankind as global human rights for global citizens. (985)

[44] **COLOMBIA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE** (1986)

[1] **Diagnosis I.** Some mutually non-exclusive perspectives: [a] An extreme case of poderes fácticos (cleros, latifundistas, militares) in power, highly hierarchic and exploitative; hence violence from below (guerrillas, FARC/ELN) and counter-violence from above (para-militares), in shifting civil war fronts. [b] A two-party system carrying 19th century agendas, incapable of absorbing into public space and debate social democracy, green-ism, communism (guerrillas) and fascism (para-militares). [c] After the murder of Gaitán 9 April 1948 a civil war ("la violencia") killing voters for the other party, with impunity. [d] An extreme case of drug traffic with Colombia as supplier; profits to key power-holders, along violent economic cycles. [e] Public space degenerates to an anarchic battle-field, with corruption, between the private spaces described in [a] to [d]. [f] US invasion gradually building up to use [d] to stop [a] above unless the Colombian government can do the job for them.

[2] **Diagnosis II.** The last points can be deepened:

- An extreme case of dissolution of social norms-values-culture for public space behavior, with impunity for murder: anomie.
- An extreme case of dissolution of social fabric, structure, of public space with fragmentation/atomization: atomie.

These conditions produce violence, corruption, drug chains (as producer/distributor; consumers in the US), sect-formation, with the violent groups as sects where people find guidance and social fabric. In short, a total social crisis.

[3] **Prognosis.** The dialectic between extreme verticality, and extreme dissolution of public space, culture and structure, makes violence endemic; the prognosis could take violence one step further to the pandemic level. The military/police, being part of public space, are parts of the problem rather than of the solution; facilitating rather than impeding the violence of the para-militares in contexts [a]-[f] above. The next step may be outside intervention (the USA in cooperation with some Latin American countries like using the base in neighboring Ecuador), against left wing guerrillas and narcotráfico. The outcome could be manifest (Viêt Nam) or latent (Bosnia today) quagmires.

[4] **Therapy.** The remedies will depend on the diagnosis chosen. Any remedy based on only one factor is doomed to fail:

[a] The pact paradigm between governments and guerrillas assumes cohesive cultures (to honor a promise) and structures (to be binding on others); under anomie/atomie not the case. In addition the temptation to see a pact as an end, not as a means.

General point: more facts, less pacts; less faith in pacts.

[b] The multi-party political paradigm can be counteracted by making elections more ritualistic and parliament less relevant;

[c] The legal paradigm (more state, police, more punishment) presupposes cohesive structures and cultures in public space;

[d] The war-on-drugs paradigm is only meaningful if the whole economic cycle with the root causes of demand (anomie-atomie in consumer countries like the USA) are effectively confronted (of course also including chemicals and air transport). One problem is how to find economic substitutes to make peace profitable. Certification of US efforts to remove US causes of drug demand?

[e] The institutional paradigm intended to provide public space with efficiently and honestly operating institutions is counter-acted by anomie/atomie, including in dubious police/military.

[f] The Plan Colombia paradigm, leaving the task increasingly to USA/OAS, can create long-lasting dependency and colonization.

But this may be patchwork to build a state when the problem is to build a society because of the anomie/atomie complex:

- against anomie: (re)creating a sense of compelling norms and values; a very challenging task for Church (younger priests?), School and Family as major agents of socialization in society. It is a question of (re)creating the traffic rules in public space, starting with norms like "Thou shalt not kill" and "Thou shalt not steal" and values of solidarity with the poor, against the egoistic cost-benefit analysis and materialist individualism of economism. Moral social and world leadership badly needed.

- against atomie: (re)creating social fabric in public space, weaving a tight web of criss-crossing NGOs of many types, with multiple memberships, not forgetting kinship, friends, workshop and worship, serving as conduits for norms of solidarity. Then:

[1] Increase the capacity for handling conflicts at all social levels, expanding conflict repertoires, using Church, School and TV courses once a week for years to combat conflict illiteracy.

[2] Empower women and young people as conflict/peace workers, training them as mediators (by an Escuela de Alto Gobierno?)

[3] Introduce peace and conflict education in schools, making texts with 50-100 stories of successful nonviolent and creative conflict handling available as reference points throughout life.

[4] Introduce peace journalism in the media, focussing on root conflicts and possible outcomes/processes, less on the violent meta-conflict and who is winning; more on people, less on elites

[5] Build disarmed peace zones based on confederations of municipalities and the points mentioned above; upgrade the zones by adding more points; international protection of the zones.

[6] For international peace keeping, with neighbor countries helping use Sun Tzu, not Clausewitz military doctrines, police methods, nonviolence and mediation; let many of them be women.

[7] "Truth and reconciliation" along South African rather than Central American lines, using Court, Church, psychology, TV.

[8] Conduct business (like coffee) along modern lines with much higher return to the workers/producers, cutting out middle men.

[9] Establish economies of subsistence (micro-credits, adequate technology, cooperatives etc.), alongside the growth economy.

[10] Attack pathologies in Colombian culture, such as machismo and cult of violence, head-on; as part of anti-anomie struggle.

[11] Create higher levels of internal security by retraining police and military for all the tasks mentioned above.

[12] Use human rights, including the economic, social and cultural rights, as moral guidelines for a vibrant democracy.

All to be done parallel/synchronously, not one after the other.

[43] GIBRALTAR AND CEUTA-MELILLA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Whereas history and geography point to integration in Spain and Morocco, self-determination points to status quo, as Spanish provinces and English colony. Madrid awkwardly changes argumentation from one side of the Mediterranean to the other.

[2] The classical approach would be transfer through conquest if status quo is neither acceptable, nor sustainable; or acceptance of adjudication. Neither one, nor the other solves the problem.

[3] When there are good arguments on both sides, some bargain, withdrawal, compromise or transcendence is called for.

[4] Bargain might be possible if Rabat could offer London X in return for London handing Gibraltar back to Spain and Madrid handing Ceuta-Melilla to Rabat. To find a good X is not easy.

[5] Withdrawal, waiting, "time is not ripe", is an option with time limits: patience may run out. Nonviolent marches of some magnitude on the three territories would be difficult to handle.

[6] Compromise in the sense of dividing territory is also unavailable as an option: the territories are too small.

[7] Transcendence is called for, and here are some formulas, not mutually exclusive, increasingly distant from status quo:

[A means return; B could lead to C, then to D, then to E]:

[A] Transfer of sovereignty: the new Hong Kong formula; the rest unchanged for X years, X to be negotiated, like the life-time of present inhabitants. They could have both new passports and territory passports, but no separate international identity.

[B] Joint sovereignty/condominium: the old Andorra formula. London and Madrid would share administration of Gibraltar; Madrid and Rabat of Ceuta-Melilla. Inhabitants would choose between two passports and voting rights, and also have territory passport and rights; but no separate international identity.

[C] Separate entity in the European Union, the EU formula. That formula is more available to Gibraltar than to Ceuta and Melilla given that Morocco is a non-member. Status unclear.

[D] Internationalization of the territories, the Tanger formula, in line with current globalization trends, making all three free ports and exclusive economic zones, in dense cooperation with their neighbors; possibly as joint condominium. Status unclear.

[E] Independence in confederation, the Nordic formula, with good transport facilities benefiting the Western Mediterranean region. Inhabitants would have passports indicating where they live, and have one local and one confederal vote. The three city-states would constitute an international entity, with membership in the UN. Investment from all over would be invited. The territories might be demilitarized with security guaranteed by the UN and/or UK/Spain/Morocco. As a zone or archipelago of peace they could also become a major convention/conference center. (977)

[42] EUSKAL HERRIA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] The right of the Basques to self-determination is recognized The definition of a "Basque" could be by self-definition as a Basque, tied less to blood quantum or linguistic ability than to cultural identification (fueros, fors), and a sense of homeland.

[2] The three provincias and four provinces are defined as a Basque entity, Euskadia, with no internal border, in EU, while also continuing for the time being as parts of Spain and of France. Navarra is invited to join or associate itself.

[3] Euskadi would be trilingual with Euskara as official language; Spanish and French also being administrative languages

[4] The present governing organs at the level of the autonomía and the département (basque) would continue.

[5] An Parliament (fors) would be elected for the Euskadi entity, with a government responsible to the assembly.

[6] There should be assemblies for the Spaniards and the French living in Euskadi, with veto rights in matters relating to their patrimony, possibly also local courts and local policing.

[7] The Euskadi entity could gradually attain more international personality, through:

[a] a passport that could gradually be recognized, within France/Spain, the European Union, the world. Any citizen would as before be entitled to French or Spanish (EU) passports.

[b] like passport, like voting: as a transition any citizen could have one vote in Euskadi and one in Spain or France.

[c] like in Andorra francs and pesetas would be welcome anywhere at acceptable exchange rates.

[d] the coming euro might have an Euskadi version with the same value (an euskadi?). To stimulate local economies a discount for deals in the euskadi might be considered.

[e] the budget for Euskadi would be based on the joint budget for the autonomía and the département, with some additional sources of revenue (duties, VAT) as for any EU country, and the same pattern of expenditure.

[f] special treaties would handle relations to Paris and Madrid, with review clauses/revision every N years (N=25?); or when the inexhaustible right to self-determination is exercised.

[g] Euskadi would be demilitarized, renouncing the right to have a separate army. Outer security would be guaranteed by Spain and France in cooperation with OSCE and the UN.

[h] Euskadi would have observer status in the EU, other European organizations, and the UN (like the Swiss).

[i] Euskadi develops gradually its own foreign policy

[j] dual citizenship de facto/de jure, might be considered.

[k] independence, federation, confederation, association etc. are all options implied by the right of self-determination.

[l] some redrawing of borders might be considered, using voting at the local level, like the Danish-German 1920 model.

[8] The process would at any time keep the outcome open.

[9] A reconciliation process has to be initiated.

[10] The process calls for both elite and people participation. A process model: Andorra, now an independent UN member. (975)

[41] LEBANON: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

Three post-violence tasks are Resolution, Reconstruction and Reconciliation, the 3 R's, to be taken on together.

Part I: Resolution

[1] Lebanon suffers from a double conflict of internal division and external intervention. Foreign powers use Lebanon's weakness. The answer is unification to overcome that division.

[2] For unity in a multinational country, divided in two world religions with subdivisions, unifying themes are needed:

- One theme is the message of conviviality, co-existence between the religions. For that to happen both confessions have to turn their softer sides to each other, building on old traditions, overcoming the shame of the war.
- Another theme (also inspired by Switzerland) is Lebanon as a place where peripheries of world religions find each other rather than being dominated by their centers.
- A third theme is Lebanon as a way of making money, placing Mammon above God and All'ah. But Mammon is a dangerous god to serve punishing with poverty, inequality and injustice: some remain or become poor, inequality spells conflict and injustice- one community making more money than the other- also spells conflict. The outcome may easily become violence, with the two confessions turning their (very) hard sides to each other.
- As fourth theme comes joint suffering and joint shame, a feeling of having betrayed the three other themes with the war.

[3] A more lasting transformation would have to be based on ever higher levels of conviviality. The Declaration of Biel 27/11/95 (commemorating the Ninth centenary of the Crusades) contains eight guidelines that all may be applied to Lebanon:

- try to understand other religions the way they understand it;
- develop school material acceptable to all parties;
- not to abuse the freedom of speech when speaking and writing;
- put into practice inspiring ethics of peace, liberty, justice; - seek ways to promote nonviolent forms of conflict resolution;
- establish inter-religious councils for peace and human rights; - discuss with media people peace-promoting forms of journalism;
- cooperate across religious borders to help reconstruct Bosnia.

[4] The problem of class differences and inequality could be addressed by economic programs for the underprivileged, like grameen (micro) banks (Bangladesh model), alternative technologies, cooperatives etc. to produce for own consumption, complementing the market mechanisms through patterns of local self-reliance. To this could be added the artistic dimension that Lebanon does so well. And the problem of injustice can be addressed through rules of parity, privileging the underprivileged for a period (Malaysia model).

[5] The problem of external intervention can be addressed by developing strong patterns of conflict autonomy, depending ever less on outside countries. This would probably presuppose some type of inter-university cooperation to develop a study and training center for peaceful conflict transformation.

Part II: Reconstruction

[6] The Ministry of the Displaced and the Aidoun have done work combined with reconciliation that merits the attention of other countries in similar situations, and could have model character. Study tours, summer camps for people in similar situations in other countries are recommended, like for Nicaragua-Mozambique. Travel companies should give discounts.

[7] A warning is needed lest reconstruction becomes the new way in which Lebanese make money, creating a vested interest not only in war economics but also in reconstruction economics. What happens when Lebanon is reconstructed and the bonanza is over? The danger of a new turn of the cycle is obvious: new war, new destruction, new reconstruction, and in the meantime Lebanon more and more indebted and entrepreneurs more enriched.

[8] Another approach would take up the Nicaraguan experience of having former combatants cooperate in the reconstruction of what they destroyed. Such efforts could be rewarded by the Ministry with incentives, and by contractors by putting the machinery at their disposal after some training. The thesis would be that joint reconstruction could contribute to reconciliation, through cooperation and joint reflection. That Lebanon may not have had not 2, but, say, seventeen warring parties is no objection: it makes reconstruction teams larger.

Part III. Reconciliation

[9] There will always be a hard nucleus of irreconcilables. One approach is to work hard with women and youth less directly involved in the violence, surrounding the irreconcilables with an ocean of conciliation. Above all, empower youth and women by having youth and women committees in all war-torn villages.

[10] A basic point is to make reconciliation visible, by having the media present examples of former antagonists who cooperate. In general the press has to pay more attention to any reconciliation process and people have to enter more willingly, without being pressed into apologies.

[11] Make a case book for elementary schools with 50 (or so) good stories about how to handle conflict without violence, so that the younger generation has a reservoir to draw upon.

[12] Introduce Days of Reflection, at the local, regional and national level, inviting the population to round-table dialogues. 4-5 persons, producing 5 ideas for the 3 R's would contribute to a Gross National Pool of Ideas (GNPI). The best ideas could be rewarded, the media could make them public.

[13] Introduce more future-directed discourses, talking less of the past, more about a future with ways of handling conflict nonviolently and creatively.

[14] Joint mourning, as a manifestation of shared sorrow at what happened and promise to reject incitement to violence by leaders who may instrumentalize the situation.

[15] Celebrate Lebanon's small, vibrant, expanding civil society that can cooperate both with the State and with Capital for the purpose of strengthening the country, without in any way rejecting the potentials of State and Capital for peace.

(975)

[40] ALBANIA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

Consider these economic, political and military factors: A market economy needs markets and markets need liquid capital. Albanian capital was to a large extent fixed as clan or family houses. To pry that capital loose very high interest rates were promised if the houses were mortgaged or sold and the money was invested in pyramid schemes. Even if there had been sporadic fighting the Albanian arena exploded when family savings disappeared in pyramid banking schemes. Well informed sources estimate that \$2-4 billion was extracted from Albania by Austrian, German, Swiss and US banks.

A democracy needs not only elections but also a civil society and an ongoing, unrestrained dialogue. Any election will probably be seen, and not without reasons, as a struggle between power groups for power for themselves, and not for the people. Participation may be very low for lack of support for already suspect politicians. In other words, the June elections may easily turn out like the elections in Haiti.

A pressure can be assumed to come from Italy, demanding a return political backing after Italy has supported Germany in Yugoslavia, France in Algeria and Spain in Morocco. The Italian army has to be given the same chance as "peace-keeper/enforcer".

Against this background, consider the following five point peace plan for (not only in) Albania:

[1] An International Inquiry Into the Banking Activities in Albania, since the end of the Cold War regime. The commission has to be international and command expertise in the role of international banking, including the World Bank and related institutions. The aim would be not so much to establish any culpability or liability as to understand what happened and who were involved, nationally and internationally.

[2] The Question of Restitution to the Victims should be raised. If people entered the schemes in good faith, and there was bad faith on the other side, the problem of liability could arise. If not, restitution money might be found somewhere, together with consideration of legal barriers, or at least very clear warnings against similar schemes in the future.

[3] Postpone the elections, and organize Round-tables over the future of Albania. One of them obviously has to be at high levels in Tirana; but equally or more important would be round-tables in each village. Ideas and arguments emerging from such round-tables (possibly organized and supervised by the OSCE) should be made available to the whole society. After that exercise elections might be more meaningful, including a possible referendum on King Lek's proposal for a monarchy.

[4] There is a need for humanitarian aid, to old age homes, hospitals, children's homes and other points of direct delivery. Such aid could best be organized from civil society to civil society, involving large groups in Italy and Albania, for instance. There might be a need for protection, in which case an international police force might be considered.

[5] Cancel Operation Alba; it is ill-conceived from the very beginning. A soldier in full combat gear is not a symbol of humanitarian aid, but of an invasion. Italian leadership is an unfortunate idea, given the memories of Mussolini's invasion 58 years earlier, April 1939. There is the suspicion of ulterior motives not too different from Mussolini's; motives that might also be attributed to Turkish, ex-Yugoslav and Greek forces.(974)

[39] HOSTAGE CRISES (PERU): A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

The take-over of the Japanese Embassy in Lima, Perú, 17/12 1996 was a conflict with six parties and the following goals:

[1] Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, MRTA;

- release of up to 400 MRTA prisoners,
- to continue the struggle.

[2] The remaining (about 70) Captives,

- to be released, unharmed.

[3] The Peruvian Government,

- not to yield to terrorism, not releasing prisoners,
- release of the captives, unharmed.

[4] The MRTA prisoners,

- to be released,
- to continue the struggle.

[5] The US government,

- that nobody yields to terrorism,
- release of the captives, unharmed.

[6] The Japanese government,

- release of the captives, unharmed,
- respect for Japanese ex-territorial premises.

There is also "Peruvian society" in search of ways to abolish misery, and "World public opinion" in favor of all the above.

If all parties yield a little and use "abolition of misery" as overarching goal, then this could become a golden opportunity:

[1] Tupac Amaru MRTA disarms and joins the political process in a democratic society, with access to mass media and elections.

[2] The captives are released, finding ways in which they could contribute to misery abolition.

[3] The Peruvian government improves the prison conditions, shortens their sentences, accepts MRTA as a nonviolent, democratic movement, and steps up misery abolition.

[4] The MRTA prisoners accept training in the prisons as village workers/social workers, and pledge to disarm.

[5] The US government makes funding/expertise available for misery abolition projects.

[6] The Japanese government makes funding/expertise available for misery abolition projects, and holds future Emperor's Birthday receptions at multi-exit hotels.

To achieve this four bilateral talks would also be useful:

[A] Direct negotiations between MRTA and Peruvian government.

[B] Direct negotiations between Prisoners and the Government.

[C] Captives and Prisoners meet and form joint pressure group.

[D] MRTA and Captives conduct dialogues on Peruvian society.

[38] RWANDA/THE GREAT LAKES: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** Limiting the Rwanda genocide in 1994 to "Rwanda" limits the understanding of the conflict and the search for possible remedies. Thus, the racism implicit in a genocide with clear class connotations has roots in German colonialism and "Rassenkunde", favoring Tutsis over Hutus (and "pygmies") being taller. The Belgian successors to the German colonialists after the First World War favored the Hutu majority ("numbers over centimeters"). Democracy was "in". Western economic investment (France, Belgium) became considerable, and Rwanda-Burundi was seen as symptomatic for more important Zaire/Congo.

Another aspect is the projection of the European (Anglo-French) tribal feud over linguistic/cultural/economic influence in Africa. Uganda/Tutsi/Bunyamelenge/Kabila anglophiles are pitted against Hutu/Mobutu francophiles, with the Western media traditionally dominated by the French as "area specialists". But disasters tend to favor the spread of English as most disasters are managed in English. French/Roman Law is losing ground, it seems, and English/Common Law is pushing westward with energy.

A third aspect is the role played by development aid, and particularly Swiss aid. Development agencies want success and tend to play on dominant groups in society, thereby cementing class relations that may be explosive. The underprivileged see no alternative to violence by revolution or migration and then invasion; the overprivileged see no alternative to pre-emptive violence against the suppressed and the moderates: genocide.

[2] **Prognosis.** If the conditions producing genocide are not removed, genocide will be reproduced. If they are in the structure of Rwandan society and a culture of violence, the latter reinforced by a massive genocide traumatizing victims and perpetrators, then the prognosis depends on how much is done to remove the conditions. Tribunals locate the conditions in evil actors. But their removal by execution or imprisonment is unlikely to touch the deeper causes, and also unlikely to reconcile victims and perpetrators and both sides.

[3] **Therapy.** One point of departure for a therapy may be to question the availability of any lasting outcome within the narrow confines of Rwanda. Thus, a married couple, deformed by the outside and by themselves, might do well to seek solutions outside the narrow confines of their apartment (note "apart"). And the solution to Rwanda might be located outside Rwanda.

One possible approach might be a bioceanic confederation from the Indian to the Atlantic oceans, including Uganda and Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, and the two Congos, maybe more countries, trading East-West with Asia and America, as much as North-South. There would be high level of mobility of people and ideas, goods and services, not confining people with a tradition of enmity to a very limited territory. Japan, with extensive programs for Africa, could contribute with East-West rail/road infrastructure. New energies could be tapped by doing what the Republic of South Africa has already done: exploiting the bioceanic opportunities further South.

It would also be useful if Germany, Belgium, France and Switzerland, US and UN could assume part of the responsibility, contributing to reconciliation by taking some of that colossal burden off local shoulders. That burden is too big for a small country. Better bring in others, identify causes, have massive programs in the culture of peace, create a new geo-political reality, reconcile, mobilizing all forces for peace. (97X)

[37] OKINAWA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Okinawa is an appendix to two powers, Japan and the USA, invaded, settled and annexed by Japan (1879); by the USA as a part of the Pacific War (1945, after 1972 as a base).

[2] Okinawans have two mother countries, Japan for many of the Japanese settlers and many of the "indigenous", and itself, the Ryukyu Islands. Okinawans have two options: some kind of status quo with Japan or some kind of autonomy.

[3] Places like Okinawa, Ulster, Hawai'i, Eiffel/Germany, Tahiti, Sicily, North Dakota, Semipalatinsk, Ul Nor have in common periphery location and that they were/are all used as testing and/or stationing/launching area for major strategic weapons; deflecting military attention away from the center.

[4] We may also talk about second and third order outstationing: the USA assigns important strategic roles to island countries far away, like Japan and England; they in turn pushing the role on to periphery places like Okinawa and Ulster. [5] People in such periphery areas are being used, even to the point of sacrifice, and the use will be hidden under veils of patriotism, serving the common cause of center and periphery.

[6] Thus, Tokyo and Washington have coinciding interests, and as a result 0.6% of Japanese territory has 75% of the US bases territory, occupying about 20% of Okinawan land. At least 10% of that land, in turn, is affected by the 3,000 out of the 32,000 land-owners who have leased their property to the US military and do not want to renew the agreements. Tokyo becomes the willing helper of Washington in trying to get some kind of consent from Okinawan authorities and/or land-owners.

[7] In the case of Okinawa there are also two other reasons why the USA hangs on to their bases.

First, there is an historical reason of perhaps minor significance: Commodore Perry, of "opening Japan" fame, also came to the Ryukyu islands and crowned himself King.

Second and more significantly: Okinawa is the only part of pre-war Japan where the USA fought a ground war (with enormous casualties on all three sides, above 200,000 altogether, 14,000 Americans). That victory is in search of a symbol: Okinawa.

[8] One argument for autonomy would have as a basis that it is in no people's interest to be somebody else's appendix, and even more so if essentially used for military purposes. That argument would be combined with an entirely nonviolent approach to autonomy, peaceful, cooperative relations after autonomy, and with precise roles in the world community as bastions of peace. [9] The way out of this dilemma, fraught with violent potential, is what Okinawans have already chosen: nonviolence.

[10] The problem of security for Okinawa is probably best solved through the following four-pronged formula:

- be neutral, non-aligned (like the Aland islands), do not serve as a stationing/launching/training center for anybody;
- develop a strong, non-military, civilian defense capability, belying Napoleon's statement ("but how do they fight, then") to Basil Hall who reported that they had no arms, August 1817;
- develop good relations in all directions; make all other parties interested in the survival, not the defeat of Okinawa; develop a capacity for peace/conflict work;
- be as self-reliant economically/ecologically as possible, with a capacity for satisfying own basic needs also in a crisis.
- for Japan a demilitarized Okinawa serving peace would provide more security than a provocative, offensive Okinawa. (96X)

[36] "COMFORT WOMEN": A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Japanese Responsibility

- recourse according to international law very limited, given the Tokyo Tribunal, the 1952 Peace Treaty and other treaties. The issue was not brought up, other claims were settled. It says a lot about the warrior-macho logic of governments that the suffering of women was outside the responsibility discourse. For individuals recourse must be within old and new domestic law.
- recourse according to general moral principles remains open although with some limitation (thus, Second World War cases would be difficult to argue; the underlying principle probably being whether the victims of non-lethal crimes are still alive).
- Conclusion: Responsibility for Japan, recourse according to old or new domestic law, and according to moral principles.

[2] Reconciliation (GOAL: Peaceful relations in the region)

[2,1] The reparation/restitution approach

TO: Qualified victims (families as successor victims?)

FROM: Japanese People (as successor people); ASIAN WOMEN'S FUND
Japanese Government, by facilitating recourse

[2,2] The apology/forgiveness approach

TO: Qualified victims

FROM: Japanese People (as successor people)
Japanese Government (as moral successor government), and
Qualified perpetrators

[2,3] The codependent origination/karma approach

Question: What went wrong, when? Any victim responsibility?

Goal: Adding victim responsibility to Japanese responsibility

Method: Deep encounters, some of them public, on national TV Financed by: Japanese government and other sources

[2,4] The historical/truth commission approach

Method: Open all archives for deep history (not only "facts"); the use of women for "comfort", and as battlefield for soldiers.

Goal: Learning from history so history does not repeat itself

Financed by: Japanese government and other sources

[2,5] The joint sorrow/healing approach

Method: Declare a day of mourning; public joint mourning

Goal: sharing the double sorrow, as victim, as perpetrator

Organized by: Japanese government, with the UN (for 8 March?)

[3] Resolution/Transformation (GOAL: Preventive, for the future)

[3,1] In international law, as explicit crime against humanity

[3,2] In school textbooks, but not only facts, also prevention

[3,3] Critiquing the warrior/macho myths, and their roots

[3,4] Critiquing the general war logic, of which this is a part

[3,5] Alternatives to war, including to the Pacific War 1931-45

Financed by: Japanese government, for a major peace fund

[4] Rehabilitation (GOAL: Therapeutic, also invisible effects)

[4,1] Offering rehabilitation (psychotherapy?) for victims

[4,2] Offering rehabilitation for families

[4,3] Thinking rehabilitation for those who deny and defend

[4,4] Improving relations among peoples in East Asia.

Financed by: Japanese government.

[35a] CAUCASUS: A PEACE & CONFLICT OUTCOME PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis** Contrary to what is asserted by many the situation in Caucasus is not that unique. In a world with about 200 countries and 2,000 nations, but only 20 nation-states, Caucasus is not the only place where the nations inside states do not appear neatly, side by side, in geographical space, but dwell inside nations dwelling inside nations, in a matrushka/ Chinese boxes manner. This pattern is particularly frequent in mountainous regions with complex topographies from the Himalayas to the Pyrenees; Bosnia-Herzegovina being another case. Hence, processes of self-determination come not only in parallel but in series: (Georgia) separates from a super-state (USSR), is confronted with a nations in its midst (Abkhazia and Ossetia), which in turn may be confronted with sub-sub nations etc. in the waiting. Even if "international law", usually an instrument for big power interests, accepts first order self-determination but not higher orders, the struggle continues. Nor is Russian intervention in its "sphere of interest" unique; big powers see that as their right and duty. Some countries like to increase their value to the USA through oil or investment, incentives. Latin American history may serve as a warning against the latter, and Middle East history against the former strategy based on oil and pipelines. To this we must add a major economic complex: when an empire, the USSR, disintegrates and privatizes, many assets are up for grabs: do they belong to Russia, Georgia or Abkhazia? "Let the weapons decide" leads to another war, etc. Added to these structural considerations come cultural factors in a "Caucasian Mentality" with warrior mentality, chief mentality, and victim mentality, but of course also with the classical five of so many "traditional/feudal" societies: hospitality, generosity, honor, courage and dignity. The Warrior Mentality leads to a low threshold for violent action, the idea that conflicts are about winning, not about solving and that negotiations are about winning, not on solving. The Chief/Sheikh Mentality place decisions about war, peace and foreign policy high up, there is nothing people can, or should, do about it. And the Victim Mentality, based on enormous suffering, even genocide, often at the hands of the others leads to a demand for undivided attention and focus on our trauma, including how to deal with the evil-doer. Any idea put forward will either be left uncommented or pushed aside, not necessarily because the idea is bad but because proposals are not essential. Protecting the cognitive and emotional maps is what matters.

The three mentalities combine in the search for the Big Man and for the Big Power, with Russia to the North, Turkey to the West and Iran to the South, and the USA everywhere eagerly waiting. Generally speaking women are less infected by this syndrome than men. Women have certainly been victims. But they are less convinced than men by warrior and chief mentality. Thus, particularly are proposals put forward by three women Naira Gelashvili (Tbilisi) about a Common Caucasian House for all Caucasian peoples and a Caucasian Civil Society; Ludmila Haroutunian (Erevan) about a Caucasian Confederation with Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan; Abkhazia, Ossetia, and Nagorno- Karabakh, and Arzu Abdullayeva (Baku) about dual citizenship.

[2] **Prognosis** Big Men with Big Clans will make Big Deals with Big Powers. Oil and cash will flow, building a corrupt class of nouveaux riches. People will not be asked, nations will not be respected, only the power of arms and money.

[3] Therapy. Basically the key to conflict transformation by peaceful means in the Caucasus lies in Caucasian cooperation, based on democracy and human rights. With 3 states and 28 nations any part is too weak to survive alone with four bigger powers pressing. Jointly they complement each other economically and culturally, and could stand up politically against pressure.

But Georgia and Armenia-Azerbaijan have to be transformed: Georgia has to countenance its multi-national reality. Any effort to impose Georgian language and history on Abkhazians, Ajaris, Ossetians and others will be resented as much as any Russian effort to do the same with Georgians. Abkhazia, Ajara, (South) Ossetia and others should have been granted linguistic and educational autonomy years ago without passing through wars of nationalism. Georgia and the others might have been saved two wars fueled by nationalism, but not Georgia's own civil war.

If a country is multi-national there is no alternative to symmetry, using Switzerland as a model. Georgia may one day have to translate multi-nationalism into federalism. And that could also apply to Azerbaijan as a federation with Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh as a part and to Armenia with Azeri Nakitchiwan as another? Dual passports in all four parts might be helpful?

Then proposals at a multilateral, Caucasian level:

[1] A Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Caucasus, C/OSCC, might be useful, with a permanent Security Commission under the auspices of the OSCE with good links to the UN, possibly on a pan-Caucasian basis. The basic goal is conflict autonomy, with Caucasians masters in their own house.

[2] A Caucasian Parliament would sooner or later have to follow, raising such questions as whether the members should be appointed by their state parliaments or elected by popular vote (the two stages in the history of the European Parliament).

[3] A useful model is probably the Nordic Council because there are members at different levels: five independent countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland, full rights), one semi-independent (Greenland), two island groups that are parts of Denmark (Faroe Islands) and Finland (Aland Islands, neutral) and a nation straddling Norway-Sweden-Finland (the Sami). Far from Caucasian complexity but similar and the formula is non-conventional. But having a voice does not mean having a vote.

[4] One model for a Caucasian Parliament would include the three states with full rights, and with their major constituent parts.

[5] Another model for a Caucasian Parliament might have two houses, one for the three states and one for the (28?) nations, for articulation of concerns or decision-making, with mechanisms like the US Congress in case of disagreement between the houses.

[6] The Nordic case suggests including such issues as abolition of visas, later passports, within Caucasus, a Caucasian labor market, facilitation of NGO activities, encouragement of joint economic enterprises and reconciliation of parties in conflict.

[7] Minorities with grievances should be invited to raise their concerns at the Caucasian level, with other Caucasians mediating

[8] A special concern of a Caucasian Parliament might be to look into the possibilities of dual citizenship, as mentioned one for the state in which a person lives and one for the state of the nation with which he identifies. Special attention would be paid to the problems of double voting, military service and taxation.

[9] This cooperation could start without prejudging the outcome later as a Council for Cooperation and lead to a common market, a community, a confederation, or even a federation. (976)

[35b] CAUCASUS: A PEACE & CONFLICT PROCESS PERSPECTIVE

A Peace Zone in the Middle of Caucasus

[1] The three biggest Caucasian countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are so fortunate as to have a three-countries point, Krasni' Most', in the middle, sparsely populated, neither lakes nor mountains. Other regions, like the Nordic countries, might wish they had such a point (Denmark and Sweden come close, the three-countries point Norway-Sweden-Finland is more problematic).

[2] If each country made available some square kilometers for a zone of peace, cooperation and development around this point (while remaining owners of their part) Caucasian cooperation might move from declarations to reality, even quickly.

[3] Culturally, and that might be a good beginning, the zone could be the site of major cultural festivals, and not only for youth, combining music and singing with dialogues (say, in groups of ten persons) producing concrete ideas for peace, cooperation and development, giving prizes for the best ideas, handing ideas over to politicians as a gift from the people - all of this in search of UNESCO's goal: peace culture. Permanent exhibitions and ecumenical dialogues might also be considered.

[4] Economically, the zone, with adequate size, could host a regional airport with good highway connections to the three capitals (thereby also connecting them with each other). International airlines that would not call on the three countries singly might be attracted by a regional facility (in the future a joint Caucasian airline might also be attractive). An economic zone for joint enterprises, particularly in the export sector following Japanese models, could be important.

[5] Militarily, the zone would be demilitarized or at least devoid of any offensive capability. Training for peace missions by a Caucasian Peacekeeping Force might be worth considering.

[6] Politically, this might be the neutral ground on which to place Caucasian institutions for functional cooperation in such fields as environment or security (eg. a Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Caucasus, C/OSCC, affiliated with the OSCE; or a Caucasian Security Commission in general). Should the region declare itself a community, or even a con-federation, then this would be the logical site for a Caucasian Assembly, whether it is with one house (for countries) or two houses (an additional house for nationalities).

[7] The outside world would be invited in as observers, the four big powers to verify that there is nothing in this concept directed against them. For North Caucasus the three-countries point has no symbolic value; cooperation with that region within a Pan-Caucasian formula might find other venues more appropriate

[8] The zone of peace can be used as a first place to practice some important ideas. The danger would be that it becomes the last.

(Galtung and Jacobsen, 976)

[35c] CAUCASUS: A PEACE & CONFLICT OUTCOME PERSPECTIVE

[1]**Diagnosis.** TRANSCEND was asked in June 1997 to explore possible ways out for the (South) Caucasian situation. As nothing along the lines suggested was implemented, the prognosis six years ago becomes the diagnosis of today: Big Men with Big Clans will make Big Deals with Big Powers. Oil and cash will flow, building a corrupt class of nouveaux riches. People will not be asked, nations will not be respected, only the power of arms and money. The geography then, as now, locates Caucasus "with Russia to the North, Turkey to the West, Iran to the South, and the USA everywhere eagerly waiting", only that the USA has now arrived, in Georgia and Azerbaidjan, and Russia in Abkhasia and Armenia.

Caucasus is today a major theater in Cold War II, the long term encirclement of Russia-India-China (40% of humanity) to control Eurasia (the "world island" in century old geopolitics), particularly the latter, through the eastward expansion of NATO and the westward expansion of AMPO, the USA-Japan security system (with South Korea and Taiwan as de facto members). Change of regime in China is No. 7 of ten geopolitical goals in the Project for a New American Century, PNAC, the major guide to US foreign policy. In addition to the two countries in Caucasus Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have also been given military roles, on the surface in connection with Afghanistan and generally the "war on terrorism". Short term goals have been obtained by mediocre leaders at the highly probable risk of becoming a major war zone in the struggle for power in Central Asia, both sides probably studying how people in Afghanistan and Iraq fight foreign invaders.

[2] **Prognosis.** This all adds up to the possibility of Caucasus as a major war zone should Cold War II become hot, like Cold War I not as direct Washington-Moscow confrontation, but through their satellites, also having poor soldiers kill each other to solve the "overpopulation problem". To mobilize the two sides Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) has to be kept alive as an unsolved issue. One possibility is Azerbaidjan invading NK when the oil has made them rich enough to override the outcome of the last war, feeding into an endless chain of revenge and redistribution. As international (read: interstate) war tends to favor territorial integrity over national self-determination protests will be few.

[3] **Therapy.** To start with NK: Any peace must respect the Armenian right of self-determination and equality of the parties. Swapping the Armenian human rights in NK for an oil flow for all future may look clever at the level of the two states but "peace" at the expense of the basic need to be ruled by one's own kind is a time bomb waiting to explode. Status quo, freezing the situation is unjust to the peoples concerned and dangerous. Dividing NK will make the parts non-viable and unstable. Viable options:

- NK as an independent state, bound to protect its minorities;
- Joint AZ-AR sovereignty, "biconsular" rule, possibly rotating;
- Azerbaidjan/NK/Armenia confederation or even federation
- Caucasus as confederation or even federation, NK as a Part
- European Union membership to all as a de facto federation

The last four options would give the inhabitants a passport with two names on it: NK and Az or Ar, NK and the name of the community or union. For the European Union that passport already exists. For Abkhasia a Russian identity also has to be recognized.

Peace in Caucasus implies disinviting big powers, engaging in integrative Caucasian policies, like the ones outlined in the 976 perspectives. The present policies lead away from peace. 039

[34] ECUADOR-PERU: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

By the classical logic of the state system now celebrating its 350th anniversary since the Treaty of Westphalia, each piece of land, clearly demarcated, belongs to one and only one state. But what if two or more states claim the same piece of land, for instance because there is not only one divortium aquarum (water-shed) but two, or a possible border river comes and goes? The classical answer is a war to arrive at a "military solution", and this is what Ecuador and Perú did in 1942, 1981 and 1995, following the 1941 war. Another answer is to have a strong, big state or community of states, take over, as a "mandate".

An answer much more in line with an increasingly borderless world would be for the states to administer a disputed territory together as a **condominium**. If both parties have reasonable claims, then rather than dividing the disputed territory define it as joint territory shared by the contestant parties. Rather than fighting it out, the joint territory may be used for cooperative ventures. But exactly what would that mean?

[1] The two states could make the "zona inejecutable"--where the Rio de Janeiro Protocol from January 1942 did not establish a precise boundary so that the treaty could not be executed--a binational zone, a condominium with both flags.

[2] They could establish a protected natural park with the help of the IUCN, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and its Programme on Protected Areas, making the zone more untouchable, in the interest of both peace and the environment. The park would be jointly administered whether a border between the two has been clearly demarcated or not.

[3] Camping facilities for youth and others from both countries would fit into a natural park, like they do elsewhere.

[4] They could establish economic zones for joint ventures inviting companies from both sides. Factories might have to be outside an ecological zone, but administrative facilities could fit in; no major problem in today's electronic world.

[5] The troops of the two countries would disengage and withdraw, and procedures would be established for joint security, patrolling, early warning of military movements, etc.

[6] Work has to be done adjusting the legal codes to each other, to adjudicate crimes and facilitate cooperation.

In short, two countries with a history of hostility could use conflict creatively to grow together at the disputed point, and at the speed national sentiments would tolerate and demand.

[7] But they could go further, internationalizing the zone, retaining binational administration and sovereignty as a fall-back. Two more flags could come up: the United Nations and the Organization of American States, alongside the national flags.

[8] A compound for negotiating border (and other) disputes would be constructed, for parties from anywhere in the world.

[9] UN/OAS peacekeeping troops would internationalize security, using contingents from the two countries, and others.

[10] The area could become an international **zone of peace**, and a registry for such zones could be established at the United Nations with emerging rules for a code of conduct. Regional organizations elsewhere (like OAU, OSCE) might be interested in the same constructive approach to border disputes, and follow up using such zones as staging areas for peacemaking and -building.

If intergovernmental organizations cooperate, so could international people's organizations from Latin America, giving more substance to an international civil society. (958 and 986)

[33] TRIPARTITE EUROPE: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** Two fault-lines cut Europe in three parts: Protestant/Catholic (also a fault-line, but inactive since 1648 except for Ireland), Slavic-Orthodox and Turko-Muslim. As the fault-lines (Catholic/Orthodox from 1054, and Christian/Muslim from 1095) intersect in Sarajevo, surrounded by Bosnia and Herzegovina, surrounded by Yugoslavia, surrounded by the Balkans this is a major conflict arena by and large with predictable alliances: a Washington/London/Paris/Berlin/Wien/Rome/Zagreb axis, a Moscow/Beograd/Skopje/Athens axis and the "green transversal" Sarajevo/Tirana/Pristina/Tetova/Ankara and onwards. Another tripartite arena is the Caucasus region, with violent encounters between Slavic-Orthodox and Turko-Muslim forces, the third parties being Georgian/Armenian Christians.

Today most Protestant/Catholic countries are in the European Union, the biggest Slavic-Orthodox in the CIS, and the Turko-Muslim countries also have an organization (ECO): Turkey, six ex-Soviet republics, and Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Should conflicts harden further economic/military/political crystallization would be easy. Oil fuels the conflict.

[2] **Prognosis.** The order is tripartite, and conflicts where all three have axes to grind with the other two are entirely possible. But wars are between two parties, calling either for alliances or for withdrawal as outsiders or declared neutrals. The Yugoslav catastrophe brought about US intervention to forge a highly unstable Croat-Bosniak federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a Dayton Agreement that does not respect self-determination of the three nations and makes B-i-H a first NATO protectorate. The Kosovo/a debacle may eventually lead to a tri-partite war with both Serbia and Kosovar/Albanian guerrillas fighting a second NATO protectorate, established against international law (not self-defense, not collective self-defense, not authorized by the Security Council). Who is next?

Escalation by imitation in similar European regions (and by extension, to) is likely. The formation of Slavic-Orthodox and Turko-Muslim blocs will follow. The culture of violence goes back to brutal, hot-blooded medieval patterns, like in the bloody Irish-English-Scottish interface in Northern Ireland.

[3] **Therapy.** A Westphalia II in 1998, 1648 + 350 years, bridging the two fault-lines or at least declaring some kind of disengagement, would have been very useful. That did not happen. The logical therapy would be to strengthen the organization that brings all three parts together, the OSCE, with measures like:

- militarily, using OSCE for peacekeeping without threatening East Asia, no extension of NATO up to the two fault-lines, or, if that happens, a five hundred kilometers disengagement zone.
- economically, using OECD, the Organization for Cooperation and Development in (all of) Europe for equitable trade and growth;
- politically, making OSCE a regional UN for Europe, without big power veto and with a real parliament in more permanent session;
- culturally, dialogues and cooperation across confession lines; using CE, Council of (almost) Europe, for culture, sport, youth.

In short, use pan-European institutions, not subregional EU, NATO or WEU. NATO has been expanded to include two Catholic and one mixed Central European country, troops are watching each other across fatal fault-lines. If Yugoslavia is a meso-cosm of Europe, then what might work in Yugoslavia might work in Europe: smaller units, more homogeneous, woven together (con)federally. The problem: so far nothing of the kind has happened. (96X)

[32] CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** On 27 November 1095 Pope Urban II made a call for what became known as the first Crusade in the French town of Clermont. In 1291, the Crusades came to an end. But a real declaration of peace has never been made.

[2] **Prognosis.** The Crusades stand out in history as an example of how religion is used to justify war. Even today collective memories and a crusade mentality persist, defining a "Gulf Syndrome" with Catholic/Protestant countries against a Muslim country with a major Crusade experience (Baghdad 1258).

[3] **Therapy.** On November 26-27, 1995, a dialogue was convened at the Swiss Institute for Development in Biel/Bienne, bringing together leading representatives of the Christian and Islamic faiths: Ayatollah, professor Mohammad Taghi Jafari, Tehran; Sheikh Ahmad Kufarou, Grand Mufti of Syria, Damascus; Nuncio, Archbishop K. J. Rauber, Bern; Metropolitan Damaskinos, Bishop of Orthodox Church, Geneva; and scholars and clerics.

Pope John Paul II sent his blessings and a message to the symposium through Cardinal Angelo Sodano, Secretary of State of the Holy See: "...It is opportune to reflect on these events, in order to draw vital lessons for today. His Holiness renews the call of the Second Vatican Council which urged that a sincere effort be made to achieve mutual understanding, so that, for the benefit of all, Christians and Muslims would together preserve and promote peace, liberty, social justice and moral values .."

Communique:

"The adherents of Islam and Christianity proposed the following to members of their respective faiths and all others:

- to try to understand other religions the way their followers understand themselves, as a condition for true dialogues;
- to develop school material in history, civic education and religious education, particularly material about the two religions, acceptable to all parties;
- not to abuse the freedom of speech when speaking and writing about other religions;
- to work together to identify, develop further and put into practice an inspiring ethic of peace, liberty, social justice, family values, human rights and dignity, and nonviolent forms of conflict resolution;
- to establish permanent inter-religious councils to further mutual respect and understanding;
- to cooperate across religious borders in Bosnia to reconstruct the country;
- to discuss with people in the media more responsible, peace-promoting forms of journalism.

On this day of the ninth centenary of the call for the Crusades, we call upon Christians, Muslims and all others, to go beyond mere tolerance. We must open our hearts and minds to each other. Instead of sensing danger when somebody is different let us be filled with joy at the opportunity to learn, to enrich and be enriched, to live in peace and create peace. Like everything else the two largest religions in the world are also subject to development. While keeping the basic message of devotion let us find new ways, acts and words. It is within the spirit of freedom of interpretation of one's own religion that genuine respect for other religions can evolve. Let the next 900 years and beyond be an era of active peace built in our hearts and our minds, and enacted in our deeds." (95Y)

[31] CHINA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** That there are (at least) five autonomy movements in the world's most populous and at the same time oldest country (from -221; there are older, but not autonomous countries) is not surprising. Those moves for autonomy are along the periphery, indicative of han China overstretching at some point in history (in Hong Kong/Macao others overstretched into a han majority). Except for Taiwan autonomy moves are built around non-han idioms, faiths, myths and a sense of territorial attachment. Thus, classical conditions for secession, irredentism, and claims for independence, are all present.

[2] **Prognosis.** The obvious prognosis is status quo with the Chinese center controlling han and non-han peripheries through carrot (clientelism, use of privileges to attract local leaders in Hong Kong), stick (repression in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia), and normative (Taiwan) policies. China works as a super-nation trying to accommodate others with nationality policies similar to Soviet efforts. And with the same weakness: nations want to decide themselves. The power profile differs among the five cases, and over time. A war over Hong Kong with the UK was avoided, a war over Taiwan with the US may still be avoided, but also may not. Military brutality in Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang may be stepped up, but Chinese military can also be brutal in han contexts. The more foreign, barbarian powers side with a movement, the more recalcitrant the Chinese. The location of the Tibetan exile government in an India with nuclear weapons, and the deepening linkage between Taiwan and the US-Japan security system counteract reasonable outcomes. Vicious short and long cycles of minor violencies are likely.

[3] **Therapy.** An acceptable, sustainable outcome will go beyond the extremist positions of a Chinese unitary state (with the present borders + Taiwan, the "run-away province") versus secession from that unitary state. In-between are the classics: federations and the looser confederation; outcomes not located in the Chinese past, but coming up frequently in dialogues with the parties. Autonomy in domestic affairs would be guaranteed. In federations foreign-security-finance policies would be common; in confederations they would be coordinated, but with autonomy. One scenario might be federation first, confederation later; the five advancing in step or separately. The underlying philosophy, from Chinese culture, would be daoist: in strength weakness, in weakness strength: force shows the weakness of the construction, stronger constructions can do without force.

The hurdles to be overcome are considerable. First, the han mind-set as the undisputed rulers between the Himalayas, the desert, the tundra and the sea. Will the Chinese be convinced that a looser configuration of Six Chinas might also be in their interest? Second, will those who seek independence find that their goals may be better satisfied in a configuration that offers enormous economies of scale and a cultural common ground; yet (in a confederation) offers military-political independence? Third: will all parties agree that time has come to solve these old Chinese problems jointly, not separately? Fourth: how to protect han Chinese in the new republics? Separate assemblies?

Tibetans may have to admit that lamaism was brutal, and that China also has positive aspects; easier for Taiwan, being itself so Chinese. Beijing and Taipeh would both have to give up the idea of being the center of the other, finding confederal equality, with Beijing somewhat more equal than the others.(972)

[30] **CONCILIATION CONFLICT (ARGENTINA): A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE**

[1] **Diagnosis.** The 30,000+ killed during the violence in Argentina, not only by the military but also by revolutionary forces, have left deep wounds in the entire society. The problem of healing the wounds from the 1970s has not been solved. The Truth is by and large assumed to be known; the Reconciliation seems far away, partly because of deeply embedded ambivalences.

On the one hand, the military are in a position to block legal processes by arguing that the revolutionary forces also would have to be arraigned into court. That position, blocking judiciary processes, could pave the way for a non-judiciary process. However, given the very strong Christian/judicial tradition of the country, with clear definitions of the "sinner" and the "guilty", prescribing the penitence of the sinner and the punishment of the guilty, any process without those elements would be defined by the culture as falling short of the ideal. And reconciliation can hardly be obtained through clear verdicts and sentences. Even if the victims may derive some satisfaction from the pain administered to the perpetrator in the sentence by the court, this may not make it easier for the two to live together in the same society, at present and in the future, or for both of them to live with their own past. But the basic point seems to be that even if a legal process is not a sufficient condition for reconciliation, it may be close to a necessary condition in that type of culture.

Added to this comes the problem of ambivalence. Some of those wanting the military brought to justice may also have wanted the military to intervene against revolutionary violence. Some of the military may also have helped and protected some victims. Some Argentines may have been on both sides, most on neither. That ambivalence could also pave the way for a non-judiciary process. But the culture may have the upper hand in those issues, effectively blocking reconciliation.

[2] **Prognosis.** There will be no reconciliation, except maybe for some perpetrators with themselves (and their God) by demanding a trial in Spain, the old Mother Country (which may use this to win in the struggle with the USA in Latin America.)

[3] **Therapy.** Open dialogue about these issues seems to be the only approach. In Argentinean society much of that dialogue is taking place, not only for their benefit, but for the Western world in general, and for other countries where these processes may be culturally problematic. That dialogue, however, will have to be informed by the many alternatives to the Christian paradigm and the legal paradigm, with elements of apology and restitution added. The problem with the alternatives is that they may come from other cultures and hence be unacceptable in a culture regarding itself as having nothing to learn. This may be more true for the Western periphery than for a Western center that has as its right and duty to be on the look-out for new approaches. The polynesian ho'o pono pono may not come across under that name,, but as a conflict circle, a round-table, a mesa redonda. The parties could be invited to tell their story, trying to establish their Truths as a point of departure, arriving at an understanding that opens for shared responsibility, and then discuss what each party could do to reconcile, meaning [a] to heal the wounds, [b] to close the book and then, in the end, to display their joint sorrow about what happened and discuss further approaches to reconciliation, all that at the local, the provincial, and the national levels. (95Z)

[29] THE MAYAS: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** To the uninformed the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas in January 1994, at the time of the NAFTA treaty ceding economic power over México to the USA and a little more than a year after the marking of the Columbus invasion, came as a surprise. Do such people never read history? How could they imagine that the dreams of the Mayan people could be totally suppressed, in southern Mexico, Northern Guatemala, Honduras, in spite of the centuries that have passed since their own decline and the Spanish conquista? The Spanish themselves fought the Muslim khalifat of Córdoba eight hundred years; why do they not attribute similar stamina and dreams to the people they suppressed so brutally? Because "primitives do not dream"?

What is happening is one more instance in the Americas of what can be called Columbus in reverse. There have been many uprisings these 500+ years AC (Anno Columbi). Could there be some hope that the world consciousness has evolved to a point where such problems are not seen merely in terms of much needed land reform, health services, and elementary schools? Or, is the Western concept of linear, irreversible history too strong?

[2] **Prognosis.** Possibly not. The discourse has oscillated between brutal repression of the uprising and some small concessions, important if enacted, but not touching the heart of the matter: self-determination. The most likely prognosis is, unfortunately, continuation of the revolution-repression cycles of the last five centuries, with most of the world, except conscious, compassionate people's organizations, doing nothing.

[3] **Therapy.** If this is a nation divided among three countries, then the future may harbor some similarities to the Kurds, including the three stages formula: first, human rights, then autonomy within countries, then, possibly, independence. The latter implies a Mayan nation not only within but across borders, possibly as a (con)federation of autonomies at the state level; Chiapas being one. And again there is the same tragedy, however heroic, of using violence when nonviolence, actively carried out, maybe by women more than men, might give much better results and much more quickly.

There is also the question of creativity. The Mayas are entitled to their state. There could be transition periods with dual citizenship and a joint authority Mexico-Guatemala-Honduras with the United Nations, in cooperation with the Organization of American States, as additional partners. And the measures suggested for the Kurdish situation, elections for a Mayan parliament in exile, a Mayan executive agency granting dual citizenship, might be further down the road if the Mayans do not have the same level of consciousness about their nation as the Kurds. Only one thing is certain: the issue will not disappear.

This does not mean that the countries, such as Guatemala, do not have their own specificity. The line between the 19 Maya communities and the ladinos is recognized as basic. But the construction of a civil war as starting in 1961, lasting for 35 years, is misleading: more important were the conquista, and the US bombing in 1954 directed against the Arbenz regime. But Spain and USA managed to appear as "third parties", thereby distorting the discourse, keeping the conflict "intra-state", suppressing the Mayan linkage. The latter is easy given the general Maya lack of access to world, or even national, media. Which only goes to prove how interesting life becomes with badly informed media: there will always be surprises like Chiapas. (958)

[28] SOMALIA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** The post-colonial, Cold War related devastation of Somalia is not disputed, nor the hunger-related violence. Added to that comes the secondary conflict over the use of Somalia as a laboratory for "humanitarian assistance", also to release German funds for UN peacekeeping (as Cambodia was used for Japan). But the major problem is intellectual: Somalia does not fit Western nation-state models as a set of territories administered from a capital, with some autonomy to the provinces of a federation, and very little or no autonomy in a unitary state. Western democracy is based on territorial constituencies and one person-one vote, with majority-takes-all or proportional representation in a national assembly. Somalia looked like a nation-state in the sense of (roughly) one religion and one language. Mogadiscio seemed to function like any capital of any nation-state, and when the model did not fit violence was used at the expense of agricultural assistance.

Virtual reality. In reality Somalia can only be understood seeing the clans as polities; missing in the discourse from the beginning, then introduced but in a very unfortunate way. The super-clans are **Darood** (clans: Dulbahante, Majerteen, Ogaden, Marehan); **Irir** (clans: Issak, Hawiye, Isa and Godabiirsay) and **Saab** (Ahanwayn). This is a different way of organizing a society, partly territorial, partly by kinship. "Modern" Westerners may decide this is the wrong way, and wish it away, but kinship is solid. In practice this means less solidarity where it should be according to Western cognitive maps, meaning within the nation-state of Somalia as such; and more solidarity where it should not be, along kinship lines and territory under their command. So the society cracks at unexpected places. And the clan leaders, instead of being honored, were fitted into an inadequate discourse as "warlords". The US/UN spent enormous resources in terms of time, personnel and money hunting for some 13-14 leaders of super-clans, clans and sub-clans instead of useful work.

[2] **Prognosis.** Focus on the "war lords", like conceiving of Panamá in terms of Noriega. Mission failure, of course.

[3] **Therapy.** If the problem is starvation, "seeds and tools" would have been a part of the package, combined with medical assistance, administered by agricultural and medical experts; bringing in the supplies by helicopter, bypassing Mogadiscio, basing assistance on competent civilian personnel with police for crowd control and order. A UN expert sent to look into the situation August 1992 reported back to the UN headquarters along such lines and was told that "this does not fit into our concept." That concept probably demanded delivery by the military to bolster UN forces, opening for German army participation, like Cambodia was used for and by Japan.

If we now assume that the primary structure of Somalia is
- as a set of clans rather than a set of territories, and that
- the method of decision-making is dialogue till consensus has been obtained rather than debates leading to a vote/election, then a better structure for Somalia might be as a set of clans and non-territorial federalism as the clans live around each other. To avoid centralism the presidency of the Council of Heads of Clans (insulted by the West with the term "war-lord") could rotate like in Switzerland, say every half a year (like in the EU), giving each clan visibility, using the very innovative Somali shir as a conflict resolution mechanism. (929)

[27a] SRI LANKA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** A minority can impose its unitary state on a multi-national people, as in the case of Hawai'i. So can, indeed, a majority, combining democratic and what they see as historical rights. The result has been a catastrophe for the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims in Sri Lanka. The conflict in Sri Lanka, with a very high toll in casualties, bereaved, wounded, displaced, material damage, derives essentially from a wrong decision in 1956--understandable given the definition of British colonialism as the major contradiction--but not excusable. Even less excusable is the inability of the Sinhalese governments simply to retract and give the Tamils not only local autonomy but independence, holding out a confederation as a good second option given the limited size of the island; even if it can be explained in terms of the virulence of the violent meta-conflict touching most families in the three communities. The Sinhalese government even engaged Indian troops in the ill-fated Indian Peace Keeping Force 1987-1990, attempting a "military solution"; also to prevent Tamils from uniting with mother-land Tamil Nadu.

[2] **Prognosis.** The prognosis is continuation of the status quo, meaning protraction, with institutionalization of violence. Both parties have become so accustomed to military offensives and terrorist attacks, to revenge and revenge for the revenge, that the whole society has become deformed. Like in Northern Ireland and in the Basque country popular and media concern is with violence only, understandable because anybody may be hit. But any focus on violence and its terrible consequences stands in the way of conflict transformation dialogues. The status quo will one day change to the better. But that day may be far off.

[3] **Therapy.** One formula, in addition to Tamil secession or a territorial (con)federation, is referred to here as non-territorial federalism. Three nations live around each other, with a high level of mix. They start fighting. The classical idea is secession, or drawing lines somewhere, separating the groups. The problem with such lines is that they may serve as an invitation to engage in "ethnic cleansing". Hence, something more creative than drawing lines is needed.

One proposal would be a parliament for each nation with autonomy for the basic concerns of the nation: religion and language, trauma and glory, the sacred points in space and time, police and courts, some of the economy. And a super-parliament for infra-structure, foreign affairs, general security, finance.

This may sound complex. But that complication is a small price to pay to avoid bitter, protracted warfare with its costs not only in dead and wounded and material damage, but in often irreparable psychological damage in terms of individual and family traumas, traumas to the nations and to the country as a whole, and in general a population less capable of handling the next conflict. And nobody has to move: like for Democrats and Republicans voting in US primaries, or the Samis in Nordic countries voting for their Sami Parliament. What is needed is to register and participate; actively, creatively, nonviolently.

The three communities in Sri Lanka live around each other with pockets of high density. However, it may very well be too late for creative solutions: the wounds are too deep. In that case it can only be hoped that the Sinhalese will produce a leadership capable of thinking the unthinkable, a Tamil state, and doing the so far undoable; and that the Tamils will join in a giant reconstruction and reconciliation operation. (938)

[27b] SRI LANKA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

Here are some points added to the 1993 perspective:

Imagine we work with a conflict formation with six parties in order to break out of the "Sinhalas vs Tamils" prison, like:

[1] "hard" Sinhalas: among them much of the buddhist clergy

[2] "soft" Sinhalas: among them much of Ariyaratne's sarvodaya

[3] Muslims (10% of the 18.6 million; 14% Tamils, 76% Sinhalas)

[4] Sri Lanka Tamils, with 15,000 "Tigers" facing 150,000 troops and a considerable diaspora with world opinion impact

[5] Indian Tamils, in Tamil Nadu (50 million)

[6] New Delhi, Hindu India (with large Muslim minority)

The most elementary mistake would be a focus only on

[1+2] vs [4], excluding [3] and [5+6]; 1/10 of the people and major outside parties. There is more going on, below or above:

[4]+[5] vs [1+2]+[6], Tamil secession/union vs Colombo/New Delhi

[1+2+3+4] vs [5+6], Sri Lanka vs India, ignoring Big Neighbor. There is a double asymmetry at work: the Sinhalas outnumber the Tamils and the Muslims, but Tamils and Muslims in India by far outnumber the Sinhalas which have no mother country to turn to.

There are, of course, the old colonial power England, the USA and the "international community", changing the discourse from inter-nation/self-determination to terrorism vs status quo, possibly with a Tribunal if the LTTE Tigers are "unreasonable".

With less than 1% participating in the violence but 63,000 killed since 1983 we can assume above half a million bereaved, with deep personal trauma/hatred fueling the conflict. Policing a determined group using violence for nationalist ends is at worst impossible, at best prohibitively costly. Governments will pursue military solutions with large-scale offensives, pinpoint counter-attacks will deny them that, so will long-term revenge. Such agendas make negotiation/mediation shallow and hollow.

The following is based on dialogues with all six parties:

A. Tripartite non-territorial federalism Tamil-Muslim-Sinhala. The map does not invite ruling with rulers, drawing lines - the Tamils are scattered all over in addition to the concentrations in the North and the East. Three separate parliaments based on the three constituencies with autonomy in cultural, local economic and legal affairs and a super-parliament for foreign, security and financial affairs might make better sense than "autonomy" or territorial federalism. Three parties may soften the present polarization. The state would guarantee full human rights for languages and religions, a joint currency and general foreign policy, and possibly no army but a federal and national police/militia in a national rather than territorial EELAM.

B. Functional independence for both Tamils and Muslims, with the right to associate with Tamils and Muslims in India, with a free flow of people, goods and services and ideas--like the French and Italian speaking in Switzerland relate to France and Italy-- as one of many nonmilitary approaches to security.

C. SAARC will have to take on umbrella functions. There are some parallels to Kashmir. Hindus and Muslims have mother countries, but not the Ladakh Buddhists. Some of them might agree that it is better to stay together ("The Valley") than joining either; yet they want free flow of people, goods and services and ideas. It might be interesting to combine the two conflicts since the implications are the same: loosening up, more flexibility.(00z)

[26] ANOMIE/ATOMIE AND "SECTS": A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** Advanced industrial societies, not only in the West, are now entering a post-modern social formation characterized by a high level of dissolution of compelling norms and values (anomie) and of social fabric (atomie). The society becomes a set of isolated individuals steered by the egocentric cost-benefit analysis of the market. The computer is an icon, sitting in front of that altar the service. In this society the human search for meaning (through compelling norms and values) and togetherness (through obliging social relations) will find strong and sometimes unexpected expressions. Typical examples are corruption, criminal gangs low down and high up in society, violence of all kinds, and sect-formation, organizations inside or across the borders of state power with members tied together by strongly shared norms and values and by strong social fabric. Usually entry into the "sect" is easier than exit, and "sects" are to some extent societies within societies, even states within states. As such they are resented by state powers fearing not only take-over or the absorption of human/social energy by the sect. Needless to say, nationalism satisfies all these criteria and is a major source of meaning and togetherness.

[2] **Prognosis.** New, and numerous, groups will form within and across societies as the state becomes "failed states", because of anomie/atomie, through violence and corruption, and because of abdication of the state to the market. Nationalism will be on the increase providing both compelling norms and social fabric. States moving from l'état provident to l'état gendarme will spend much of their energy fighting these new formations, partly with very violent means. The sects will increasingly become similar to underground, clandestine groups under the conditions of foreign occupation. Obedience to sect leadership will be the dominant norm. States often accommodated different types of people; sects will be much more homogeneous.

[3] **Therapy.** The human rights tradition will protect the freedom of thought and expression of the sectarians, important as much of their critique of contemporary society has validity. The same tradition will also protect their right of assembly. But there is a need for a social contract where "freedom of expression" and "freedom of assembly" come together with the "freedom of non-expression" and "freedom of disassembly", of exiting. There is a gap here in the human rights tradition. We might think in terms of an SOS system similar to the admirable machinery made available some places for women beaten by their husbands, children beaten by their parents, etc.

But beyond that point the therapy would have to move in a very different direction by counteracting anomie and atomie rather than strengthening the coercive machinery of the state.

Counteracting the absence of compelling values and norms by preaching the old values and norms is probably meaningless and even counterproductive. They may be the values of a dying social formation, and can only be made compelling by returning to that formation. More promising would be a search for new values, and one place not to be overlooked would be "sects" with something to offer, preferring the term "movement" to "sect". Anything new looks sectarian to start with, but may carry some valid truth.

Counteracting the absence of social fabric presupposes norms of solidarity or reciprocity, abundant in movements and not in gigantic social formations like "society", "market". The state may regulate the movements - but should also learn. (938)

[25] HINDU-MUSLIM RELATIONS (AYODHYA): A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** What has to be explained in India is not so much the occurrence of violent communal conflict between Hindus and Muslims as its infrequency, especially given that the line drawn by the British (the last Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten) gave Muslim territory to India to secure the road access to Kashmir. After the bloodshed accompanying the Partition, Hindu-Muslim peace in India has been the rule rather than violence (but not Indo-Pak peace between India and Pakistan). Any explanation would include high level of tolerance in ecumenical, inclusive (soft) Hinduism, under the condition that others are equally tolerant and respectful of Hinduism. The Islamic invasions of Northern India, from +1000, were traumatizing, far from tolerant and respectful. They are not forgotten.

The historicity of the Ayodhya "Babri Mosque on top of a Ram Temple" is less important than mobilization of Hindu masses, ending with the demolition of the Mosque on December 6 1992 and widespread Hindu-Muslim violence in parts of India, paving the way for a fundamentalist party, the BJP, in 1998. The conflict was instrumentalized by cynical leaders, but had solid roots.

[2] **Prognosis.** But what follows later is not easily predicted. This could have been a catalytic event for a civil war to follow with the standard Indian lag, but could also have been the cathartic event instead of that civil war. To gamble on the latter is risky; it would have been better had it not happened. Separation of the communities, even sporadic violence, given the numbers and the proximity involved, could be serious. Remembering the massacre following the invasion of the Sikh Golden Temple and the subsequent assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984, the prognosis could be ominous.

[3] **Therapy.** Shortly before the 6 Dec 1992 confrontation a committee of four met in Ladhun in Rajasthan: a Hindu, a Tibetan Buddhist (Dalai Lama), a Jain (Acharya Tulsi), and a Western peace worker (Johan Galtung), dialoguing for a solution. The approaches say perhaps more about their conflict philosophy than about what could be an acceptable/sustainable outcome:

A Hindu view: persuade the parties to postpone any action;

A Buddhist view: compassion of and with all to soften positions;

A Jain view: whatever happens should happen nonviolently;

A Western peace worker: an engineering approach, moving the mosque hundred meters away from the site, building a Hindu temple on the presumed Ram site, constructing a corridor between the two with a room in the middle for inter-communal dialogues.

In other words, Western "do something!" against Eastern slow-down-the-action, focus on the inner Self and how, not what. These four perspectives do not exclude each other, and they do not exclude standard approaches like Hindu-Muslim dialogues and local cooperation councils to solve conflicts proactively.

But the deeper issue is whether this was a conflict at all. Did the temple really matter to the parties, or was it a choreographed violent encounter, chosen by the majority, for instance to show who was master in India? Was the temple too concrete as a focus, standing in for much deeper issues? If the temple issue had not been there, what kind of issue would have come in its place? Thus, could it be like the inclination to discuss technical "resource issues" (over oil, water) when the conflict is over class or the nation/state dialectic in general? A deep, dangerous conflict in search of a manageable discourse?

Un train peut en cacher un autre?

(92Z)

[24] **THE CONFLICT IN/OVER YUGOSLAVIA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE**

[1] **Diagnosis.** Standard conflict analysis demands a listing of the key actors and their goals, and of standard fault-lines:

- I. **Nature:** the military destruction of nature
- II. **Gender:** general macho attitude, backlash from equality
- III. **Generation:** seeding hatred, revanchism in next generation
- IV. **Race:** probably irrelevant, except for some UN troops
- V. **Class:** the under-class revolt against Yugoslav technocrats; and the revolt of the less well-off against the more well-off.
- VI. **Nation:** the Catholic/Orthodox divide (395, 1054) and the Christian/Muslim divide (1096), intersecting in Sarajevo.
- VII. **Country:** borders from the Nazi occupation+Tito/Djilas
- VIII. **State/Capital:** the socialism/capitalism controversy
- IX. **Capital/Civil Society:** inter-nation, inter-class exploitation
- X. **State/Civil Society:** human rights crimes, killed/wounded and displaced peoples's organizations inside/outside Yugoslavia.

All is relevant, but particularly the nation divides:

<u>Intersection</u> Sarajevo	Catholic: Croats	Orthodox: Serbs	Muslim: Bosniaks
<u>Inner Circle</u> Bosnia-i- Hercegovina	Bosnian Croats	Bosnian Serbs	Bosniaks
<u>Middle Circle</u> Yugoslavia	Slovenia Croatia	Serbia Montenegro Macedonia	in B-H; in Kosovo; in Macedonia
<u>Outer Circle</u> Europe USA	The Vatican Germany-Austria European Union Catholics USA	Russia+ Greece Orthodox	Turkey+ Iran/Saudi Muslims USA (?)

There are three standard hypotheses about the role of nation:

- age-old unprocessed inter-nation violence and hatred;
- instrumentalization of that hatred by cynical leaders; and
- instrumentalization of that instrumentalization by cynical outer circle powers supporting their inner/middle circle people.

Tito's Yugoslavia was no longer able to contain these enormous tensions, with gender and class added to nation. Tito's death in 1980 was a factor, but the death of the Cold War in 1990 was more important since non-alignment had become a major rationale for the Yugoslav construction and one party, the East and later the Soviet Union, had collapsed. The rest is history.

That the Vatican reinforced the Catholic church by state-building (Slovenia, Croatia) and that Austria took revenge for the First world war and Germany for the Second world war with the same allies and the same enemies was predictable. That the USA should support the non-orthodox was also predictable, but not the strong support for the Albanians in BiH, Kosovo/a and Montenegro except from a "what is in it for me" (bases, oil pipelines in return for military/political support) perspective. [2]

Prognosis. Massive alliances vertically in the Table, massive, sometimes trilateral, wars horizontally.

[3] **Therapy.** Massive use of self-determination to define states for Slovenes, Croats, Bosniaks, Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians, but at least autonomy for Serbs in Croatia, Serbs and Croats in BiH, Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia. (965)

[24a] YUGOSLAVIA NW CONFLICT 1991-95: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **A Conference on Security and Cooperation in Southeast Europe, CSCSEE**, UN and OSCE sponsored, UNSC being too remote, EU too partial, in addition to the London/Geneva conference process. All concerned parties (also sub-state, super-state and non-state) should be invited, with all relevant themes on the agenda; possibly lasting 3-5 years. Outsiders to the region should be present as observers with right to speak, there being no disinterested outside states. One possible long term goal: A Southeast European Confederation.

[2] **CSCSEE Working Groups on top priority areas to consider:**

- Bosnia-Herzegovina as a tripartite confederation;
- Kosovo/a as a republic with the same status as for the Serbs in Krajina (not Knin), and with respect for Serbian history;
- Macedonia: a Macedonian confederation should not be ruled out, but can only emerge within a broader setting ([1]) above.
- ex-Yugoslavia: as long-term goal, a confederation this time.

[3] **Increase UNPROFOR 10 times, or more, with 50% women**, creating a dense blue carpet to supervise truces and to stabilize the situation. The soldiers must be adequately briefed with police, nonviolence and conflict facilitation training, working together with civilian peacekeeping components. Avoid big power participation and powers with a history in the region.

[4] **A dense network of municipal solidarity with all parts of ex-Yugoslavia**, for refugees, relief work, reconstruction: Gemeinde gemeinsam, Cause commune, Council of Europe.

[5] **Let 1,000 local peace conferences blossom**, support local groups with communication hardware, and the Verona Forum for Peace and Reconciliation on the Territory of Former Yugoslavia.

[6] **International Peace Brigades as Hostages for Peace**, unarmed foreigners, professionals like doctors (WHO/IPPNW/MSF), working in threatened areas, communicating, dampening violence.

[7] **Intensify ecumenical peace work**, building on nonviolence and peace traditions in Catholic and Orthodox Christianity and Islam. Challenge hard line religious institutions in the region.

[8] **Permanent contact among persons, groups and states working for peace within the state system ([1]-[3]), municipal system ([4]) and civil society system ([5]-[7]); let ideas flow**. Have a "Peace Ladies Conference" parallel to the London/Geneva conference among the war lords; in the Palais des Nations.

[9] **Demand professionalism from the media**, less violence and elitism and bias; more focus on common people and peace efforts.

[10] **In the spirit of future reconciliation,**

- drop the sanctions, they hit the innocent and harden the conflicts;

- drop the War Crimes Tribunal except as moral individual judgment, there is no road to the future through revenge and punishment, adding to all the traumas, creating new martyrs;

- have inside and outside specialists search for understanding of what went wrong and for positive past and present experiences that can inspire a common, even if more separate, future.

- build on the longing of the Yugoslav peoples to come together again, nonetheless, on **bratstvo** (brotherhood) even if it should be with less **jedinstvo** (unity). (1992)

[24b] YUGOSLAVIA SE CONFLICT II 1998: A PEACE AND CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Old historical processes pitting Orthodox Serbs/Macedonians against Muslim Albanians are picking up new energies at the same time as the region seems unable to arrive at its own solutions.

[2] The "international community" will probably again postpone intervention till the situation is "ripe", meaning till the violence has come so far that almost any non-war outcome is preferable, meaning that outside powers can dictate the "peace".

[3] Starting with Kosovo/a, there seem to be five outcomes:

[a] status quo within Serbia, unacceptable to the Albanians

[b] autonomy ("1974 at a higher level")

[c] a Third Republic inside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

[d] as a part of a Yugoslav confederation

[e] independence, unacceptable to the Serbs

[4] One reasonable prognosis is that [a] leads to [b] leads to [c] leads to [d] leads to [e], possibly jumping some steps (like straight to [e] with foreign military assistance to UCK). If that happens a next prognosis might be unification with Albania and absorption of Western Macedonia ("green transversal"). The next prognosis would be a major Balkan war between Orthodox and Muslim forces, involving Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, implying major outside intervention and semi-permanent occupation of Kosovo/a-Macedonia (like in Bosnia at present).

[5] An alternative to this scenario might look as follows:

- Kosovo/a gets status as Third Republic inside FRJ, or a very high level of autonomy. The treaty is made binding for X years (X=20?) after which it is up for review (and a confederation may then be among the options, including Montenegro-Vojvodina?).

- Protection of Serbian minority rights is ensured also through a Serbian Assembly with veto rights for cultural patrimony (teaching of and in own language, access to sacred sites, etc.).

- Preventive peacekeeping and international guarantees needed.

[6] For Macedonia a productive peace policy might include:

- a switch from the present passive neutrality (or "equi-distance") to active neutrality in the sense of serving as a venue for major conferences on the problems of the region,

- also like Switzerland deemphasizing nationality by a higher level of decentralization and local rule ("cantonization")

- continuing and stepping up all efforts at cooperation at all levels across the divide between Macedonians and Albanians,

- if this does not work a federation should not be excluded.

[7] For the region a Balkan Community including Albania, FRJ, Romania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (the "European part"?) might be capable of accommodating some of the tensions, working towards such features found in the Nordic and European communities of the 1980s as a common market, free flow of goods and services, capital and labor, coordinating foreign policies.

[8] Nothing of what is mentioned above is overdue, overtaken by recent events. But lack of proaction during the 1990s, heeding the warnings of the 1980s has been highly irresponsible, leading to the current vicious cycles of violent action/reaction. (986)

[24c] THE CRISIS IN AND AROUND KOSOVO/A: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

The present illegal NATO war on Serbia is not conducive to any lasting solution. The only road is through negotiation, not diktat and, pending that, immediate cessation of the hostilities and atrocities, and agreement on a massive UN peacekeeping operation.

For a political solution consider the points made by former UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar in his correspondence with former German Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans Dietrich Genscher December 1991: do not favor any party, develop a plan for all of ex-Yugoslavia, make sure that plans are acceptable to minorities

In this spirit TRANSCEND suggests:

[1] **The United Nations**, which has to learn from its previous failures, **should replace NATO** and assume a peace-keeping role in Former Yugoslavia, including Kosovo/a, with contingents from non-NATO countries. The United Nations will have to mobilize all its agencies, UNHCR, UNHCHR, UNICEF, WHO, etc. to rebuild Kosovo/a, and before that, to provide the minimum needs of the people and the safe return of the refugees.

[2] If the Security Council is paralyzed by a US or Russian veto, this gives **the General Assembly and the UN Secretary General** legitimacy to play an active role in negotiating an end of hostilities. The Secretary General could be supported in that role by a group of eminent world leaders such as Nelson Mandela, former German President Richard von Weizsäcker, and Jimmy Carter. Pressure from world public opinion is necessary.

[3] **A Conference on Security and Cooperation in Southeast Europe, CSCSEE**, should be organized, sponsored by the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The UN Security Council is too remote, the EU and NATO too partial. All concerned parties (also sub-state, super-state and non-state) should be invited, with all relevant themes on the agenda; possibly lasting 3-5 years.

[4] The negotiations should aim to establish a **Kosovo/a Zone of Peace Protectorate, KZOPP**, under direct United Nations Trusteeship, or if political circumstances preclude this, under an OSCE mandate. It would consist of an Administrative Office; a Negotiation Task Force consisting mainly of retired personnel with experience in diplomacy, nonviolent conflict resolution, and international negotiations; a Legal Advisory Unit to provide legal opinions on various issues to assist in negotiations; Reconciliation Teams, consisting of various NGOs and religious organizations, deployed throughout the region to promote reconciliation among conflicting parties, human rights, and peace education; and a Security Group of police and peacekeeping forces to train police forces and maintain security. A first step in a multi-year process would include the development of principles and goals to which the parties can agree, the promotion of Confidence and Security Building Measures, setting standards regarding self-determination in the zone, peace education, training local police forces in human security and deploying reconciliation teams. Later phases include permanent institution-building.

[5] **For a more lasting solution, the similarity between the Serb position in Krajina/Slavonija and the Kosovars in Kosovo/a can be used.** Both ethnic groups form clear majorities in those areas but minorities in Croatia and Serbia as a whole, with "mother countries" near-by. Refugees, most of them forced to leave, are brought back, and the Kosovars are accorded the same status within Serbia as the Serbs in Krajina/Slavonija. To draw exact borders, each community can join the side its voters prefer, the process used in 1920 to define the Danish-German border. The possibility of Kosovo/a as a third republic in Serbia, with guarantees against seeking independence for a period of perhaps 20 years, and the same for Krajina/Slavonija in Croatia, should not be excluded (nor Vojvodina as a fourth republic). The parallel is not with Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was never a part of Serbia.

[6] **For the Southern Balkan, a Balkan Community might be considered,** including Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (maybe only the "European part"). It would allow the Southern Balkan peoples to decide their own fate--economically and politically--supported economically by the European Union, but without meddling by outside big powers. It might be capable of accommodating some of the Orthodox/Muslim tensions, working towards such features found in the Nordic and European communities of the 1980s as a common market, free flow of goods and services, capital and labor, coordination of foreign policies; it might also come up with original and better solutions than the European Union.

[7] **A dense network of municipal solidarity with all parts of ex-Yugoslavia,** for refugee/relief work and reconstruction can be developed. Similar groups in Germany ("Gemeinde gemeinsam") and France ("Cause commune") have been highly successful. The Council of Europe could provide help and advice.

[8] **Let 1,000 local peace conferences blossom,** support local groups with communication hardware, elicit and collect people's ideas and present them to the governments.

[9] **Intensify ecumenical peace work,** building on peace traditions in Catholic and Orthodox Christianity, and Islam. Challenge hard line, sectarian religious institutions in the whole region, not only in Yugoslavia.

[10] **In the spirit of future reconciliation, drop the sanctions,** and have inside and outside specialists search for understanding of what went wrong, and for positive past and present experiences that can inspire a common future, such as a Yugoslav confederation of more and smaller parts (somewhat similar to the Swiss cantons, with a high degree of internal autonomy, which have long helped a linguistically and religiously diverse people live in peace). And rather than criminal courts initiate massive reconciliation processes.

[24d] A POSSIBLE SOLUTION FOR KOSOVO/A: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

The 1999 war ended with military victory for USA/NATO/UCK and defeat for JNA, occupation of Kosovo/a and a major US military base in Urosevac, 20 kms from Pristina, obviously with military tasks far beyond the limits of Kosovo/a.

A military victory is not the same as conflict resolution and may imply conflict aggravation, adding one more trauma, this time on the Serbian side, to the problems. The major problem, although there are also other groups involved, is the co-existence of Albanians and the Serbs within a limited area, the Albanians having the democratic legitimacy of a clear majority, and the Serbs sharing historical legitimacy of different kinds with the Albanians. There is a Chinese boxes/matrushka problem in the sense of the Serbs being a majority in Serbia with Kosovo/a, the Albanians a majority in Kosovo/a and the Serbs a majority in Northern Kosovo/a with Mitrovica (and in a smaller area closer to Pristina).

A mediation workshop organized by OSCE in Pristina 11-13 September 2000 with about 70 Albanians and 30 Serbs--from Kosovo/a and Northern Kosovo/a--explored this problem in detail. After initial presentation by some Albanians of the atrocities committed by Serbs during the centuries, a presentation by some Serbs of atrocities committed by the Albanians during the centuries, and a listing by the mediator of cooperation during the centuries (inter-marriage, trade and other exchanges in the economy, etc.) the attention turned to possible solutions.

A general consensus emerged around self-determination as the guiding principle regardless of other provisions of and in international law relating to how the present situation came about. Oppression by Beograd, nonviolent resistance and close to self-rule by Albanians unsupported by the international community, a war based on false premisses like the "Racak massacre", and "Operation Horseshoe" to drive out the Albanians, the massive escape of the Albanians due to propaganda and NATO bombing, the violent UCK invasion, are incidental, not crucial to the reality of Albanian majority in Kosova and Serbian majority, and deep historical attachment, in Northern Kosovo.

These two basic facts point to a simple solution: An independent Kosova, and inside that independent Kosova very high autonomy for the Serbs in Northern Kosovo by devolution of power to that part, or by means of a federal constitution for Kosova with one, possibly two, Serbian cantons. Following the Swiss model the cantons would be run by, for and of the Serbs in Serbian idiom linguistically and culturally, like in Albanian idiom for most of the rest of the country. In addition to this there would have to be executive power-sharing for Kosovo/a as a whole with proportionality as guiding principle and use of two or more languages for money bills, street and place names, etc.

A confederation with Serbia and Albania, and also with a federated Macedonia (where the two nations are more equal), might be a future possibility, both to reduce tensions in the area and to make Kosovo/a more viable. For those very reasons a division of Kosovo/a would be counterproductive. (009)

[23] JAPAN-RUSSIA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** The Northern Territories/South Kuriles issue derives from history and geography pointing in different directions. The four islands (one is a small archipelago) were discovered 1634 by the Russians and settled by them. In 1875 Japan got the islands in exchange for Sakhalin. At Yalta Roosevelt promised the four islands to the Soviet Union if they enter the Pacific War, possibly as a substitute for having to promise them Hokkaido. In 1972 the Soviet Union agreed to the return of Habomai and Shikotan, but ownership of the bigger and southernmost islands Etorofu and Kunashiri is still contested.

The division of Korea had a similar background. Both can serve as typical examples of big powers cutting, dividing and joining together according to their inclinations and interests, with little regard for people, culture, history and geography.

[2] **Prognosis.** The present situation has lasted more than 50 years and is probably coming to an end. There is no negative prognosis if status quo continues, no war for instance, but a positive prognosis with greatly improved Japan-Russia relations if the issue is solved in a mutually acceptable and sustainable way. Japan and Russia could then enter an escalating cooperation race benefiting all if Russia introduces distributive economies.

[3] **Therapy.** To find a solution the place to look is not always who settled where and when among the pretenders. To find a solution the meaning of ownership by whom, to whom, might be a better point of departure. The economic and military value of the islands as such to the Soviet Union/Russia seems to be negligible. Quite another matter is the price that might be expected for their return if the islands are used as pawns in a bargain in return for investment: money, goods, and/or services.

No doubt this approach can be used, and is used, when real estate changes hands. But this is not one of these cases if instead of military or economic values the focus is on the cultural value. Japan cannot claim a long-lasting relationship, but Japan can claim that the islands belong "naturally" to Japan because of proximity (like Turkey argues about the Dodecanese islands in the Aegean, passing from Turkey to Italy to Greece).

If Japan is seen as the chosen land for the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu o-mikami, then the islands take on a higher value. They become priceless because the ground is sacred, not because of possible ores etc. hiding underneath as would be emphasized in a materialistic culture. Such places should be approached with more awe and less money on the mind. The Japanese came close to breaking that rule acquiring property in the USA, and the Russians may have done so with the Kuriles/Northern territories. Hence:

- if something has infinite value to the other side, and only finite value to you, give it back because it is the right thing to do. Do not bargain, be generous and you may reap generosity.

- the less you talk, even think of anything in return, the more amply you may be rewarded. The more you haggle, the less you get. The sacred is not approached with profanity.

This could be combined with an intermediary step, joint sovereignty, for the two contested islands for a period of X years, after which they will either revert to Japan or remain a condominium (X to be negotiated). The latter would set a useful precedent for territorial conflicts that cannot be decided by self-determination; and does not exclude reciprocal generosity.

A great opportunity for the whole world! (916)

[22] JAPAN-USA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** The situation between Japan and the USA is serious if the four phases from early Meiji till the Pacific War (1931-45) is a model: "opening up", then "Japanese learning enthusiastically", then "Japan practicing what she has learnt by and for herself, with increasing tension", then "war or warlike activity". The occupation was the first phase of the post-1945 cycle, the second phase then and right after, the third phase started around 1970, and is still on. Will there be a Phase IV?

Exacerbating the situation is the rank incongruence: the USA commands more political and military power (de facto occupying Japan), and Japan responded for a long period with more economic power (to sell highly demanded products when the yen was not so strong, to buy US property when the yen was strong; underwriting US debt buying US bonds). Both use their comparative advantage, at the expense of the other, increasing the tension. The USA no doubt brings up the Pacific war to get more submissiveness from Japan; Japan uses political/military submissiveness to gain more economic access; the USA launches economic counter-aggression, manipulating the currency rate, challenging the Japanese formula of lifelong employment and seniority promotion. Highly unstable; with memories of Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima/Nagasaki right under the surface.

[2] **Prognosis.** The second "opening-imitation-conflict-war" cycle has stayed for a long time in the third phase (if that is what is going on). No war is in sight, but warlike action might include such measures as deepening and broadening the US de facto occupation of Japan through new, expanded, guidelines for the Japan-USA security treaty (AMPO), and Japan leaving to the people of Okinawa the struggle for a reduction of the base load.

[3] **Therapy.** One way out of sour relations could be for the two to interact less, to disentangle. The USA could pull out militarily, AMPO could be abrogated, or diluted, not deepened, and both of them could focus on other trade partners; the USA more on NAFTA, Japan more on interaction with East Asian partners. Japan should press less for trade across great differences in degree-of-processing, and open for import of processed products from all other countries. The USA now makes competitive products; Japan should look for new markets. And when they interact, externalities should be watched carefully lest Japan treats the USA like the USA treats Latin America. They should recouple, but on a basis of equality and equity.

However, the USA has an expanding NAFTA based on US power in the Americas. Japan has nothing similar in East Asia, not so much because the USA is popular in Latin America and Japan hated and feared in East Asia because of the Pacific War, as because the USA is so much better at handling the traumas created by the USA, and Latin America so unable to produce competitive goods. Moreover, Japan has become tied to the USA as local appendage. Culturally, historically and geographically Japan's partners would be the other East Asian countries, meaning the Koreas and China (and Viêt Nam if the criterion is Confucianism/Mahayana Buddhism, and Chinese culture). An East Asian Free Trade Area, EAFTA, later to become an East Asian Community, would be a good alternative to the USA; open to NAFTA countries like NAFTA (to some extent) is open to others. The alternative is a Japan lost between East Asia and the USA, unable to reconcile with the former and increasingly dumped by the latter. That would make war and warlike responses even more likely. (929)

[21] THE KURDS: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** The Kurds are a nation without a state. Some 25 million Kurds are divided among five states (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia), with a considerable diaspora in Europe. Like any other state-less, divided nation they have a yearning not only to come together but to be ruled by their own, a basic part of the democratic project. They also form a major part of the vast and complex Middle East conflict syndrome, not only because conflicts over nation/state relations easily spill over into violence in the other five countries, but because a Kurdish state might create a precedent for another key stateless nation in the region, the Palestinians. There are also obvious oil and water issues transcending the Middle East. This may place the Kurds on the opposite side of the US-Turkey-Israel de facto alliance even if Iraq is the enemy of all three.

[2] **Prognosis.** Protracted, endless violence, terrorism and torturism, including export of the violence to Europe and beyond

[3] **Therapy.** The Kurds have a three stage program:

-human rights for Kurds in countries dividing the Kurdish nation

-autonomy within the countries, with Kurdish as one language and -a Kurdistan, possibly as a (con)federation of the autonomies, giving the Kurdish nation what they see as their right: a state.

There is nothing extremist in this program unless one assumes any level of nationalism to be extremist. Should it ever take the form of a unitary Kurdish state, the map of the Middle East would change considerably. The Kurds were until recently basically a nomad nation, and nomads claim much space. What is extremist, however, is the violence of all sides, legitimized by macho, violent cultures in all parts of the conflict formation. In July 1994, at the Rambouillet conference, TRANSCEND argued (in vain) for a nonviolent approach and more women in political leadership positions in the Kurdish struggle, building on the fact that Kurdish women demonstrating and arguing nonviolently got the two Kurdish factions in Northern Iraq to stop fighting. One day this may happen on a large scale. But violence is deeply rooted, fed by demands for revenge, honor and male mobility through male acts of courageous violence, keeping women out of politics. The Kurds are also their own enemies. In that they are not alone; this also applies to many of the other parties.

Creative solutions, using Northern Iraq for training in state-building and in complex conflict politics, would include:

-a Kurdish parliament abroad, democratically and secretly elected inside the countries. A basic problem is that Kurds seem to prefer naive, even violent, political fights, and have been willingly used by those who pretend to offer them something in return, like the Turks (in return for killing Armenians) and the USA (in return for turning against Iran and Iraq).

-a Kurdish government in exile, the executive arm of the parliament, with a mandate to organize a pattern of

-dual citizenship, giving Kurds a passport in addition to what they have in their country of residence, making them mutually recognizable and recognized more of a nation, one day in the future transforming that virtual reality into a real reality, for instance as a confederation of autonomies.

However, there is a condition for all of this to happen, and that condition applies also to the Kurds: to step down the violence. For those who will not contemplate that on ethical grounds there are military reasons: violence will bring the Kurds nowhere against overwhelming enemies. (90Z)

[20a] THE GULF CONFLICT 1990-91: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** Much ignorance was needed to be surprised by the Gulf War. Kuwait was an outcome of Western political and economic colonialism; the border was artificial and contested, and many other issues (access to the Gulf, oil fields under the border, currency issues after the Iraq-Iran war) and actors were coupled together in a super-complex conflict. That the US/Bush administration would hit hard and use the war to "kick the Viêt Nam syndrome", making war legitimate again in US public opinion, was obvious. In the heat of the conflict all parties reduced the complexity to a "two parties, one issue" formula, acting out the chosen people, glory and trauma ideas in the USA and the Middle East. Key memory: the Crusades, and the 1258 Baghdad massacre. The war became the Armageddon enactment of God vs. Satan. There was also the ambiguity over the US Ambassador's statement about not interfering in a conflict between two friendly countries.

[2] **Prognosis.** Given the linkage to the millennium old crusades syndrome genocide attempts could be expected, depending on availability of means, this time through bombing and economic sanctions. Given Bedouin values like dignity/courage/honor, and more so the more overwhelming the enemy, Iraq will claim victory.

[3] **Therapy.** The conflict has to be complexified historically and culturally, bringing in many more parties and goals and issues. As a bilateral conflict essentially between Iraq and US (backed by old UK colonial power traumas, including UK use of chemical warfare in Iraq in 1920) no acceptable and sustainable conflict transformation is to be expected. But a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME) might one day achieve some thing like this:

A 12-POINT PLAN FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

- [1] Iraq withdraws from Kuwait, but Kuwait enters negotiations with Iraq over modifications of the northern border of Kuwait.
- [2] Iraq enters negotiations with the Kurds over human rights and autonomy with a view to sovereignty, and encourages other states in the regions with a Kurdish population to do likewise.
- [3] Israel recognizes, encourages and helps a Palestinian state as outlined in the PNC 15 November 1988 resolution; Palestine recognizes Israel fully.
- [4] The Golan Heights revert to Syria; Syria recognizes Israel.
- [5] All Arab states recognize Israel with non-aggression treaties.
- [6] The UN in cooperation with the Arab League organizes a major UN Peace-Keeping Operation, with several hundred thousand police troops, stationed on both sides of borders in the area.
- [7] All foreign troops are withdrawn not only from Kuwait, but also from Palestine, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Turkey etc.
- [8] An arms control regime is introduced, modelled after the European process, with first priority to elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the area, confidence-building measures, inspection on challenge under UN satellite surveillance.
- [9] A water regime is studied and negotiated for the region.
- [10] An oil regime, possibly under UN auspices, bringing oil importing and oil exporting countries in permanent dialogue with each other, is studied and negotiated.
- [11] A human rights regime is introduced, moving the countries in the region closer to respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
- [12] A Middle East Common Market, with Israel as full member, is studied and negotiated. (90X)

[20b] THE GULF CONFLICT 1998: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Diagnosis.

- Iraqi motivations:

- the need for some weapons, hence an element of concealment;
- very aggressive, gas Halabja 1988 (UK Summer 1920), Kuwait;
- Bedouin warrior logic: use wars for dignity/courage/honor;
- future of the region and their historical mission at stake.

- US/UK motivations:

- to punish Hussein as The Enemy of the People (Orwell 1984);
- very aggressive, 310,000 killed 1991 (IPPNW), 2 million by embargo (UNICEF 1,210,000 children, 960,000 adults);

- US/UK warrior logic: win wars to gain status as leaders;
- marking the Middle East as a US/UK sphere of interest.

- Conflict Formation: A major war for inspection reasons does at present not have UNSC consent.

US/UK have signaled readiness to go alone in US/UK contra Iraq, against the UN charter 2(4). US has the support of the new NATO members Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; and England the support of former dependencies, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. In addition Argentina, Spain and Portugal, Norway, Germany, have joined. Kuwait and Oman are used for build-up. Less than half the support last time, and mainly from countries far away.

[2] **Prognosis.** Bombing will not achieve the destruction of hidden arms since very small areas are needed, for instance in the mountains. An occupation may, but at least 1/10 of the size of Iraq's population would be needed by traditional counts.

- After the bombing inspection will probably be impossible.

- The increase in fundamentalism in Turkey, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan may lead to changes in regimes.

- The Conference of Islamic Countries may emerge as a bloc.

- The Russian-Chinese cooperation/military alliance induced by NATO/AMPO expansion deepens, and may de facto include Iraq/Iran.

[3] **Therapy.** The following is **A 7-point plan:**

- give Russia-China-France and the UNSG more time to negotiate acceptable compromises, soften the language of the inspectors;

- accept right now Iraq's demand, since 1990, for a dialogue, letting Iraq voice her concerns, including sovereignty. Only very weak people are unwilling to give the other side a voice;

- make a compromise permitting unfettered, representative UNSCOM work against offers on valid points in Iraqi positions;

- but, a broader agenda is needed, so take steps to organize a **UN Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME)**, modeled on Helsinki (1973-75), including the Israel/Palestine and Kurdish issues; with Palestinian state and Kurdish autonomies/state not excluded as options. The conference should not be chaired by outside big powers but by somebody from the region, like Jordan (King Hussein and his brother).

- the UN in cooperation with the Arab League, organizes a major UN Peace-Keeping Operation in the area, with several hundred thousand troops stationed on either side of critical borders.

- regimes for arms control, water, oil and human rights are studied for the whole area.

- A Middle East Common Market with Israel as full member is studied and negotiated.

The important point is not to isolate the issue from the rest by defining it as an arms control/inspection/compliance issue alone. There is no way out of the present imbroglio if that narrow conflict logic is accepted. The agenda has to be opened up lest the situation deteriorates even further.

(982)

[19] HAWAII: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** The classical problem: settler colonialism, with overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893, annexation in 1898 (President McKinley) and the 50th US state in 1959; all illegitimate, from above, at the expense of the Hawaiian people. With more than 50 percent Hawaiians in the population they would today have been decolonized. But missionary deculturation, diseases ("Acts of God") and land-grabbing reduced them from 800,000 in 1778 to 8,000; today they count 20%, white settlers more like 25%. Most of the rest are East Asians brought in as indentured labor, themselves exploited. The archipelago has been used by the settlers for plantations, tourism and military bases attracting a major Japanese attack. All three industries are today in economic difficulties, leading to major cut-backs.

[2] **Prognosis.** The obvious prognosis is the protraction of the status quo with the indigenous as second class citizens in their own land, and settlers' rights prevailing over historical rights. An interesting beginning, however, was made by President Clinton, November 1993, offering "an apology to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i." (Public Law 103-150). The danger is that this will be followed by the US "nation-within-a-nation" concept, like the reservations for the Native Americans in the USA. That system smacks of South African apartheid some time ago. Apologies, some land restitution, reparations to Native Hawaiians are no longer sufficient (there is also the problem that after Clinton may come a new McKinley, wielding brutal Washington power.) Real sovereignty implies control over all eight islands in the archipelago, not only one (Kaho'olawe). And that raises the problem, what happens then to the non-Hawaiians, the majority?

[3] **Therapy.** One possible solution for a more independent Hawai'i might be a bicameral legislature: one ordinary chamber for all citizens regardless of background, and one for Hawaiians only, with a veto over such basic matters as control of sacred time and sacred spaces, the dyad of trauma and glory, allocation of land, control of residence, of foreign relations, language (two administrative languages), and police and court systems for the Hawaiians, administered by themselves. To be achieved by nonviolence, and based on a long, complex educational process.

One example would be using the concept of "sacred time, sacred spaces" to reconquer space and time in an archipelago of sacred spaces (such as burial sites), dotting the calendar with Hawaiian sacred time, with their days of glory and trauma, by far outnumbering the ha'ole (white) July 4, December 7, etc.

Hawai'i could also be reinscribed as Non-Self-Governing Territory and taken through the process defined by the United Nations (a similar case, Kanaky, by the French called Nouvelle Calédonie, was put on the list by the General Assembly December 1986). The sovereignty process can no longer be stopped, the consciousness is too high even with many stages down the road.

A more independent Hawai'i would include, not exclude, non-Hawaiians if they respect basic aspects of Hawaiian culture, like holism and respect for nature. Increasingly autonomous of Washington, a more independent Hawai'i might have both a strong finance economy and a basic needs oriented self-reliant economy. It would relate to the others in the Polynesian triangle, to the Pacific Rim through the diasporas in Hawai'i, base the security on good relations with all neighbors and no army, and possibly use the bases as staging areas for UN Peacekeeping forces. (93Y)

[18] PAX PACIFICA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** This is a major part of humankind:

In the Western Pacific: Russia (Eastern Siberia), Japan, (han-)China, the "mini Japans/Chinas" of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South and North Korea, and the ten ASEAN countries Viêt Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore (again), Malaysia, Thailand and Myanmar/Burma;

In the Central/South Pacific: the Pacific Islands in clusters known as Polynesia (with Hawai'i and Tahiti), Melanesia and Micronesia, and the big islands Australia and New Zealand;

In the Eastern Pacific: Canada (Yukon and British Columbia), the United States (Alaska, Washington, Oregon and California), Central America (México, Guatemala, El Salvador (Honduras), Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panamá) and South America (Colombia, Ecuador, Perú (Bolivia), Chile).

Counting only the population living on the seaboards of the rim countries we are talking about at least 2 billion, maybe 2.5 billion, human beings; 40-50 % of humankind. Of these about 5 million live on the Pacific Islands, a relation of 1:400 or 1:500, indicative of extreme vulnerability to their neighbors; among them four of the big powers today, with very much residual colonialism, some of it even surviving colonialism. Western and Japanese complexes of superiority also survives in the region; as in the French nuclear tests and the South Pacific Commission.

[2] **Prognosis.** The dynamic diversity of the Pacific Hemisphere can easily spill over into massive violence, against the former or present colonial powers, and among them for "control" or to prevent control by the others (the Pacific War Japan/China+ from 1931 and Japan/USA from December 1941 is still on everybody's mind, not to mention the US/Korea and US/Viêt Nam wars). The USA-EU-Japan-China-Russia pentagon easily dominates the islands when not tempered by some equitable symbiosis.

[3] **Therapy.** The forms of peace, the fa'a pasifika, would have strong cultural components, celebrating unity-of-humankind, playing on traditional Pacific faiths and other soft religions like buddhism, quakerism, baha'i and the considerable traditions of dialogical and nonviolent patterns of conflict resolution.

But it would also address the problems of direct and structural peace, and not only the problems of today but also the past and tomorrow. Thus, there is a need for reconciliation from the horrors of colonialism and the Pacific War. The karma approach to traumas, "we are in it together", of never-ending healing, reparations, apologies can be combined with complete decolonization to restore sovereignty, in part of the contested territories, using formulas like bicameralism and bilingualism.

The area would benefit greatly from massive withdrawal of forward and offensive deployment (the USA, Russia, China, Japan within AMPO, North Korea) and, for the USA, to scrap JCS 570/2. Denuclearization of the whole area, not only some small islands, would be a great step toward a pacific Pacific. And as to the economic aspect: both self-reliance I (do as much as you can yourself) and self-reliance II (cooperate with others at the same level, creating no dependencies) would help, with dense networks of affordable communication and transport.

For the future: many more states without armies, conversion to UNPKF for use in nonmilitarized areas, conversion of the rest to purely nonoffensive defense, massive use of creative conflict resolution and a regional forum for the whole area dominated by no big power(s)--a Pacific Hemisphere Forum.(894)

[17] **THE MALVINAS/FALKLANDS: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE** (1982)

[16] **THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (76Z)**

[15] KOREA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** Korea is located in the field of force constituted by four big powers: the USA and Japan on one side, well established in South Korea even if resented by parts of the population, and China and the Soviet Union/Russia on the other, with complex relations to North Korea. Thus, there is a 2+4 formula or a 2+2 formula if only the USA and China with clear military alliances with one Korea are counted. The crime of dividing a people in 1945 is compounded by the crime of denying the Korea conflict autonomy in this strong field of force. Japan has the complex relation of a very illegitimate colonizer, and the USA the trauma of not having won the Korean war. At the same time North Korea has increasingly developed an absurd society with deep disjunction between propaganda and reality, to some extent mirrored in South Korea being caught between a self-image as "advanced industrial country" and a crisis-hit economy. A high level of general Korean resentment (han), combined with missionary complexes, makes the situation even more complicated.

[2] **Prognosis.** Standard prognoses include collapse of one or the other Korea, take-over of one by the other, a modified replay of the Korean War 1950-53. A more valid prognosis: status quo. And then a more optimistic prognosis: there will be a slow move from steps of cooperation via an associative relationship to confederation, then to federation and finally to unification. After 40 years new generations often come into power, with new perspectives on bitter, traumatizing conflicts (Spain 1936-1976, Germany 1949-1989). 1950-53 should have implied transformation in Korea 1990-93; it did not. Leaders too old? Too Confucian? Lack of autonomy, with both US and China preferring status quo?

[3] **Therapy.** Four premises might help in a transition:

- to regard both Koreas as experiencing crises, neither system is perfect, that maybe both Koreas, not only one, has given in to single-minded ideologies, leading to too little trade in the North and too much trade in the South, and hence that all-Korean cooperation, including trade, might be useful to both;
- to talk less about collapse of the two countries, more about the need for some social and political change in both;
- to talk less about unification of the countries, more about some concrete cooperation between them;
- to talk less about the big/hard military-political issues, more about small/soft economic, social and cultural cooperation.

Concrete examples of cooperation:

- all-Korean cooperation in alternative energy production;
- all-Korean cooperation in ecological agriculture, forestation;
- all-Korean cooperation in fish farming;
- all-Korean cooperation, opening Rail and Road transportation, in a setting of Euro-Asian cooperation, and the ESCAP plans; opening for enormous transit and links to Euro-Asia in general and for a Peace University on rails;

Perspectives on the cooperation:

- direct North-South links between provinces, cities and NGOs; - moves toward, and not away from, mixed economies are useful;
- cooperation with East Asian neighbors (China, Japan, Việt Nam)
- Third Parties who can have dialogues with both sides, sounding out ideas without direct negotiations should be used; -- less use of trading X in return for Y, if X is a good idea, like helping North out of famine, then do it unconditionally. - do not set deadlines, do not touch the military, do not insist on a peace treaty but accumulate many small steps. (728-985).

[14] KASHMIR: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Process.** The Simla Accord in 1972 mandated Indo-Pak bilateral negotiations which so far have not delivered peace. If the approach is not wrong but incomplete, add the following:

- [a] South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation setting
- [b] Indo-PAK NGO roundtables for dialogue-negotiation
- [c] Outside mediators, governmental
- [d] Outside mediators, nongovernmental, individual
- [e] United Nations

All could be tried, and simultaneously for synergy effects. If [c] is attempted big powers with obvious interests in the area, such as USA/China (seen as pro-Pakistan) and UK/Russia (seen as pro-India, and then the UK is also the former colonial power) should have the good sense of staying away. So should UNSC as the sum of biases is not likely to be creative and useful.

[2] **Outcome.** The following is an image of possible outcomes that may one day be acceptable to most parties in the conflict:

A. Differential Center-Periphery Relations in the Indian Union

For the center in New Delhi to have the same relations to all states makes sense in a colonial/bureaucratic setting, but guarantees continued violence. That violence should not be construed as a demand for secession/independence when autonomy in some fields is what is asked for. Thus, in Western Europe the countries not EU members all cooperate with EU, and two EU members (Denmark and the UK) have autonomy in very important fields. India is twice the size and more complex. Kashmir is not the only part interested in negotiating, say, less federal, more confederal ties: so might Nagaland, and some others. The process will be painful. But "in strength there is weakness, and in weakness strength"; flexibility will serve them all.

B. Differential yet cohesive policies to the parts of Kashmir

An undifferentiated policy for a Kashmir with three/four parts makes sense in a colonial/bureaucratic setting, but guarantees continued violence. That violence should not be construed as a demand for secession/independence when autonomy in some fields may be the solution, ruling out three options:

- full integration with Pakistan (Jamat, Hizbul Mujahideen),
- full integration with India (the Instrument of Accession),
- independent state of Kashmir (the Hurriyat Conference).

A differentiated policy could include the following:

- if Jammu and Ladakh want integration with India, so be it;
- if Azad-Kashmir wants integration with Pakistan, so be it;
- for the Valley: if autonomy and devolution within India on the lines of the 1952 or 1974 constitutional provisions is what is wanted, so be it (the National Conference, Shabbir Shah?).

For cohesiveness the following might be useful:

- [a] Indo-Pak transitional condominium for the Valley.
- [b] Indo-Pak cooperation in softening the Line of Control;
- [c] Civil society cooperation across the border/LoC: union of families, cultural cooperation, local economic cooperation-- needed everywhere also to overcome the effects of globalization;
- [d] A Greater Kashmir Confederation, with open borders among the parts, economic cooperation, SAARC observer status and representatives in New Delhi and Islamabad.

C. Collateral issues. This does not solve such serious problems as arms merchants/mercenaries wanting profits, military wanting battle, and youth in alienating societies seeing violence/rape not only as "the best show, but the only show in town." But they would dwindle away and could also be attacked separately. (981)

[13a] **ULSTER: A PEACE & CONFLICT OUTCOME PERSPECTIVE**

[1] A transitional Anglo-Irish condominium is substituted for the present status for Northern Ireland, with a view to a very high level of autonomy/independence for Ulster after X years. Neither "UK", nor "Northern Ireland", convey autonomy.

[2] The six counties would constitute Ulster as an entity-- actually 6/9 of Ulster--with no internal borders, and could for the period of transition be considered territory of England and Ireland. Any resident could opt for English or Irish passport. Voting and some other rights in England or Ireland would go with the passport; not excluding voting and other rights in Ulster.

[3] Ultimately the right of Ulsterites to self-rule has to be recognized. The definition of an "Ulsterite" could be one who defines him/herself as an Ulsterite, not tied to blood quantum, cultural habits, or duration of residence. Respect for Ulster, its inhabitants, and a sense of homeland, would be more basic.

[4] A parliament, the Stormont, exists already for the Ulster entity, with a government accountable to the parliament; non-sectarian parties have gradually to be in command.

[5] Two assemblies might be elected for and by the Protestant and the Catholic communities, with veto rights in matters relating to their patrimony and local police/courts.

[6] There might be a Governing Council with five members, one representative of London, one of Dublin, one of the Protestant Community, one of the Catholic Community and one of the Ulster Parliament, to guide a process toward ever increasing autonomy, and to mediate among the communities.

[7] Ulster would gradually attain international identity:

[a] an Ulster passport would be recognized, first within the British Isles and the European Union, then in the world; in addition to the British or Irish (EU) passports. Thus, every Ulsterite is entitled to two passports, but may choose only one. [b] English and Irish pounds would be welcomed anywhere.

[c] The coming euro might have a local version with the same value (an ulster?). To stimulate local economies a discount for deals in the ulster might be considered. Investment in very sophisticated industries and services would be encouraged.

[d] The budget for Ulster would also be based on additional sources of revenue (duties, VAT) as for an EU country, with EU subsidy; monitoring the distribution among the communities.

[e] Special treaties would handle the relations to London and Dublin, to be implemented by the Governing Council, with review clauses guaranteeing revision every Y years ($Y=X=25?$).

[f] The entity would be demilitarized, renouncing the right to have a separate army. Its security would be guaranteed by England and Ireland together, in cooperation with OSCE and UN.

[g] The British Army would be withdrawn, the RUC made non-sectarian, and the IRA/UDF encouraged to disarm bilaterally. [h] The entity would have observer status in the European Union, other European organizations and the UN (like the Swiss).

[i] Massive aid from the European Union, other European organizations and the UN could be tuned to a peaceful progress.

[j] Independence should not be a priori excluded, provided there is a clear majority in both communities.

[k] Some redrawing of some borders should not be a priori excluded, using a voting process at the municipal level similar to the Danish-German model for Schleswig-Holstein 1920. (976)

[13b] **ULSTER: A PEACE & CONFLICT PROCESS PERSPECTIVE**

[1] Giving priority to conflict resolution may make violence dwindle away, giving priority to arms/violence control may encourage violence. In addition, the unresolved conflict may also encourage violence. There are no absolute truths in conflict theory and practice, but this is probably a better rule of thumb than most. To give first priority to violence control ("decommissioning") plays the ball into the court of violent parties that can break any agreement with one bomb (policing is very expensive); moreover, why should they give up their means of violence with no conflict resolution in sight? The parties also worry about their own security. Find exits from a conflict that got stuck, acceptable to all parties and reasonably sustainable without violence, and remaining proponents of violence will probably be very few, far between, and easily controlled by softer methods. Give the impression that violence control is the first priority, and fronts will harden, and not only among the very few who engage in violence for its own sake.

[2] Let 1,000 dialogues blossom. That conflict resolution affecting millions in a most basic way is too important to leave to a handful of politicians/diplomats/statesman is a truism in a democracy, and a remnant of feudal phases in our history. Ultimately the people, the ultimate sovereign in democracies, must also be given a chance in a referendum. But voting does not tap people's creativity. Better, organize dialogues (not debates) all over, in small groups, take note of ideas, let them flow together in a Gross National Idea Pool (GNIP), and feed that into the decision-making processes, to the benefit of all.

[3] Give more space in the process to the moderate majority and less to declared Republicans and Unionists. The moderates carry less negative baggage from the past into the future.

[4] The Orange Order marches will have to come to an end, or be balanced by "Green Order" marches. Catholics have to learn to react non-violently and not to be so easily provoked.

[5] There is a need for healing, for reconciliation, for closure. The following may be useful perspectives:

[a] Encounter groups, high or low in society, publicly visible or not, where parties that have committed violence against each other actually meet, is one way. They would share experiences and emotions, concerns, fears. There might be elements of restitution and apologies/forgiveness. But above all such groups could very profitably do the following:

- joint reconstruction, the parties, together, repairing some material damage rather than leaving it all to construction firms in search of contracts (they may also needed); helping healing wounds, rehabilitating the physically and spiritually wounded rather than leaving it all to professionals (also needed).
- joint resolution, the parties, together, working out the details of conflict resolution in their area.
- joint sorrow, the parties, together, locally or all over, setting aside time to mark the tragedy of what happened, as an hour, a day of reflection, also on what could have been done and what needs still to be done to prevent it from recurring.

[b] Personal testimonies. The victims, including the bereaved, are numerous; their stories should not be forgotten. Their testimonies should be collected and made available, also to deter future generations from doing the same.

[c] A Truth and Reconciliation Commission. South Africans and other conflict resolution/reconciliation cultures (Polynesian ho'o pono pono, Somali shir) could assist in the process.

(Glenree, Dublin 978, House of Commons Committee, London 983)

[12] **A NORWAY-POLAND AXIS: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (1966)**

[11] INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLES (ZIMBABWE): A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** Under this general heading a research project was carried out in what was then Southern Rhodesia, partly on the effect of the economic sanctions against the white minority (4%) regime after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) November 1965, and partly on the general strategy of a struggle for independence; in this case against a white settler colonialism with a **mission civilisatrice** complex on top of their obvious economic interests. The conflict was trilateral, the three parties being the white settlers, the black majority (divided, but that was not the focus) and the sanction countries, particularly the UK. The settler goal was status quo through UDI, the goal of the black majority was majority rule, the goal of the UK was to manage that process by making the run-away white regime yield to the "mother country."

[2] **Prognosis.** The prognosis was that the economic sanctions would not suffice to unsettle the regime, partly because both the Republic of South Africa and the white settler regimes in what were then the Portuguese colonies Angola and Moçambique, would come to the assistance, and partly because economic sanctions tend to strengthen the targets and stimulate innovations. But more important was another prognosis: that the black freedom fighters wanted to be the masters, and cause, of their own liberation in a relation which was no longer a UK-White Rhodesia relation. In other words, the freedom fighters would step up their fight rather than wait for the economic sanctions to "bite". That fight was a violent guerilla struggle, not by peaceful means. Economic sanctions were at that time at least less violent, but also almost totally ineffective.

[3] **Therapy.** The proposal was a struggle for independence through massive nonviolence. The other aspect of conflict transformation, creativity, was less important: colonialism, like slavery, is not to be transcended but to be abolished. There is no room for compromise, the only question was how and when minor problems, like the nature of guarantees for settlers who wanted to stay as citizens of Zimbabwe could be agreed upon.

Top people in white security intimated that what they were most afraid of was precisely massive nonviolence, for instance in the form of a nonviolent march, particularly by women and children, on the center of then Salisbury. They felt they could handle guerrillas, but not massive nonviolence.

The reaction of the freedom fighters brought up an other aspect of the conflict over the ownership of liberation. The struggle for independence is also a struggle for manhood, for self-assertion, if needed through violence, not by "fighting like women, like Gandhi". Negotiations also have limitations because they did not cover their degradation as "the Other" of colonialism, their own plight for generations under white rule. Added to this comes the macho display of prowess as the key to power after the struggle is over, and black majority prevails.

The same reaction was observed from the Akhali movement for a Sikh Khalistan independent of New Delhi: Singh means lion! And from the Kurdish movement for Kurdish autonomy: the problem was not efficacy and efficiency, but who gets into power after the struggle was over, men or women, in a solid patriarchy.

The problem is general. Traditional means of violence were monopolized by the warrior caste. Class and gender survived even if actors changed. With violent popular struggle patriarchy survives. To overcome both repression, violence, and patriarchy is the challenge. A tall bill, indeed. (1970-75).

[10] **MINISTRIES OF PEACE: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (1965)**

[9] **CYPRUS: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE**

[1] **Diagnosis.** The depth of the conflict is very clear and has a long history. First, the basic incompatibility between:

-**enosis**, union with Greece, for the whole island, for the Greeks

-**taksim**, independence for the Northern part, for the Turks.

This is complicated by the high level of population mix before the violence carried "ethnic cleansing" in its wake. Second,

-the background of centuries of inter-nation conflict.

One possibility suggested after many dialogues was to bring in some Turkish claims on Dodekanese islands in exchange for **enosis**. But this underestimates Turkish-Cypriot sentiments.

The confrontation in 1974, when a Greek national guard coup in favor of **enosis** was followed one month later by a Turkish military operation for **taksim**, provided an unnecessary proof that the positions were deep. Only Ankara recognized the North.

In 1990 the (Greek) Cypriot government applied for membership in the European Union; in 1995/98 the EU opened for negotiations. The original positions are now repeated:

-"**enosis**", EU membership for the whole island, for the Greeks;

-"**taksim**", in that case a military liberation, for the Turks; unless Cyprus enters as a federation of Greek and Turkish parts.

On top of this comes EU unwillingness to have as a member a country deeply divided (if this were a general position, both UK and Spanish memberships, to some extent also the French, should have been suspended till matters have been solved.)

In addition to the two nations in Cyprus, there are also two mother countries, the EU, and the UN with the 1992 Resolution 789 holding the Turks responsible. Russia came on the Greek Cypriot side (Orthodox brotherhood) 1997 with an offer of S-300 missiles for air defense. To the extent these missiles are seen as not only anti-Turkey but also anti-Israel, the new Middle East alliance US-Turkey-Israel is activated, "Turkey" meaning secular, anti-Muslim, military Turkey.

EU has postponed indefinitely the Turkish membership issue. Germany has been associated with that position, possibly because Germany does not want to share economic advantages in Turkey (or in Russia, for that matter) with other EU members; each Turkish former guest worker being an economic bridgehead for Germany.

[2] **Prognosis.** The possibility of a war is far from negligible; erupting along the European Orthodox-Muslim fault-line (like on Bosnia, Kosovo/a, Macedonia, Chechnya). Turkey is 80 kms away, Greece 400 kms. And the root conflict, with the inflexible island setting, remains as intractable as ever.

[3] **Therapy.** The following political measures are sufficient for a solution; they are probably also necessary:

[1] There is a moratorium on the arms race.

[2] The EU admits Turkey after Turkey has settled with the Kurds or before (human rights were also violated in Northern Ireland);

[3] EU members and others recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (like they did for Slovenia, in spite of a war).

[4] Cyprus becomes a federation with two parts and equal opportunities for both nationalities (like positions in the federal government, right to work and right to settle).

[5] UNFICYP is withdrawn after a transition period; the wall is opened for increasingly free flow of persons and goods, and

[6] The federal republic becomes an EU member in a symmetric setting, with both mother countries present.

The assumption is that nothing short of symmetry at all levels in and outside Cyprus will be peace, and that the alternative is a stalemate with occasional wars. (1964-1997)

[8a] ISRAEL-PALESTINE-MIDDLE EAST: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** The conflict is between settler colonialism and indigenous peoples, complicated by the settlers' claim as a Chosen People with a Promised Land. The land, and particular points in space and time, are sacred to both, but to some on either side (fundamentalists) more than to others (moderates). There are diasporas and supporting countries, particularly the USA (with a similar story of Chosen People conquering a Promised Land, early 17th century, drawing on the Jewish archetype) for Israel, very far from a neutral third party.

The Oslo/Wye processes fall short of a peace process (and so did Camp David where the Palestinians were not even present):

[1] Fundamentalists were excluded, reinserting themselves in the process through acts of violence. They also have peace concepts. [2] Peace actors/movements on both sides excluded, Intifadah, Peace Now were not acknowledged; their action was indispensable.

[3] USA is not a signatory, even if it is a major actor on the Israeli side, posing as "third party".

[4] Underestimation of polarization inside Palestine and Israel; overestimation of the extent to which the accords are binding.

[5] An unnecessary amount of secrecy, no dialogue with public.

[6] Lack of symmetry: the agreement is between a state and an "autonomy" lower than for bantustans in apartheid South Africa.

[7] Palestinian state not defined, how would that state relate to Israel, militarily, politically, economically, culturally?

[8] Excessive governmentalism and institutionalism, the relations between the two sides are not spelt out economically, culturally; [9] No real effort to weave the two civil societies together.

[10] An underestimation of the strength of religion as a code steering people's behavior, like killing a prime minister, the Hebron Purim massacre, and the fourth, suicidal, stage of Jihad.

[11] An underestimation of the sacredness of many points in the area for the Jews (Jabutinski), only political/military focus.

[12] An underestimation of the possibility of ecumenical work, between Jews, Muslims and Christians, emphasizing the positive, gentler aspects of their faiths, turning against harder aspects.

[2] **Prognosis.** The prognosis today is the same as fifty years ago: oscillation between the structural violence of occupation, exploitation and alienation and the direct violence of bombs and bombing, terror and torture. Also, the probability of escalation of the civil war within Israel between moderates and fundamentalists (with a fundamentalist killing a moderate prime minister, and suicide bombing) is high; and increasing as the "moment of truth", statehood, is approaching.

[3] **Therapy.** Four necessary conditions stand out:

- symmetry is of the essence, meaning the long overdue and full recognition by all of Palestine, and all of Israel, as states;
- the conflict cannot be transformed within the narrow confines of today's Israel, but possibly in the context of a long overdue Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East-CSCME under UN auspices, Helsinki type, accommodating the linkages to the US/UK-Iraq conflict and to the Kurdish issue, with full recognition of all states in the region, a Middle East Common Market, arms/oil/water regimes, etc. Neighboring Arab states might consider ceding some territory to a Palestinian state;
- there have to be plans beyond autonomy, with a Palestinian state confederating with neighbors, including Israel;
- there also has to be a concept of a Palestinian-Israeli confederation or even a federal state where the communities learn to live together in peace. (1964-1971-1993)

THE OSLO ACCORDS: FROM A FLAWED PROCESS TO A FLAWED OUTCOME

I. PROCESS

[1] Extremists excluded, meaning Hamas and Likud/Orthodox, the agreement being between PLO and Labor/Secular-Modern; probably related to Norwegian social democrat "reason is in the middle".

This works in moderate Norway, but not when more than 50% may feel excluded. They also have peace concepts, and they will announce themselves (like killing Rabin, like suicide bombs).

[2] Peace actors/movements both sides excluded, Intifadah, Peace Now, not even acknowledged; yet their action was indispensable.

[3] USA is not a signatory, even if it is a major actor on the Israeli side, posing as "third party". Was Oslo acting for USA?

[4] A general underestimation of polarization inside Palestine and Israel; overestimation of whether the accords are binding.

[5] An unnecessary amount of secrecy, no dialogue with public.

II. OUTCOME; STRUCTURE

[6] Lack of symmetry: the agreement does not define two states, but a state and an "autonomy" which in fact is at a lower level than for the bantustans in apartheid South Africa.

[7] Not relational: the relations between the two sides are not spelt out militarily, politically, economically, culturally.

[8] Palestinian state not defined: there are glimpses, but not how that state would relate to Israel, militarily, politically, economically, culturally, e.g. as confederation (with Jordan?)

[9] Excessive governmentalism and excessive institutionalism, no real effort to weave the two civil societies together.

III. OUTCOME; CULTURE

[10] An underestimation, probably related to Norwegian secularism, of the strength of religion as a code steering people's behavior, like the killing of a prime minister and the Hebron massacre at Purim, and the general fourth stage of Jihad.

[11] An underestimation of the sacredness of many points in the area for the Jews (Jabotinski), only political/economic focus.

[12] An underestimation of the possibility of ecumenical work, between Jews, Muslims and Christians, to emphasize the positive, gentle aspects of the faiths and turn against the hard aspects.

These flaws were evident already August/September 1993, and the repercussions after the White House signing are easily traced. The counter-argument is that the alternative was no agreement. But is it obvious that a seriously flawed agreement is better?

(939, 978)

[8b] ISRAEL-PALESTINE-MIDDLE EAST: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** The conflict is a classical conflict between settler colonialism and the indigenous peoples, complicated by the settlers' claim as a Chosen People with a Promised Land. The land, and particular points, are sacred to both, but to some on either side ("fundamentalists") more than to others ("moderates"). There are diasporas and supporting countries.

[2] **Prognosis.** The prognosis today is the same as fifty years ago: oscillation between the structural violence of occupation, exploitation and alienation and the direct violence of bombs and bombing, terror and torture. In addition the probability of escalation of the civil war within Israel between moderates and fundamentalists (with one of the latter killing a prime minister of the former) and similar phenomena in Palestine is very high.

[3] **Therapy.** Two necessary conditions stand out:

- symmetry is of the essence, meaning the long overdue and full recognition by all of Palestine and Israel as states;
- the conflict cannot be transformed within the narrow confines of today's Israel, but possibly in the context of a long overdue Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East-CSCME under UN auspices, Helsinki type, open to the linkages to the US/UK-Iraq conflict and the Kurdish issue, with full recognition of all states in the region, a Middle East Common Market, arms/oil/water regimes, etc. Neighboring Arab states might consider ceding some territory to a Palestinian state.

The Oslo process falls far short of this:

-peace actors/movements on both sides excluded, Intifadah, Peace Now, not even acknowledged; yet their action was indispensable.

-fundamentalists were excluded, reinserting themselves in the process through acts of violence. Their peace concepts have to be included in any realistic peace process.

-underestimation of polarization inside Palestine and Israel; overestimation of the extent to which the accords are binding.

-lack of symmetry: the agreement is between a state and an "autonomy" lower than for bantustans in apartheid South Africa.

-Palestinian state not defined, how would that state relate to Israel, militarily, politically, economically, culturally?

A process from autonomy to two-states to cooperation?

-excessive governmentalism and excessive institutionalism, no real effort to weave the two civil societies together.

-underestimation of the strength of religion as a code for behavior, like the killing of a prime minister, the Hebron massacre at Purim, and the general fourth stage of jihad.

-underestimation of sacredness of certain points for Jews and Arabs (West Bank, Jerusalem); military/political/economic focus.

-underestimation of the possibility of ecumenical work, between Jews, Muslims and Christians, emphasizing the positive, gentle aspects of the faiths, dialogues with the hard religionists (992)

[8c] ISRAEL-PALESTINE-MIDDLE EAST: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] Diagnosis Unfortunately, the prognosis in the 992 perspective came true in the second intifada of fall 2000, and a diagnosis of the seriously flawed "Oslo process" (from 939, this version was written 978) is at least partly confirmed. The Oslo process did not die fall 2000. It was still-born. The US and Norwegian process managers carry major responsibility for the violence, posing as disinterested third parties, frustrating the Palestinians. Time has come for the UN, EU and Arab states to mediate; possibly easier than it seems. Time is over for a US policy of fragmented reservations for natives, complete with casinos and duty free shopping like for "God-chosen" whites in South Africa. Palestinians have to be treated with respect.

[2] Prognosis. One reason for failure was that they knew the process was flawed and preferred failure to parallel civil wars; in Israel as continuation of the Rabin murder. Both parties know that more parties will have to be involved because an agreement between "moderates" only hides real issues and will spread so as to include "extremists". To sort this out takes time. But there will be talks, and agreements, at some future time. The two peoples are doomed to coexistence, in turn doomed to be peaceful and both peoples have very long time perspectives for the task. Images of possible outcomes, not only processes, are needed.

[3] Therapy. The following images have emerged from dialogues: [a] The only point of departure for peace is UNSC Resolution 242 and return to the June 4 1967 borders with small land exchanges. Israeli "non-lethal" bullets kill, but no longer convince.

[b] If Israel wants peace it is obtainable, but by using peace studies rather than security studies as a useful guide:

- **a basic key to peace is equal rights:**

- Palestinians have the same right to a State as Israelis;
- Palestinians have the same right to Return as Israelis;
- Palestinians have the same right to a Capital in Jerusalem.

- **another basic key to peace is equitable cooperation:**

- joint management of Jerusalem as two confederated capitals;
- joint efforts to control terrorism and state terrorism;
- joint economic ventures based on equal inputs and outputs;
- joint peace education with creative conflict resolution;
- joint peace journalism with conflict resolution focus;
- joint ecumenical focus on peaceful aspects of religions.

- **another basic key to peace is a regional cooperative umbrella:**

- a Middle East Community of Israel/Arab states/Turkey/Kurds;
- with regimes for water equity, arms control, Return;
- with free flow of goods/services, persons and ideas; and

- **another basic key to peace is peacekeeping:**

- international policing of Jerusalem;
- international monitors chosen by both sides for inspection; experiments with joint police, and nonviolent, patrolling.

[c] Recognition of a Palestinian state could be combined with:

- recognition before final agreement on borders;
- Palestinian citizenship for Israelis like vice versa; Israeli canton in Palestine and Palestinian in Israel;

Egypt and Jordan lease adjacent territory to Palestine.

[d] Beyond this two states formula there should be images of a confederation a federation a unitary state for the future.

[e] Sooner or later a **Truth & Reconciliation** process is needed, combining fact-finding, joint textbooks, healing, closure. (00z)

[8d] ISRAEL-PALESTINE-MIDDLE EAST: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

For Israel and Palestine there is no security at the end of this road of violence; only increased violence and insecurity.

Israel is now in the most dangerous period of its history:

increasingly militarist, fighting unwinnable wars, increasingly isolated and with ever more enemies, exposed to violence, non-violence and boycott from within and without with the USA sooner or later making support conditional on concessions. The basic change in South Africa, from inside and outside, comes to mind:

** Israel's moral capital is rapidly depreciating, is probably negative in most countries, slowly also changing in the USA;

** Israel suffers from a de facto military coup, offering the electorate a choice of generals with limited agendas;

** Israeli violence and intransigence mobilize resistance and struggle in the Arab and Muslims worlds, if not in the sense of inter-state warfare then in the postmodern sense of terrorism against Israeli state-terrorism. Highly motivated volunteers willing to enter this struggle are in unlimited supply;

** Sooner or later this will include the 18% Israeli Arabs;

** Sooner or later this may lead to massive nonviolent struggle, like 100,000 Arab women in black marching on Israel;

** Economic boycott of Israeli may come, like for South Africa initiated by NGOs and followed by local authorities and, like South Africa, maybe more important morally than economically;

** Again like for South Africa, US policy may change:

-economically Israel is becoming a liability, given trade/oil problems with Arab countries no longer willing to see the USA as a third party; with imminent boycotts and pressure to disinvest;

-militarily Israel may commit the USA to a highly ambiguous war, and bases are available elsewhere (Turkey, Kosova, Macedonia);

-politically Israel is a liability in the UN; the EU, and NATO allies, may not legitimize violent intervention. USA may prefer a reasonable agreement to supporting a loser (the Shah, Marcos).

Could this peace package be more attractive to reasonable people if the context changes in the way foreseen here?

[1] Palestine is recognized as a state following UNSC Res. 242, 338; with June 4 1967 borders with small land exchanges;

[2] The capital of Palestine is in East Jerusalem;

[3] A Middle East Community with Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria as full members, with water, arms, trade regimes based on multilateral consensus; and an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East with a broader base;

[4] The Community is supported by the EU, Nordic Community and ASEAN financially and for institution-building expertise;

[5] Egypt and Jordan lease additional land to Palestine;

[6] Israel and Palestine become federations with 2 Israeli cantons in Palestine and 2 Palestinian cantons in Israel;

[7] The two neighbor capitals become a city confederation, also host to major regional, UN and ecumenical institutions;

[8] The right of return also to Israel is accepted in principle, numbers to be negotiated within the canton formula;

[9] Israel and Palestine have joint and equitable economic ventures, joint peace education and joint border patrolling;

[10] Massive stationing of UN monitoring forces.

[11] Sooner or later a Truth and Reconciliation process.

Mediating a peace package should not be a country, or a group of countries; but a respected person or group of such persons.(018)

[7] CHILE-PERU-BOLIVIA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[6] NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** What makes this giant formation a conflict formation is not that some people are rich and some poor, that some people's basic needs are met and others are not; but that some people are poor because others are rich and vice versa. This is called exploitation (or inequity, a softer term), and is ubiquitous. It explains neither poverty nor wealth. There are many other factors at work, one being hard work, another greed, but a third factor is certainly inconsideration/exploitation.

This inconsideration is deeply embedded in economism as an ideology explaining economic growth in terms of willingness to take risks under conditions only offered by free markets, hoping for a trickling down effect/distribution, by creating jobs.

Under some conditions this happens, particularly at the top of the global economy. But the externalities (side-effects) are usually negative for the poor and positive for the wealthy, like the lack of challenge accruing to the person digging out raw materials for export, and the deep challenge to the person wrestling with problems of processing raw materials. Challenge, training in working together, pollution and depletion, all those asymmetrically distributed side-effects of economic activity, add up to the asymmetric exchange as the solid base on which the Western superiority is built. As the "science" of economics is its rationale, this is one place where the remedies have to be found: alternative economics; a major intellectual challenge. Many people are working on that. In the meantime the Western economic globalization continues after red and green socialism have been defeated, for the time being, at the expense of ever increasing inequality, all over. The wealth created cannot even insure rich societies against unemployment, misery and crisis.

[2] **Prognosis.** There will be economic growth, meaning average upward change in the world, and in many societies; and there will be ever increasing disparity between rich and poor countries and rich and poor people in most countries as the ideology of economism (neo-liberalism, neo-classicism) gets more firmly rooted in practice. In many parts of the South/Third World this will lead to even more massive misery, violence and migration; in the North it will lead to massive unemployment.

[3] **Therapy.** Given the limits set by nature the material living standard of the richest people is unattainable for most, and may also be undesirable. But a decent livelihood for all is entirely realistic. Some guidelines for that to happen:

- alternative economics, change the focus of economics from growth to meeting the needs of everybody, including the obvious, "internalizing the externalities", considering all side-effects;
- self-reliance I, stimulate production for basic needs locally, particularly in the fields of food, clothing, shelter, health and education, and beyond necessities into normal consumer goods, internalizing challenges, reducing transportation pollution, using resources better, safeguarding sustainability;
- self-reliance II, beyond that develop trade with partners at the same level to prevent patterns of dependency, meaning much South-South trade, and cooperation of all kinds;
- reciprocal development assistance, for the same reason accept development assistance only from partner (countries) willing to accept development assistance in return, including from poor countries that can offer more human and social (as opposed to technical and economic) assistance, building equity.

Much of this will depend on the very uneven capacity of the civil society: the local authorities and the NGOs. (1964, 1978)

[4] CUBA: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** The roots of the conflict are much deeper than the current phase: they are found in Spanish colonialism. From the turn of the century the remnants of the Spanish empire were included in the second wave of US imperialism (Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, Eastern Samoa, the Philippines; the first wave being the conquest of continental USA). In a very real way Castro is a successor to a José Martí fighting a system of bridgehead imperialism, with a tiny, mainly white, upper class delivering goods to an imperial power, together repressing, exploiting and alienating a vast, to a large extent black, lower class. Added to this comes the traumas and destruction of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence. There are excessive expectations when a new imperial power replaces the old, like when the USA replaced Spain, and when the Soviet Union replaced the USA.

The USA entered with its three-stage Manifest Destiny program: first, contiguous USA, then the Western Hemisphere (Monroe Doctrine 1823 keeping others out as a condition), and, much later, the whole world as "globalization".

The Soviet Union entered the conflict as a part of the Cold War logic, adding to the boycott organized by the old imperial power the continuation of Cuban export of the raw (sugar), this time even against the raw (oil) with some other goods thrown in; and encouraged the "dictatorship of the proletariat" by a single party with local committees--CDR--and general surveillance.

The net result is an island country desperately fighting, with an underdeveloped economy, and a narrow band of freedom of expression, to keep the achievements of the revolution (food, clothing, shelter, health and education for all). The white upper class is in the diaspora (Florida); Cuba is mainly black.

[2] **Prognosis.** Stability at this unsatisfactory level. There will be neither collapse, nor improvement, neither take-over from the inside, nor from the outside. One reason for stability is probably the Cuban government's ability to handle these four threats, based on considerable experience by now.

[3] **Therapy,** as usual based on very many dialogues from the top to the bottom, inside and outside Cuba:

- an ever higher level of Cuban economic self-reliance, a shame that an island that resource rich, with excellent literacy and higher education institutions, has not become more capable of growing all its own food, and creating small scale industries for the basic means of production, distribution and consumption. There is still an inability to transcend the old pattern of getting all in return for sugar instead of processing the cane in 100 directions. The present situation calls for a maximum of alternative energy conversion, and land and fish farming.

- an ever higher level of participatory democracy, including, like for the USA, a two-party system. Cuba would only gain from getting countless debates out of private space and into public space, by having, for instance, two socialist parties. The creativity of the population has to find its legitimate expression, inner party discussions are always insufficient. But a white regime and white opposition may not survive democracy in a country with an overwhelmingly black majority.

- an ever higher level of individuals, organizations, countries counteracting the USA/OAS boycott. High time to scrap it.

- an ever higher level of admiration for a regime that insists on basic needs satisfaction as a key part of basic rights. High time for the world to recognize the significance of this position in spite of other human rights shortcomings. (734)

[3] **COMMUNITY RACE RELATIONS: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE**

[1] **Diagnosis.** Under this general heading a research project was carried out in Charlottesville VA, USA 1958-1960. The research project was a multi-wave panel study of elites in the city, and the major organizations of the segregationists (White Citizens' Councils), of the desegregationists (Human Relations Councils) and of the blacks (NAACP). In addition a two-wave survey was made of the attitudes of a random sample of the population of the county; more material than anywhere else.

The population was nervous. A KKK cross had been burned. There was a violent meta-conflict in the air superimposed on the root conflict over equal, not separate, citizenship for black and white, according to the Supreme Court Decision 17 May 1954. The conflict was actually trilateral, not bilateral. The two white groups differed not only in terms of their stand on the issue (with schools being symbolic of the rest of public space: theaters, toilets, hotels, anything). They had very different relations to the community, enacting the roles of "locals" and "cosmopolitans". The segregationists had deep roots and were more inward-looking; the desegregationists (or, in some cases, even integrationists as they practiced the value of togetherness in their private lives) were migrants, often academic, and outward-looking. They legitimized their positions in obvious ways: "only those who have roots here are entitled to an opinion" said one, "the nation/the world outside moves on; you are left behind" said the other. But all of this was verbal and a question of community power. There was no urge anywhere for violence as language or conflict mechanism. But the three parties almost never met. There was no transparency.

[2] **Prognosis.** With frustration and hatred building up between white segregationists and the black community, the expectation of violence was almost automatic, leading to a growing search among some whites for self-defense, and maybe also for pre-emptive violence. The expectation could develop into a self-fulfilling prophecy, and even more so because of the polarized map of outcomes. With only two possibilities in people's minds: public schools segregated (status quo) vs. public schools desegregated a self-reinforcing dualism arose.

[3] **Therapy.** Three approaches were suggested:

- to make the situation transparent to the participants, in the media and in meetings, explaining their positions, taking all of them equally seriously, how they had gotten stuck; but at the same time pointing out that even if there was fear of violence there was no urge for violence anywhere. On the other hand, the mechanisms of self-fulfilling prophecies had to be explained, particularly how exaggerated perceptions could lead to violence.
- these talks included elementary conflict talk, like defining conflict in terms of incompatible goals, not as violence, about how polarization was linked to seeing two outcomes only, how that would play into the hands of the extremists and exacerbate the conflict, the importance of finding something acceptable to both, that outside parties sometimes might see outcomes hidden to the parties to the conflict. This was done in cooperation with capable local journalists to promote conflict literacy;
- one third alternative might be private schools with the advantages (free choice, finding a solution for white extremists) and disadvantages (considerable costs, segregation of private space) of that outcome.

The net result was de-escalation, an opening for other positions, and, indeed, desegregation.

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[2a] EAST-WEST CONFLICT, COLD WAR I: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** The core of this conflict is the inter-state class conflict against the rich, dominant, North-Western corner of Europe, and of the world, the "First world"; coupled to the intra-state class conflicts of workers against upper and middle classes; and of the world colored against the white. In this family of populist uprisings we might count the fascism of Southern Europe; the nazism of Central Europe; the communism of Eastern Europe/Soviet Union, and the decolonization struggles. The Second World War was used to beat nazism and fascism, neo-colonialism was used to beat decolonization, and the Cold War to beat the absurd Soviet Union, which ultimately imploded. In this struggle between Northwestern Europe and the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe the Northwest presented the conflict as between democracy/market and dictatorship/plan, not as world and social class conflict; reducing complexity to a conflict of two parties over one issue. On top of this a potentially devastating meta-conflict over the threat and use of nuclear arms monopolized the attention at the expense of Eastern Europe and ideal society.

[2] **Prognosis.** The prognosis was war, but not in the East-West core arena in Europe, with the possible exception of using the two Berlins/Germanies as battle-field (hence the vast German peace and dissident movements). Displaced wars over Third World territory and allegiance were more likely; Korea and Viêt Nam, and the near-war over Cuba, being examples. Escalation into the core area, nuclear war and mutual genocide were not impossible. But there was also another prognosis: the collapse of the Soviet Union as an absurd society with an intolerable disjunction between myth and reality, and that was what eventually happened.

[3] **Therapy.** Remedies proposed during the Cold War included

- for conflict transformation, a permanent organization for dialogue and implementation under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva: a Security Commission for Europe, using as a model the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).¹
- for the arms race/war threat: GRIT² and defensive defense,³ based on conventional, para-, and non-military components.
- People's Diplomacy, also between peace and dissident movements.

(1967, 1984)

¹ See Johan Galtung: "Regional Security Commissions: A Proposal", chapter 6 in Johan Galtung and Sverre Lodgaard, eds., Co-operation in Europe, Oslo: Norwegian Universities Press, 1970; pp.73-83, particularly pp. 77-80. The proposal (p. 77) is "a United Nations' system of regional security commissions, standing in the same relation to the Security Council of the UN (UN Charter, Chapter 8, Articles 52, 53 and 54) as the regional economic commissions (ECE in Geneva for Europe, ECLA in Santiago de Chile for Latin America, ECA in Addis Ababa for Africa and ECAFE in Bangkok for Asia) have to ECOSOC, the Economic and Social Council. Thus, we are suggesting an SCE, SCLA, SCA and SCAFE". (p. 77, SCAFE would today be SCAP, "Asia-Pacific").

² Gradual Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction, by Charles Osgood, in An Alternative to War and Surrender, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1967; possibly the most important idea coming out of US peace studies during the Cold War.

³ See Johan Galtung, There Are Alternatives, Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984, in eight languages, particularly chapter 5.

[2b] EAST-WEST CONFLICT, COLD WAR II: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** As mentioned in connection with Cold War I there is a deeper agenda, rooted in the 19th century, now brought into the 21st century by the double expansion of NATO eastward (so far with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) and AMPO, the Japan-USA security system, westward. Seen from the center of the world Northwest, the USA, the "Eurasian Continent", is the source of geopolitical evil. Latin America is an easily controlled backyard, Africa is insignificant; but Eurasia is the seat of populism, war and terrorism, of billions of colored people, of other faiths and fundamentalism. West Asia/the Middle East; South Asia with the two new nuclear powers, Central Asia with oil (and US bridge-heads), Southeast Asia with until recently booming economies are all key parts of the concept. And so are, indeed, Russia (with Ukraina and Belarus) and China, not to mention the problematic Eurasian peripheries, Korea and the Balkans. "A global nation with global interests" has its reasons for bringing the alliance systems up to the basic fault-lines: between Catholic/Protestant and Slavic-Orthodox Europe, and between Japan and the rest of Asia. A purely defensive Japan would signal non-threat. But deep cooperation with the most mobile military power in the world signals the opposite. What matters is the bond to offensive capability, not the defensive posture of the Japanese forces. The double expansion, establishing "anchors" on either end of Eurasia, adding the USA-Turkey-Israel alliance, is a logical follow-up of the US JCS 570/2 directive under Roosevelt, the "Base Bible". A glance at the map informs us that the double anchor expansion is, or can be perceived, as a pincer movement.

[2] **Prognosis.** There will be a **reactio** of (about) the same size and opposite direction. Russia and China will settle grievances (like over the Ussuri), share military information, building a de facto alliance. China will reinforce agreements with Pakistan and Russia with India; (Kashmir may be settled in the wake of all that). Russia will pick up what the USA defines as pariah states, Serbia, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran, N. Korea and support them, also in the UN. The whole continent may cohere against the USA-NATO-AMPO complex. A minor incident along the highly problematic Poland/Ukraine border or the North and South Korea/Japan complex may easily set in motion large geotectonic aggregates, or at least be grossly magnified geopolitically.

[3] **Therapy.** It is difficult to imagine any therapies short of "stop it, reverse the decision, promote super-regional, UN, world security, instead". The solution is not to invite Russia into first class NATO membership since that would trigger an East Asia Security Community along a White-Yellow faultline. Nor should China join AMPO, for the same reason. Regional solutions would have to bridge fault-lines, not reinforce them. And that pushes the only viable solution in the direction of world disarmament and UN peace-making/keeping/building capability with soft military means: Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz, defensive rather than offensive, nonviolent rather than violent, with confidence-building, disengagement zones, systematic use of conflict transformation dialogues for local, regional and global conflicts, like this conflict formation.

The United Nations, with its universal membership, would have to be the key carrier of such initiatives, the problem being that the key actor, the USA, can block any significant action with a veto. That confrontation may ultimately lead to another double movement: "the UN out of the US, the US out of the UN". (968)

[1] PEACE SERVICE: A PEACE & CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

[1] **Diagnosis.** Obligatory military service, proposed by Machiavelli in 1505, was first introduced by France (1793) as the other side of the rights of the citizen: the duty to give their life when called upon by the state to do so. A logical consequence of the military approach to conflict, deeply ingrained in the European tradition, conscription was also a consequence of increasing democratization (participation of the demos); for males. Conscription raises a number of questions:

- is there such a thing as a "military solution" to a conflict?
- is there an alternative for those who for any reason say "no"? - could that alternative be a peace, or development, service?
- what would be the precise content of that service?
- how about the female part of the population?

The answer to the first question conditions the answer to the other four, reflecting the bellicist/pacifist divide:

Bellicist: there is no alternative. If CO status is accepted, not more attractive than the military service, with risks; they then divide over whether women should be given combat roles;

Pacifist: an alternative is a human right, there should be a peace/development service also open to others, including women.

The state monopoly on violence makes the state not only the organizer of military power, but also of the force to execute (as deserters), persecute, imprison, those who refuse military service, or to grant them the right to an alternative. Thus, the whole issue becomes a state-citizen issue from a formal point of view, and an issue opening for new ways of energizing peace processes all over from an evolutionary point of view.

[2] **Prognosis.** The prognosis is positive because of the absurdity in denying young people who want to serve peace the right to do so (absurdity: a deep disjunction between avowed goals and reality).

In some countries this may essentially be a question of a sufficient number of conscientious objectors, not only formulating an alternative with general appeal, but backing that approach with a civil

disobedience enacting the alternative [3] **Therapy.** From the late 50s/early 60s, a "peace corps", but not in the name only, combining four aspects, is relevant:⁴

- development service for the most needy in the world community;
- making that service reciprocal, not only from rich to poor countries, having a flow of human and social development services in return for technical services;
- using the service also as a conflict resolution corps of people, young and old, men and women, moving with integrity into conflict arenas, offering their good services as witnesses, facilitators of conflict resolution and reconciliation, social networking and empowerment for peace, peace zones, etc.;
- internationalizing the corps (like United Nations Volunteers), also to avoid using it as propaganda for one country only;
- keeping the service open, for young and old, men and women.

This would not only solve the problem of wasting time for COs and their increasing polarization and marginalization from government, but also mobilize people for alternative, nonviolent service for peace as a human right. (1959, 1964)

⁴ See Johan Galtung, Norske Fredsinitiativ: 20 Forslag, Oslo: Pax, 1964, 47pp; Norwegian Peace Initiatives: 20 Proposals and the earlier Forsvar uten militærvesen, Oslo 1959 (Defense Without the Military), and Norwegian Peace Corps proposals.

